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Thesis Abstract 
The ability to update one’s goal in a changing environment and adapt 
actions accordingly is often thought to reflect cognitive flexibility. Early 
childhood, from 3 to 6 years of age, is witness to a large improvement in this 
ability. In real life, environmental changes can be incredibly dynamic and fast, 
thus flexible behaviours need to happen in a timely manner. Moreover, attention 
operates in a multisensory environment so switching between tasks is often 
carried out cross-modally (e.g. stop doing the colouring exercise and put the 
story books away when being told to). Developmental studies with young 
children have generally focused on specific aspects of how the switch is 
initiated, if at all, in a unimodal, highly controlled framework. This approach may 
miss out aspects of task switching important for understanding cognitive 
flexibility in a wider context that relates better to real-world dynamics.  Thus, the 
current thesis investigates young children’s task switching abilities in a 
temporally-driven and multisensory context. 
My thesis combines two approaches: (1) behavioural experiments with 
children and adults, and (2) computational modelling. Three behavioural 
experiments were carried out with 4-year-olds, 6-year-olds and adults. These 
experiments were unimodal task-switching (UTS), cross-modal task-switching 
with bimodal stimuli (bimodal CMTS) and cross-modal task-switching with 
unimodal stimuli (unimodal CMTS) respectively. In the cross-modal 
experiments, not only did the participants have to switch between tasks, but the 
stimuli associated with the tasks could be either visual or auditory. Past 
research has suggested that young children can exhibit cross-modal attention 
effects different from those observed in adults (e.g. modality dominance). 
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However, it remains unclear how the developmental differences in cross-modal 
attention manifest in a highly task-oriented context. The task-switching 
procedures in these experiments draw heavily from established adult task-
switching paradigms. 
The computational models followed the principles of Interactive 
Activation as described in Gilbert and Shallice (2002). These are connectionist 
networks with units and connections between the units. The models were used 
to understand the behavioural results in the bimodal CMTS experiment. A 
series of computational models are used to understand what factors affect 
performance on different trial types, how task representations and responses 
can be triggered proactively and reactively, and how variations in performance 
can be modelled using a population modelling approach.  
The thesis combines the current understanding of the development of 
cognitive control with the literature on information processes in task-switching. 
Finally, the thesis proposes answers to questions such as what 
behaviours/measures are reflective of the development of cognitive function or 
constraints, of information processes associated with specific tasks, and of the 
inter-individual differences present at different ages.  
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Chapter 1. What can flexible behaviours tell us about 
the development of cognitive control? 
It is now well established that cognitive control and brain development 
undergoes a protracted development from early years well into adulthood 
(Amso & Scerif, 2015; Best & Miller, 2010; Fair et al., 2009; Giedd et al., 1999; 
Johnson, 2001, 2011; Rice & Barone, 2000). Within this timescale, children 
from 3 to 6 years of age bear witness to dramatic improvements in their 
cognitive control, as they start to show the ability to adhere to instructions and 
regulate their behaviours appropriately. Indeed, the development of cognitive 
control during early childhood has been main focus of much developmental 
research (Bull, Espy, Wiebe, Sheffield, & Nelson, 2011; Carlson, 2005; 
Diamond, Carlson, & Beck, 2005; Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994; Wiebe, 
Espy, & Charak, 2008; Zelazo, 2006). The development of cognitive control is 
perhaps best manifested in situations where cognitive flexibility is required.  
Although relatively poorly defined, cognitive flexibility broadly refers to the ability 
to update mindsets adaptively to the changing environment, often in the face of 
interference, and to carry out appropriate goal-directed actions (Freier, Cooper, 
& Mareschal, 2017). Many studies have documented a large improvement in 
cognitive flexibility during early childhood (e.g. Carlson, 2005; Cepeda, Kramer, 
& Gonzalez de Sather, 2001; Cragg & Nation, 2009; Zelazo, Müller, Frye, & 
Marcovitch, 2003).  
One popular way to assess cognitive flexibility during early childhood is 
to study how children switch from one task to a different cognitive task (e.g., 
Fisher, 2011; Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003; Kloo & Perner, 2005; Zelazo, 
2006); although different in methodological detail, research on cognitive 
 21 
flexibility in adults has also employed procedures that require switching 
between different cognitive tasks. Although both developmental studies and 
adult studies may at first appear similar in their common interest in cognitive 
flexibility, there are important differences in the experimental paradigms used 
with young children and those used with adults, making it difficult to map out the 
developmental changes in attention control across lifespan. Importantly, 
developmental research has generally focused on how children initiate a switch 
in behaviour, whereas adult studies have focused on how adults manage 
dynamic changes in the task environment.  
Laboratory experiments with young children often utilise tasks similar to 
each other with a limited range of stimuli (the colour-shape tasks being the most 
common of all). Focusing on behaviours with a limited range of tasks may 
potentially underestimate young children’s ability to change their goal-directed 
behaviours adaptively. In this thesis, I will argue that cognitive flexibility should 
be examined with different types of tasks, and in situations where environmental 
changes are frequent and fast. The logic is simple: if cognitive flexibility is a 
general skill associated with the child’s overall development, then it should be 
examined with different types of tasks, different types of stimuli, different task 
instructions and different temporal dynamics. In addition to arguing for the 
importance of the diversity of task context, in this thesis, I will also argue that 
cognitive flexibility should be examined in a multisensory environment.  
My research combines convergent approaches; namely, behavioural 
studies and computational models. While the behavioural findings from past and 
present studies have allowed me to theorise about how developmental 
differences in performance may occur, and what associated information 
processes may underlie the performance differences observed in children and 
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adults, computational models allow me to explicitly test the relevance of 
different parameters associated with the theories, and in the process, to 
generate new prediction relevant to behavioural experiments.  
In this introduction, I will discuss the similarities and differences of the 
premises underlying theories of cognitive flexibility in children and adults, as 
well as in the paradigms used in either developmental and adult studies of 
cognitive flexibility, before suggesting that bridging between the two domains is 
necessary in order to appreciate the more nuanced aspects of the development 
of cognitive control. I will also discuss the importance of understanding cognitive 
flexibility in a multisensory setting, and of understanding different forms of 
attentional shifts—those occurring between tasks and those occurring between 
modalities. Finally, I will talk about the importance of grounding control 
mechanisms within contexts, and about the benefits of computational models 
for understanding developmental, task-specific, and modality-specific effects in 
cross-modal task-switching studies. 
1.1 Are flexible behaviours underpinned by continuous 
development? 
Three-year-olds often have difficulties in flexibly shifting between 
different mental representations, and this ability improves between 4 to 5 years 
of age (Carlson, 2005; Zelazo, 2006; Zelazo & Frye, 1998). In particular, 
younger children are more likely to exhibit perseverative behaviours, since they 
often appear to stick to the previous task rule even when the situation has 
changed. The observation of perseverative errors is often taken as evidence of 
poorer flexibility in young children. A canonical paradigm that investigates 
preschool children’s cognitive flexibility is Dimensional Card Change Sorting 
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task (DCCS1), first proposed by Zelazo (Zelazo, 2006; Zelazo & Frye, 1998). 
The original task involves verbally asking children to sort a deck of cards that 
contain multidimensional information (e.g. ‘red truck’ and ‘blue rabbit’) with one 
dimension in the pre-switch phase (e.g. colour), and another dimension (e.g. 
shape) in the post-switch phase. While most children are able to sort the cards 
correctly in the pre-switch phase, three-year-olds have a substantial difficulty in 
sorting the cards correctly in the post-switch phase. In contrast, most 4-year-
olds are able to sort the cards correctly in the post-switch phase.  
The DCCS is challenging on many levels: from limited practice 
opportunities, lack of foreknowledge about the experimental procedure, 
counterintuitive task changes, reliance on verbal instruction, lack of feedbacks, 
to high level of interferences between task sets. Thus, subsequent studies that 
have attempted either to reduce the level of task set interferences or to 
encourage children to engage in the alternative dimension, have been largely 
successful in improving the pass rates in young children (Hanania, 2010; 
Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003; Kloo & Perner, 2005). What remains 
unclear is which of these factors (that facilitate/hinder task performance) are 
directly related to cognitive flexibility. 
Perhaps the most striking finding with the DCCS task is not so much the 
absolute level of performance of 3-year-olds, but the dissociation between the 
children’s correct verbal response to task rules when being queried, and the 
incorrect sorting actions during the post-switch phase. Young children typically 
                                            
1  Glossary of terminology throughout this thesis can be found in 
Appendix A 
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can recall the correct task rule when being verbally queried, and thus it is 
generally assumed that the children know what they are expected to do, but 
nonetheless fail to do so. The dissociation between thought and action is often 
taken as a lack of wilful control, and not a lack of awareness of the appropriate 
task rules.  Equipped with this observation, researchers have generally 
explained the poor performance in young children by appealing to a unitary 
account such as an inhibitory deficit to direct attention away from an initial 
representation formed during the pre-switch phase (Kirkham & Diamond, 2003), 
an inability to construct task rules in a hierarchically complex manner (Zelazo & 
Frye, 1998), or an inability to actively maintain current goals or other 
weaknesses in representations (e.g. Chevalier & Blaye, 2008; Kharitonova & 
Munakata, 2011; Munakata, 2001).  
Although the response to a verbal query and the sorting behaviour both 
appear to be associated with the same task context, and any adult may easily 
relate both to the same task context, the two events may not necessarily have 
the same meaning to children, and thus essentially constitute different tasks 
that required different cognitive operations (Munakata & Yerys, 2001). It is also 
possible that young children with limited verbal skills may not see the 
significance in translating the verbal instruction into a change in action, 
particularly when they are already motivated to do whatever they have been 
successfully doing so far (i.e. sorting cards by the first dimension).  
Without ensuring that children of different ages have the same 
understanding of the task instructions and task demands (at least to some 
degree), it is difficult to know how cognitive flexibility develops. Many 
developmental studies appear to favour the pass/fail measure of cognitive 
flexibility with counterintuitive tasks similar to DCCS (e.g., the Day/Night task, in 
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which the participants have to say ‘Night’ or ‘Day’ when presented with a 
counterintuitive image of a sun or a moon respectively; see Carlson, 2005, for a 
complete review). Because these tasks all have pass/fail outcomes, they can 
lead to a relatively restricted all-or-none perception of cognitive flexibility. This 
restricted approach to the study of cognitive flexibility may be due in part to the 
fact that developmental studies are often motivated to find the largest 
measureable difference between age groups, at least at the beginning of the 
research. In addition to this latent motivation, with very young children, there is 
often a challenge in envisioning an age-appropriate yet suitably complex task 
that permits the investigation of cognitive flexibility. These factors often result in 
experimental paradigms that have a limited range of ages to which the 
paradigms are applicable, since children in one age group often perform poorly 
and the children in another age group are at ceiling levels of performance.  
Dichotomous pass/fail measures may be useful to understand the 
starting point of flexible behaviour, but can be an insensitive measure of the 
continuous development of cognitive flexibility. Development occurs across 
time, with important sensitive periods and maturation timescales within and 
between different brain regions (Amso & Scerif, 2015; Giedd et al., 1999; 
Lenroot & Giedd, 2006; Paus et al., 1999). Interactions between the various 
processing pathways, with differing degrees of maturation, should give rise to 
subtle and continuous behavioural/physiological differences that are beyond 
what simple dichotomous measures can detect. By focusing only on what 
children can or cannot do, there is a danger of missing out on a great 
opportunity for understanding how development affects each stage of 
information processes, from goal setting, formulating internal models of task 
sets, encoding task-associated information, interference between task sets, 
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internal interference from attentional biases or inattentiveness, to planned and 
unplanned actions. Since posterior brain regions responsible for lower-level 
information processes and anterior frontal control centres are both under major 
architectural change across development, cognitive flexibility in children is likely 
to lie somewhere in between a domain-general and a task-specific ability (Deák 
& Wiseheart, 2015).  
In sum, young children’s ability to flexibly adapt their behaviours to 
environmental changes may have been underestimated by the existing studies 
that rely on dichotomous measures. If so, then a key question remains 
unanswered; namely, how do developmental changes in cognitive control relate 
to changes in generalizable and/or specific flexible behaviours? In the next 
section I will review some theoretical accounts of cognitive flexibility and what 
they mean to flexible behaviours when considering cognitive flexibility from an 
information-processing standpoint. 
1.2 What abilities underlie cognitive flexibility? 
Different developmental researchers view ‘cognitive flexibility’ differently. 
The definition of cognitive flexibility is elusive since different experiments focus 
on different aspects of the cognitive operations required for that specific task. 
That said, cognitive flexibility is likely to be greater than the sum of experimental 
findings! One example of the inconsistent views of cognitive flexibility is that 
cognitive flexibility is often defined conceptually in the introduction of a journal 
article, and then defined operationally in the discussion sections. At the 
conceptual level, cognitive flexibility is often defined as the ability to 
simultaneously hold goal representations online, resolve conflicting information, 
and shift attention and respond appropriately to environmental changes (e.g. 
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Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006; Diamond, Carlson, & Beck, 
2005; Zelazo et al., 2003), thus encompassing multiple cognitive operations. 
However, the specificity of these core cognitive operations remain largely 
elusive (Cragg & Chevalier, 2012) . 
In comparison, operationally, cognitive flexibility in developmental 
research is often defined with a specific theoretical account relevant for a 
specific experimental result only. The tendency to propose a restricted 
theoretical account for a complex behaviour reflects the methodological 
constraints of behavioural studies, since only a limited number of independent 
variables can be tested at one time in an experimental setting. Thus, it is not 
always clear how these precise theoretical accounts relate to the multi-faceted 
definition of cognitive flexibility at the conceptual level. Below I will give an 
overview of what some of the theoretical accounts are, and how it may be 
possible to approach cognitive flexibility more liberally, by moving beyond 
adopting a specific theoretical account of flexible behaviour. 
(1) Cognitive flexibility may be about the ability to construct complex task 
rules. Zelazo’s Cognitive Complexity Control Theory (Zelazo et al., 
2003) posits that young children fail on the DCCS task because they 
are unable to form a complex, hierarchical ‘if-if-then’-like rule structure. 
However, other studies that required a similar task structure have 
shown that 3-year-olds are able to switch their responses on tasks 
that require a similar hierarchical task rule, if the need to redescribe 
the same object is removed (Kloo & Perner, 2005; Perner & Lang, 
2002). Kloo and Perner (2005) argued that young children may simply 
be unaware that one object can be two distinct things at the same 
time (e.g. a red object and a truck), and that this lack of awareness 
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prevents them from forming an appropriate task set. Crucially, 
whether an appropriate task representation is formed or not may not 
necessarily implicate the development of domain-general cognitive 
control, but may have more to do with learning about different 
possible concepts. If anything, DCCS tasks highlight the possibility 
that young children may form task representations differently from 
older participants under some situations, due to their limited 
experience with the task attributes and task structures. 
(2) Cognitive flexibility may be about the ability to actively maintain 
information. Some authors have argued that a major source of 
performance error in children comes from their difficulty in actively 
maintaining the relevant goal state (Blaye & Chevalier, 2011; 
Chevalier & Blaye, 2008; Freier et al., 2017; Marcovitch, Boseovski, & 
Knapp, 2007). According to this view, external factors that assist 
children in maintaining goal states should facilitate performance. One 
way to facilitate goal representation is through transparent task cues, 
which has been shown to be particularly effective in improving 
performance in 4-year-olds (Blaye & Chevalier, 2011). Furthermore, it 
was found that young children sometimes fail to switch responses not 
necessarily because they perseverate with the previous task rule, but 
because they fail to activate the current task rule (Chevalier & Blaye, 
2008; Marcovitch et al., 2007). Similarly focusing on representations, 
Munakata (Morton & Munakata, 2002; Munakata, 2001) argued that 
representations at different levels of processing are graded rather 
than all-or-none. When young children pass in one task but fail on 
another task that taps into the same kind of knowledge (e.g. 
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colour/shape), the underlying cause may be the difference in the 
requirement of how strongly these representations need to be 
activated to succeed on these two tasks. To support the graded 
representation account, Blackwell, Cepeda and Munakata (2009) 
found that 4- to 5-year-olds who were quicker in responding to simple 
no conflict task-rule queries were also better at switching between 
tasks with multivalent stimuli than those who were slow at answering 
simple questions. This was true even after controlling for simple 
processing speed, indicating that the ability to actively represent rule 
may underlie the differences between switcher and non-switchers. 
(3) Cognitive flexibility may be about the ability to resolve information 
interference. Most developmental studies of cognitive flexibility 
involve task sets that have overlapping task attributes, either in the 
stimulus set, the response set, or both. Thus, one defining feature of 
cognitive flexibility, at least in the laboratory tests, is the ability to 
resolve interference.  
Trial-to-trial and task-to-task interferences can exist at different 
levels of processing, and different ages may be more or less affected 
by the types of interference. Several studies have suggested that 
children aged between 5 and 7 years experienced a greater level of 
stimulus-based interference than older children and adults, but not 
necessarily response-based interferences (Cragg, 2016; Cragg & 
Nation, 2009). The general procedure in those studies involved 
independently varying the degree of dimensional overlaps among the 
stimuli (e.g. univalent colour-only stimulus vs. bivalent integrated 
coloured shape) for stimulus-based interference and varying how 
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many stimuli are mapped onto the same response for response-
based interference. The interference in this context should be classed 
as representational incongruency, since the interference arises from 
how task sets were defined the first place. Thus, children’s inflexible 
behaviours may be due to the lack of ability in overcoming 
representational interferences between stimulus attributes associated 
with the task goals. 
(4) Cognitive flexibility may be about inhibitory control on prepotent 
responses. Children’s difficulty with flexible behaviours may arise 
because they are unable to stop themselves from making a response, 
even when they know what the relevant task attribute is. In a series of 
spatial-compatibility studies using speeded tasks with children aged 4 
to 13 years old and adults, Davidson et al. (2006) found that young 
children’s performance was particularly affected by spatial 
incompatibility between the location of the stimulus and the response 
(this is also known as the Simon Effect), indicating  difficulty in 
suppressing prepotent responses caused by spatial compatibility. In 
another study, Ling, Wong, & Diamond (2016) examined whether 
young children’s difficulty in the Day/Night task (i.e. saying Day when 
seeing a picture of a moon) was due to response prepotency or weak 
task representation. They found that if there was an imposed delay 
between the stimulus and the response stages, such as the use of 
task-unassociated ‘ditty song’, children’s performance on Day/Night 
task improved. This result suggests that young children may have a 
particular difficulty in inhibiting a prepotent response, particularly if the 
response can be strongly triggered by external cues, and that the 
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ability to inhibit a response appears to be independent to the control 
component of task representation (e.g. Diamond & Kirkham, 2005). 
Although inhibition of a prepotent response may be important in some 
situations, not all tasks necessarily elicit strong habitual responses. 
Thus, it is unclear what role inhibitory control plays in tasks where 
responses are less habitual in nature. 
(5) Cognitive flexibility may be about the ability to update task 
approaches and monitor performance adaptively. This ability cannot 
be measured at a single specific time point in the task, such as the 
point of switch, but rather, should be examined through the 
continuous changes in behaviours. In this view, flexibility is defined as 
the ability to take in new information and dynamically revise task 
approaches (i.e. plans and actions). This means that even when the 
behaviour initially appears inflexible, through continuous revision of 
internal representations and planned actions, adaptive flexible 
behaviours can emerge later on. There are reasons to believe that 
young children’s ability to change their behaviour within a task context 
may be better than what the standard laboratory tests suggest. For 
example, Kloo and Perner (2003) found that false-belief training 
improved performance on the DCCS task, and that DCCS training 
also improved performance on false-belief tasks in 3- and 4-year-olds. 
Both false belief and DCCS tasks required the participants to view the 
same object from an alternative perspective. Their result shows that 
once children are encouraged to view the same object differently in 
the first task, they are able to apply a similar approach to a different 
task. Importantly, this training effect is not to do with the development 
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of control itself, but to do with the understanding and exploration of 
different approaches in a given task context. 
 
In all likelihood cognitive flexibility is closely associated with most if not 
all of the above abilities, and modulated by task-specific demands and structural 
variables such as cueing, feedback, probabilities of switches, task attributes, 
task conflicts, and so on. Although the picture outlined here may seem 
overwhelmingly complex, when broken down, each ability may only matter to 
different stages or aspects of information processing. For example, to undertake 
a task, one must form a task representation within a specific context, and exhibit 
the ability to form an appropriate rule structure (Point 1). The person then needs 
to employ some form of control to maintain this task representation throughout 
the duration of the trial (Point 2). To be able to carry out actions purposefully, 
one must be able to select what information is relevant to the current goal, and 
filter out the irrelevant and interfering information (Point 3). Once a change of 
goal is recognised, the person must be able to adjust their response plan 
according to the new task rule. This new response plan may only be weakly 
represented in the face of strongly triggered habitual response. Thus, the 
person needs to overcome the urge to respond too quickly through mechanisms 
such as inhibitory control (Point 4). And finally, the person may monitor their 
current state in the overall task context and form an internal representation of 
the task events, and consciously or unconsciously update task strategies that 
alter the performance in future tasks (Point 5).  
When multiple information processes are in operation, and when each 
process is dependent on different abilities and experimental factors, any 
observed behaviour may not be easily attributable to a single cause. For 
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example, any developmental differences in active task representation may be 
masked by the response prepotency if the context strongly triggers a habitual 
response. Similarly, any developmental difference in conflict resolution may be 
masked by the differences in structural representations of the task set (i.e. when 
the participant failed to know what the current task goal is). Thus, our 
understanding of cognitive flexibility may need to move beyond a single factor, 
and importantly, beyond the sole measure of accuracy. Thus, in this thesis, I will 
argue that cognitive flexibility may be better investigated by placing greater 
emphasis on understanding the information processes that take place within the 
task context, within an individual, and within the developmental constraints (for 
a similar perspective, see Deák & Wiseheart, 2015).  
 In the next section I will be describing task-switching studies of adults 
that focus on the information processing underlying flexible rule switches, and 
look for both conceptual and procedural overlaps between adult and 
developmental studies of cognitive flexibility. These overlaps will provide the 
framework for how cognitive flexibility is viewed and investigated in the current 
thesis.  
1.3 The adult task-switching paradigm 
Task-switching is a canonical paradigm for investigating the control 
processes in flexible goal-oriented behaviours in adults (see Monsell, 2003). In 
this paradigm, participants are required to switch between two—or sometimes 
three—different tasks. However, unlike in the developmental studies where 
tasks often switch only once or at most a few times, the adult task-switching 
paradigm involves frequent alternations between different task sets (e.g. 
AABBAA…, where bold letters are task-switch trials). In addition, adult task-
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switching studies have focused on RT changes as high accuracy is a desirable 
criterion within the studies. The experiments have often involved a practice part 
to ensure that the participants are familiar enough with the stimuli and the 
associated task rules (e.g. (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; 
Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001). Therefore, the main research interest in 
adult studies lies within the cognitive processes that underlie multi-tasking 
(within a context but not at the same time) and task-switching, within the 
existing cognitive control systems. Both control mechanisms and information 
processes within the task have been subjected to intense scrutiny (for a 
comprehensive review, see Kiesel et al., 2010). A task set in a task-switching 
experiment is generally defined with multiple components—a task goal (e.g. 
colour task), a task cue, and a set of governing rules relevant to the task goal 
(e.g. stimulus-response mappings). The studies using this task-switching 
procedure generally measure the performance differences between task-
repetition trials and task-switch trials within the same task context. Reaction 
times and to a lesser degree, errors, are larger on the switch trials than on 
repetition trials. This cost is termed local switch cost, since it represents 
transient differences between the successive trials. 
The task-switching paradigm also allows for the comparison between 
different task contexts—such as a pure ‘single-task’ block, and a mixed ‘multi-
task’ block. The mixed task block involves both task-repetition and task-switch 
trials, as previously described; in contrast, the pure task block involves only one 
task, thus no rule switch is involved. The comparison between the pure task and 
mixed task block yields another type of performance cost—global mixing cost—
manifested by a longer RT and lower accuracy on the repetition trials in the 
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mixed task block, than on trials in the pure block, despite the absence of rule 
change on either trial types.  
These two most-investigated between-condition costs are discussed 
below with their respective plausible mechanisms. 
1.3.1 Between-condition effects 
RT switch cost is often seen as the time needed for the additional 
cognitive operations in task reconfiguration on switch trials, compared to 
repetition trials, and is thought to implicate cognitive controls (Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). Support for the need of endogenous control in switching task 
comes from studies that modulate the effectiveness of task preparation, such as 
preparation window (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995), anticipation of task changes 
(Monsell & Mizon, 2006), and task cue transparency (Koch, 2003; Logan & 
Bundesen, 2003; Logan & Schneider, 2006b). While many agree that switching 
to an alternative task requires endogenous control, it is still unclear whether 
switching to another task requires additional cognitive control processes, 
compared to repetition trials.  
A task set generally consists of a task representation that refers to a goal 
or an intent (e.g. colour task), and the constituents that make up the task rules 
to achieve the goal (e.g. stimulus-response associations). Since a task set is 
composed of multiple components, task preparation is also theorised to be a 
multi-stage operation. It is generally thought that the first stage involves 
updating the goal representation and the second stage involves retrieval of the 
associated task rules (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Monsell & Driver, 2000; Rubinstein 
et al., 2001). While the first stage of intentional update is carried out during the 
preparation window, the second stage of preparation may be completed 
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exogenously only upon seeing the stimulus, which prompts the retrieval of 
specific S-R mappings.  
Although switching tasks is likely to implicate cognitive control, it is 
generally agreed that there are multiple components contributing to the overall 
switch cost, some of which are more of a by-product of the information 
processes, such as information interference, rather than cognitive control itself. 
In task-switching studies, representational overlaps are often inherent in the 
stimulus and response sets. Thus when the task changes, there can be 
lingering interference from the previous trial(s) (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; 
Wylie & Allport, 2000). This interference, collectively causes task set inertia, and 
is thought to be made up of both positive priming interference of the just-
executed S-R event, negative priming of the ignored stimulus, as well as the 
lingering inhibition of the previously inhibited task set.  
RT Mixing cost was originally thought to reflect the greater working 
memory demand (WM) in the mixed task block, compared to the pure task block 
(Los, 1996). However, later studies showed that increasing the number of task 
rules did not affect the size of mixing cost. Instead, mixing cost may reflect 
inherent ambiguity about the mixed task elements (Rubin & Meiran, 2005), 
which may require multiple steps of selection to resolve the information 
ambiguity (Steinhauser & Hübner, 2005).  
If the difference between pure and mixed task blocks is the requirement 
for selection processes in the latter condition, then distinct cognitive operations 
may be found in the mixed block as compared to the pure block. Indeed, an 
electroencephalography (EEG) study has shown differential topography in the 
early ERP (event-related potential) components on pure trials, compared to 
trials in the mixed block; in contrast, switch and repetition trials in the mixed 
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block showed a similar topography and ERP components (Tarantino, 
Mazzonetto, & Vallesi, 2016; Wylie, Murray, Javitt, & Foxe, 2009). It thus 
suggests that different cognitive processes may be at play between the pure 
and mixed task blocks, perhaps more so than between the switch and repetition 
trials. 
Other than the between-condition switch and mixing costs, which are 
sensitive to different trial types, RTs on the same trial type can also change 
from moment to moment as a function of within-condition effect. 
1.3.2 Within-condition effects 
Although between-condition switch and mixing costs are reliably 
observed in most studies, RTs often fluctuate across a sequence of trials. Such 
effects are referred to as within-condition effects. For example, De Jong (2000) 
observed that on the fastest switch trials, RTs were comparable to those on 
repetition trials. This result indicates that switch costs are not a universal 
phenomenon, and can vary within the task context itself. He argued that 
successful full task preparation on switch trials can happen, but only 
occasionally; on some trials, the task reconfiguration process is not complete 
and can continue after the stimulus onset. This within-condition performance 
variation is likely to reflect how participants approached the task—since task-
switching experiments require participants to sustain attention for a long time, 
participants are likely to deploy control sufficiently but conservatively, due to the 
taxing nature of a continuous cognitive control. As a result, on some switch 
trials, the participants only reactively complete task reconfiguration upon seeing 
the stimulus (such as the retrieval of S-R rule). Support for the all-or-none 
preparation has also come from neuroimaging study. Wylie, Javitt and Foxe 
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(2006) found that if the participants can activate the neural circuit associated 
with the task prior to the stimulus onset, no switch cost was observed. A similar 
finding of a greater activation on successful switch trials (i.e. no switch cost) 
was also reported by Braver, Reynolds and Donaldson (2003). 
Indeed, several studies argue for a strategy-dependent perspective on 
task preparation (Brass & von Cramon, 2004; De Baene & Brass, 2014; Forrest, 
Monsell, & McLaren, 2014; Forrest, Elchlepp, Monsell, & McLaren, 2012; Poljac 
& Yeung, 2014; Wylie et al., 2006).  Task-strategy is likely to be modulated by 
how the task context is interpreted, and is sensitive to factors that motivate a 
specific approach, construct the task structures, and thus affect how information 
conflicts are played out within the system. De Baene and Brass (2014) have 
argued that the differences observed between repetition and switch trials are 
not necessarily driven by different underlying cognitive processes, but rather by 
the contextual factors that affect the preparatory strategies used on these trial 
types. Thus, performance differences observed in switch and mixing trials can 
be by-products of the underlying task strategies used on these trials, rather than 
the result of inherent differences in cognitive control processes operating 
between trial types. 
In sum, adult task switching studies have identified two key types of 
costs: between-condition costs further broken down as either switch costs or 
mixing costs, and within-condition costs related to strategy selection. 
1.4 Does the same measure of cognitive flexibility mean the 
same thing in different age group? 
Although developmental and adult studies are motivated by a common 
interest, it is not clear if the different experimental paradigms used with these 
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two populations measure the same cognitive processes. Cragg and Chevalier 
(2012) provides an excellent review of the differences and similarities between 
the paradigms commonly used with young children and adults. These include 
differences in task instruction, types of stimulus and response sets, as well as 
differences in dependent measures. As discussed previously, the 
developmental studies on switching ability have placed a lot of emphasis on the 
functional accounts of inflexible behaviour (e.g. goal representation, inhibitory 
control, cognitive complexity etc.). In contrast, adult studies have focused on the 
information processes involved in the trial-to-trial changes occurring within the 
overall experimental context.   
Although the ways that developmental and adult research have 
approached the question of cognitive flexibility differ slightly, there may be 
enough common ground to bridge between the two disciplines. In this section, I 
will therefore discuss some common factors that affect performance in both 
adults and children. 
1.4.1 Common processes in switching tasks in children and adults 
1.4.1.1 Retrieval process 
The ease of memory retrieval affects switching performance in children 
and adults alike. Since the demand for memory retrieval is the highest on switch 
trials, the magnitude of a switch cost is directly affected by the memory retrieval 
process. Adult studies have suggested that task reconfiguration on switch trials 
can be a two-stage process— the first stage involves updating the current goal 
(intention), and second stage involves the retrieval of task rules (Mayr & Kliegl, 
2000; Monsell & Driver, 2000; Rubinstein et al., 2001). Difficulties in either stage 
may affect the size of any observed switch cost. For example, the first stage of 
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preparation may be affected by how easily the task cue can be translated into a 
goal representation. Past studies suggest that both children and adults are 
affected by cue transparency. Young children performed better on a colour-
shape task with transparent cues, than with arbitrary task cues (Chevalier & 
Blaye, 2009). Adults have also been found to be affected by cue retrieval 
difficulties (Logan & Schneider, 2006b, 2006a). 
1.4.1.2 Carry-over interference and inhibition 
Task-switching studies have generally involved task set overlaps that 
result in interferences.  Moreover, switching back and forth between competing 
tasks requires reactivation and deactivation of task-relevant and irrelevant 
processes. On switch trials, the need for reactivation/deactivation is often the 
greatest since the processes relevant to the pre-switch trial becomes task-
irrelevant and thus interfering. The collective interference from the previous 
task-irrelevant trial(s) forms a task set inertia, which is believed to contribute to 
performance cost on switch trials in both adults and children (Allport et al., 
1994; Kirkham & Diamond, 2003). Task set inertia is likely to consist of multiple 
processes, including active concurrent interference such as the excitatory 
priming cost from the competing episodic events (FitzGibbon, Cragg, & Carroll, 
2014; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003; Wylie & Allport, 2000), negative 
priming of the previously ignored stimulus attribute (Allport & Wylie, 2000; 
Müller, Gela, Dick, Overton, & Zelazo, 2006), and lingering activation of the 
irrelevant task goal and/or the persisting inhibition of the relevant task goal on 
switch trial (Allport et al., 1994; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Waszak et al., 2003).  
Support for the idea of an excitatory priming cost comes from the 
observation that responses are slowed if the response on a switch trial is the 
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same as the previous trial (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Interestingly when task-, 
cue-, stimulus- and response-repetition were manipulated independently, a 
substantial amount of RT change could be accounted for by the different forms 
of primes among the task elements, irrespective to the change of goal (Schmidt 
& Liefooghe, 2016). Thus, any change in the priming compound can contribute 
to RT costs. Switch costs may therefore reflect an overall net facilitative and 
interfering effect on a specific trial, and the size of which depends on task-
specific context. 
In contrast to the costs caused by the active interferences, slowed RT 
and errors can also be caused by persisting inhibition of the task-relevant 
processes. The persisting inhibition may happen at the perceptual level, 
resulting in negative priming. This negative priming effect refers to the 
performance cost in responding to a target that was previously ignored (e.g. 
inhibited) through selection processes (Neill, 1997; Steven P. Tipper, 1985, 
2001). Inhibition can also be observed at a higher level of task set. By 
alternating between three tasks (A, B, C), Mayr and Keele (2000) found that 
switch costs were larger if the task was previously switched away from (e.g. 
ABA) than if it was not recently encountered (e.g. CBA). This effect was termed 
n-2 repetition cost (or backward inhibition) and is interpreted as evidence that 
on switch trials, the previous task was actively inhibited to avoid the danger of 
perseverative behaviours (Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 2010; Mayr & Kliegl, 
2000). Although n-2 repetition cost appears similar to negative priming, n-2 
repetition cost may be more associated with endogenous control than is 
negative priming, since the cost is only observed on tasks with overlapping task 
interferences, but not on tasks without conflicts (for a review, see Koch, Gade, 
Schuch, & Philipp, 2010). In comparison, costs from negative priming occurs 
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more readily as long as the negatively primed information is filtered out during a 
previous selection process.  
That said, the cost phenomenon can often be explained without a need 
to resort to inhibitory control. At least one study has, rather counterintuitively, 
found a larger negative priming effect in younger children than older children 
(Müller et al., 2006). If the size of negative priming indexes inhibition through 
control mechanisms, older children would be expected to be more affected by a 
negatively primed stimulus than younger children. As the results did not suggest 
that this was the case, it is possible that negative priming is an instrumental 
mechanism for stimulus selection, but that it does not relate directly to the 
control mechanism. Indeed, adult studies suggest negative priming can happen 
without resorting to an inhibitory control account, and can be explained by other 
non-inhibitory non-control processes (e.g.,Tipper, 2001).  
Although the abovementioned inhibition phenomena, commonly 
measured in RT cost, may not necessarily be associated with inhibitory control, 
the ability to suppress a prepotent response does appear to share a common 
control mechanism across different tasks (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Thus, it 
remains possible that young children’s poorer performance in switching to an 
alternative task lies in their inability to suppress a prepotent response. However, 
this leaves open the questions of how prepotent the stimulus-response should 
be to warrant inhibitory control, and of how response prepotency is formed in 
task-switching studies with frequent S-R changes. Indeed, Friedman & Miyake 
(2004) have cautioned that inhibitory control mechanisms may be overextended 
as a causal mechanism in the literature on inhibition-related phenomena, and 
that there are likely to be many forms of inhibitory mechanisms, both controlled 
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or not controlled. Thus, researchers should be mindful when explaining 
performance costs with a singular inhibitory control account.  
In sum, although active priming costs and persisting inhibition are likely 
to contribute to switch costs, the questions of whether inhibitory control is 
needed to account for the developmental differences in switching performance, 
and whether inhibition itself is associated with endogenous control, remain 
unanswered.  
1.4.1.3 Sustained and adaptive control 
Several researchers have proposed a dual-mechanism account for 
stable and adaptive cognitive controls. Stable control refers to the activation of 
the neural network that is sustained throughout a series of trials, within a larger 
task context. In contrast, adaptive control refers to the transient elevated 
activation of the neural network in response to a demand for information update. 
Both resting state and functional MRI support the dual-mechanism account of 
sustained and adaptive controls (Braver et al., 2003; Dosenbach et al., 2007). 
Demand for sustained control is greater in the mixed block since there is a need 
to maintain multiple intermixed information online. In contrast, demand for 
transient control is greater on switch trials since the task set requires 
reconfiguration.  
The dual-mechanism account of task control also marries well with the 
concept of proactive and reactive controls in developmental studies (Chevalier 
et al., 2015; Doebel et al., 2017). Proactive control refers to a sustained 
cognitive control in anticipation of the need for a response, whereas reactive 
control refers to a temporary control in response to a change in the 
environment. The dual-control account also shares some similarities with other 
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hierarchical accounts of cognitive control, since sustained proactive control 
implies a need to bridge distinct temporal events through longer lasting stable 
controls. Notable examples of hierarchical control models include Koechlin and 
Summerfield's Cascade Model (2007) and Norman and Shallice’s Supervisory 
Attention System (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shallice, Burgess, & Robertson, 
1996). Although these models vary in the degree of specificity of the temporal 
and functional organisations of their putative hierarchical controls, and of the 
specificity of cortical organisations of these controls, these models are both 
framed around the idea that higher-order sustained control can bias a lower-
level decision-making process. Thus, in task-switching studies, transient control 
on switch trials is likely to be only part of the story of cognitive control that 
occurs during an extended sequence of behaviours. It is therefore possible that 
young children are equipped with the cognitive control to switch tasks, but still 
lack the ability to sustain this control throughout an extended sequence of trials. 
1.4.2 What measures show developmental change? 
Although both children and adults may engage in common information 
processes in switching between tasks, it is not clear what measures and what 
measurement methods reflect developmental changes best. The common 
measures used in task-switching studies are between-condition mixing cost and 
switch costs in RT and accuracy, as well as overall RT and accuracy on 
different trial types (pure trials in single-task block, repetition and switch trials in 
mixed-task block). In what follows, I will discuss these measures in the few 
developmental studies that have employed procedures similar to those in the 
adult task-switching studies. 
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1.4.2.1 Mixing cost 
Several developmental studies that have employed a block design with 
pure- and mixed-task blocks have found developmental effects on mixing cost. 
For example, Davidson et al. (2006) carried out a series of experiments, 
involving task-switching elements, with children aged between 4 and 13 years 
of age, as well as on adults. The tasks involved response conflicts with spatial 
incompatibility. These required the participants to switch between responding 
on either the same or the opposite side of the screen to where the target 
stimulus appeared, based on the form of the stimulus. The authors reported 
greater global mixing costs in accuracy for children aged 10 years or younger, 
than for older participants. However, the accuracy mixing costs appeared as the 
result of a trade-off with RTs, with older participants showing greater RT mixing 
costs than younger children. Although accuracy mixing costs were greater with 
younger participants, this trade-off effect renders the overall effect of age on 
mixing costs difficult to interpret.  
In another study with young children, Dibbets and Jolles (2006) carefully 
designed tasks suitable for preschool children (i.e. tasks on which young 
children had high accuracy). They also reported greater accuracy mixing costs 
among the youngest participants (aged from 4.8 years to 13 years of age), but 
no greater RT mixing costs. Thus, there was no change in the cost criteria 
between age groups (i.e., no speed-accuracy trade-off). However, some other 
studies have found an age effect on RT and/or accuracy mixing costs (Cepeda 
et al., 2001, with participants aged 7 to 82 years of age; Kray, Eber, & Karbach, 
2008, with participants aged 7 to 77 years of age; Reimers & Maylor, 2005, with 
participants aged 10 to 66 years of age). Of course, these latter studies involved 
children older than the preschool years. Overall, past research generally 
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supports the presence of an age effect on mixing costs, although the types of 
costs (i.e. RT or accuracy) are less consistent across studies. Finally, at least 
one experiment has failed to find any influence of age on mixing costs using a 
colour/shape choice task, despite a large age gap  in participants (7-year-olds 
vs. University students [Exp. 1], Ellefson, Shapiro, & Chater, 2006). Thus, this 
raises the question of whether the effect age on mixing costs is robust across 
different types of tasks. 
1.4.2.2 Switch cost 
Switch costs were found to interact with age in some studies (Cepeda et 
al., 2001, [7 to 82 years old]; Chevalier, Martis, Curran, & Munakata, 2015, [5 
and 10 years old]; Crone, Bunge, Van Der Molen, & Ridderinkhof, 2006, [7 to 25 
years old]; Davidson et al., 2006, [4 to 13 years old and adults]). However, 
numerous other studies have found no age effect on either RT or accuracy 
switch costs (e.g. Dibbets & Jolles, 2006, [4.8 to 13 years old]; Ellefson et al., 
2006, [7 years old and adults]; Reimers & Maylor, 2005 [10 to 66 years old]). If 
switch cost is an effective measure of cognitive control in task set 
reconfiguration, and/or goal maintenance, developmental differences in switch 
costs should be observed. However, as discussed previously, switch costs can 
also be the result of task set inertia, which may or may not be resolved with 
control mechanism such as inhibitory control.  If inhibitory control is needed to 
resolve effects of task set inertia, then younger children may exhibit greater 
switch costs than older participants. However, if task set inertia is just the result 
of the information processes, irrespective of age, then switch cost may not 
exhibit reliable interaction with age. Thus, at the moment it remains unclear 
whether switch costs are a meaningful correlate of cognitive development.    
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1.4.2.3 Processing speed 
Many developmental studies suggest that processing speed changes as 
a function of global development, and is often seen as a mental resource that 
mediates other general ability such as IQ and fluid intelligence (Robert Kail, 
2000; Park, Mainela-arnold, & Miller, 2015). This global account of processing 
speed comes from the observation that reaction time variability across different 
tasks can be mostly captured by simple linear regressions (Hale, 1990; Robert 
Kail, 2000; Kiselev, Espy, & Sheffield, 2009; Miller & Vernon, 1997). However, 
while much of the developmental difference in speeded tasks may be 
accounted for by processing speed alone, merely looking at processing speed 
in isolation may run the risk of overlooking other potentially age-dependent, 
function-specific and task-specific processes in complex speeded tasks. The 
issue of how changes in function-specific and task-specific processes may 
interact with the global development indexed by processing speed is particularly 
pertinent when it comes to young children between 3 to 6 years of age, since a 
slight change in task parameter can often have a dramatic impact on task 
performance (Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006). It is not clear, for 
example, if components in the task set inertia (e.g. priming cost) are more or 
less easily overcome because of differences in global processing speed, or 
because of some other specific functional processes such as working memory 
and inhibitory control.  
1.4.2.4 Errors 
Developmental studies of cognitive flexibility have shown that different 
types of errors decrease with age—perseverative errors or errors caused by 
difficulty in shifting goals (Crone, Ridderinkhof, Worm, Somsen, & van der 
Molen, 2004; Zelazo, 2006), distraction errors caused by weak goal 
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maintenance (Carroll, Blakey, & FitzGibbon, 2016; Chevalier & Blaye, 2008; 
Crone et al., 2004), and errors caused by prepotent motoric responses (Ling, 
Wong, & Diamond, 2016; Wright & Diamond, 2014). Although all error types 
decrease as a function of age, different error types may have different 
developmental trajectories. Crone and colleagues (2004) looked into this issue 
with participants from 8 to 25 years of age, on a task structurally similar to 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST), and using a task-switching paradigm 
where the participants had to change rule through induction with error feedback 
or with explicit cues. They measured perseverative error on the trials 
immediately after the error feedback, and the distraction error on trials where 
the sorting behaviour changed from the chosen rule on the previous trial (i.e. 
without error feedback or being instructed so). The found that adult-levels of 
perseverative error were reached earlier in development than adult-levels of 
distraction error  (Crone et al., 2004). This result was interpreted as evidence of 
an earlier maturation of the ability to shift goals than the ability to actively 
maintain task set. 
Since the age group of interest in the current thesis is much younger 
than in Crone et al.’s study, it is likely that the errors committed by young 
children would encompass all error types. Thus, in the current thesis, instead of 
differentiating error types, accuracy serves only as an indicator of the overall 
level of development than to the development of a specific cognitive function. 
To achieve an overview of development by accuracy measure, it is important to 
have an experimental design that mitigates biases for a specific error type. 
Perseverative error happens only when the pre-switch rule can also be applied 
to the post-switch stimulus, such as when the stimulus is bivalent. In 
comparison, distractor errors may happen more sporadically, although they may 
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still be tied to the goal representations (Blakey & Carroll, 2018). It is possible 
that by intermixing bivalent, univalent and neutral stimuli in a task set, biases 
towards a specific error type can be minimised. 
1.5 Flexible goal-directed behaviours in a multisensory 
environment 
So far I have talked extensively about how cognitive flexibility was 
explored in both children and adults, in experiments based on unisensory tasks. 
There has been little discussion of how cognitive flexibility may operate in a 
multisensory context. However, we clearly live in a multisensory world. Thus, a 
key aim of the current thesis is to explore the development of task-switching 
within a multisensory environment, so as to better reflect this real-world context. 
In the real world one needs to not only be able to switch between tasks, but also 
between tasks in different sensory modalities. For example, young children 
need to learn to look out for cars when crossing the road, even when they are 
currently engaged in a conversation with their classmates. They need to use 
their multisensory attention system not only to look for cars, but also to hear the 
cars’ approaching sounds, whist monitoring the social interactions. 
We already know that the development of cognitive and attentional 
control is long and protracted (Best & Miller, 2010). In comparison, perceptual 
and multisensory systems show rapid progression in both differentiation and 
emergent interactions by the age of 2 (Bremner, Lewkowicz, & Spence, 2012; 
Lewkowicz & Ghazanfar, 2009). Although the multisensory system is already in 
place at an early age, children still exhibit many subtle differences in how they 
respond to multisensory information as compared to adults, such as the 
differences observed in modality dominance (Nava & Pavani, 2013; Robinson & 
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Sloutsky, 2010; Sloutsky & Napolitano, 2003), multisensory integration 
(Brandwein et al., 2011; Nardini, Bales, & Mareschal, 2016), cross-modal 
interference (Downing, Barutchu, & Crewther, 2015; Matusz et al., 2015; R. L. 
Thomas, Nardini, & Mareschal, 2017) and multisensory learning (Broadbent, 
White, Mareschal, & Kirkham, 2017). It is possible that the development that 
underpins cognitive and attentional control, also underpins the development of 
multisensory attention, given that attentional control may have a direct effect on 
how cross-modal information is processed (see Talsma, Senkowski, Soto-
Faraco, & Woldorff, 2010).  
Cross-modal attention is often explored in the context of interferences 
from concurrent cross-modal events. It has been well documented that adults’ 
attention is often biased towards visual inputs rather than auditory inputs when 
encountering an audiovisual event. This attentional bias is termed visual 
dominance (for review, see Koppen & Spence, 2007). One example of adult 
visual dominance is the Colavita visual dominance effect, which is an 
overshadowing effect from visual input over auditory inputs. When presented 
with a quick audiovisual input, adults often only perceive the visual element of 
the audiovisual input (Colavita, 1974). In contrast to the visual dominance in 
adults, infants and young children’s multisensory attention is dominated by 
auditory processing, exhibiting an auditory Colavita dominance effect (Nava & 
Pavani, 2013; Wille & Ebersbach, 2016). However, children’s auditory 
dominance appears to extend beyond a simple overshadowing effect as they 
often make auditory-based judgements in learning-based tasks even when they 
have plenty of opportunities to process both auditory and visual inputs (e.g. 
Leary & Sloutsky, 2013; Robinson & Sloutsky, 2010; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2003). 
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Studies that investigate modality dominance have generally involved 
passive encoding of the stimulus, and do not impose high demands on cognitive 
control.  Thus, it remains unclear if modality dominance affects performance 
when the behaviour is directed by an abstract task goal, as is the case in most 
task-switching studies.  To date, there are no developmental task-switching 
studies that also include cross-modal attentional shifts.  
In adult studies, shifting attention to another modality produces a reliable 
modality shift effect (MSE) in RT (Cohen & Rist, 1992). However, it is not clear if 
shifting between modalities is associated with endogenous control similar to that 
which occurs during task-switching. Lukas, Philipp and Koch (2010) found that if 
cues for the upcoming modality are provided, the MSE can be reduced through 
endogenous control. This effect may be synonymous to the preparation effect in 
task-switching studies (already discussed above). Thus, it may be possible that 
shifting between modalities and tasks taps into a common attentional control 
system, at least when cues are provided. Lukas et al. (2010) also observed an 
asymmetry in the MSE—RT costs were greater when shifting from visual to 
auditory than from auditory to visual modalities. It is unclear whether the smaller 
MSE when switching to visual targets is associated with visual dominance, or if 
it is a result of different levels of endogenous control on the visual and auditory 
trials, similar to the asymmetry cost reported between tasks that differ in 
difficulties (Gilbert & Shallice, 2002). 
There have been only a handful of cross-modal task-switching studies 
with adults in which both visual and auditory stimuli shared the same task 
attribute as in unimodal task-switching studies (e.g., Hunt & Kingstone, 2004; 
Murray, Santis, Thut, & Wylie, 2009; Sandhu & Dyson, 2013). These studies 
explored the idea that, if the same endogenous system mediates switching 
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between tasks and shifting between modalities, then there may be an 
attentional bottleneck when both tasks and modality changed. An attentional 
bottleneck account would produce the largest RT cost when both modality and 
task changed, compared to either modality or task changing alone. So far, the 
evidence for a unitary attentional control system in cross-modal task-switching 
is mixed. Although RT costs can be largest when both task and modality are 
changed, adult cross-modal task-switching studies often report a less-than-
expected cost that is subadditive to the combined modality shift cost and task 
switch cost (Hunt & Kingstone, 2004; Sandhu & Dyson, 2013; although see 
Murray et al., 2009 for comparison). The lack of conclusive evidence one way or 
another, suggests that cross-modal information processes are more complex 
than suggested by a simple dichotomy—modality-specific and task-specific 
processes are likely to operate both in parallel and interactively.   
Since young children often exhibit different cross-modal attentional 
effects than adults, such as a different modality dominance, they may also 
exhibit cross-modal task-switching effects that differ from those of adults. While 
there is no direct developmental research on cross-modal task-switching, 
children and adults show differences in brain activation patterns in cross-modal 
oddball detection (Johannsen & Röder, 2014). If  efficient cross-modal task-
switches depend on the  segregation of information or neural pathways to 
minimize interference, then young children may experience a greater cross-
modal interference when switching between tasks due to lesser specialized 
networks (Fair et al., 2007a, 2007b). If so, children may need to exert a greater 
level of top-down control to overcome the interference at the lower processing 
level, and experience a greater attentional bottleneck in conditions in which 
cross-modal attentional shifting is required, compared to task-switching alone. 
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Thus, by combining the need to shift attention cross-modally and to 
switch attention between tasks, the current thesis sets the stage to explore how 
multisensory attention is deployed in a task-oriented context, and is well 
positioned to understand whether cross-modal attentional shift indeed interact 
with higher level cognitive/attentional control from a developmental perspective. 
In addition to taking a behavioural approach to studying cognitive 
flexibility with task-switching and modality-shifting, the current thesis also 
employs computational modelling in an attempt to understand developmental 
differences in information processes associated the observe behaviours. In the 
next section, I will argue for the benefits of computational approach to 
developmental research. This will be followed by a brief overview of past 
computational models on task-switching.  
1.6 Bridging the gap: why use computational modelling? 
Findings in developmental cognitive psychology with young children have 
traditionally relied on descriptive theories to explain the observed behaviours 
that are lacking in mechanistic details (Mareschal & Thomas, 2006). For 
example, young children are said to have weaker representations of task goal, 
but questions such as how much weaker and why they are weaker, remain 
enigmatic with descriptive theories (e.g. is it due to inadequately activating the 
task goal in the first place; subsequent decay of the task goal once the 
environmental cue disappears; competition from the alternative task goals; 
and/or other forms of interferences and that interact with goal representations?).  
Although descriptive theories are also used in adult cognitive psychology, 
adult studies generally have a greater availability and reliability of diverse 
measurement tools, and convergence across these measures, compared to 
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studies with infants or young children. Additionally, adult experiments can often 
introduce subtle experimental manipulations to observe more elusive response 
changes. With these advantages, cognitive theories built on adult studies often 
include more detailed accounts of information processes and functions related 
to a specific cognitive task. 
Unfortunately, the descriptive theories based on adults generally are not 
readily applicable to children since children and adults may represent and 
process information differently due to fundamental changes in learning and 
development (Shultz, 2003; Sylvain Sirois & Shultz, 1999). In addition to these 
fundamental differences, experimental procedures used in adults and children 
often differ in essential and immeasurable ways. One central disparity, as 
mentioned previously, is that developmental studies often track what infants and 
children can and cannot do at different stages of development, despite the fact 
that these cans and cannots often change with experimental manipulations. In 
contrast, adult studies focus on behaviours that are generalizable between 
individuals and across different experimental conditions. 
Mareschal (2010) argued that the lack of available tools to elucidate 
causal mechanisms of observed behaviours in infants and children (from 
moment-to-moment observations within a study, to gradual changes throughout 
development) can undermine the scientific rigor in developmental research. 
There is growing evidence in the past 20 to 30 years that computational models 
can be instrumental in bridging between empirical developmental studies and 
mechanistic explanations of behavioural changes (Elman et al., 1996; Shultz, 
2003). 
 Computational models, particularly those that incorporate temporal, 
functional and structural constraints, as well as developmental changes, are 
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particularly useful in accounting for developmental changes. This is because 
these models often aim not only to understand how information processes result 
in a specific behaviour, but also to propose explanations as to why a cognitive 
system gains computational power with development. Of the different types of 
computational models out there, the connectionist approach is perhaps most 
commonly employed in developmental research (Mareschal, 2010). 
 A connectionist model is largely inspired by the processing principles of 
neural networks. In a connectionist model there are multiple units at different 
processing layers with input-output relations specified by the associative 
weights between the units (Fig. 1.1). The activity of the units in the network is 
modulated by the inputs from the associated processing units. The strength of 
this input is governed by how strongly the two units in the network are wired 
together. However, unlike in a real neural network, where the units are either 
neurons or clusters of neurons, the units in connectionist models of cognitive 
processes are often assigned subsymbolic meanings—from as small as a 
specific perceptual attribute (e.g. an angle of a line), to as large an abstract 
concept as a task goal (e.g. select the red colour). Irrespective to the level of 
abstractness of each unit, information within the network is processed in 
parallel. This means that multiple representations are active at any given time, 
influencing one another. This contrasts with serial processes where a single or 
a limited number of processes are carried out at a specific stage. In addition to 
the analogous structure of the model to a neural network, the governing 
functions such as firing thresholds and experience-dependent changes in 
connection weights are also similar to the principles of neural dynamics. 
Learning and development in the model arise from the changes of connections. 
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These trackable changes provide neurally plausible explanations of how 
cognitive development may occur. 
 
Figure 1.1. Schematic illustration of a two-layer connectionist network. The 
network has an input layer (I) with three units, which have feedforward weighted 
connections (Wi, j)  to the output layer (O) comprised of two units. 
 
For these reasons, the current thesis will adopt a connectionist approach 
to task-switching. Note, however, that because we will focus on tasks that do 
not involve learning, it is the activation dynamics side of connectionist networks 
that will be used to model task switching and not the weight dynamics. 
However, other computational models of task-switching exist. So, in the next 
section, I will briefly review different computational models for task-switching 
based on adult studies, before focusing on connectionist model of task-
switching by Gilbert & Shallice (2002). All computational models in the current 
thesis were adapted from Gilbert and Shallice’s initial task-switching model.  
1.7 Computational models of task-switching 
The computational models of task-switching can be broadly classified 
into normative models and process models. The normative models are models 
that describe an optimal behaviour under specific theory-driven assumptions, 
but the behaviours from the model are not grounded by process-based 
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constraints. A normative model asks: “given a particular theory, what is the 
optimal level of performance that should be observed?” It does not map real-
time behaviours in a given study, and is generally less concerned about the 
interactions of different processes than a process model. A normative model 
has clear mathematical specification for each cognitive process.  
Meiran's (2000) normative model aimed to understand how inter-trial 
response conflicts with bivalent response sets give rise to RT cost. In the 
model, task-associated stimuli and responses each form different mental 
representations. The RT cost arises because of the similarity/ dissimilarity 
between the newly calculated response representations and the n-1 response 
representations. If the representations are similar, then there is a greater 
response potency than if the two representations are dissimilar. The value of 
response potency is used to infer how much RT would be slowed. The model 
focuses on quantifiable interferences between different mental representations, 
but lacks processes that govern goal activation and maintenance. In contrast, 
Logan and colleagues’ normative models incorporate different forms of memory 
retrieval in switching tasks (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Schneider & Logan, 
2005). These authors developed different models reflecting different theoretical 
assumptions—a model that assumed slow retrieval of task cue from long-term 
memory (i.e. endogenous control), and a model that assumed a fast priming 
function from short-term memory. Each cognitive process is governed by 
specific mathematical equations. They found that performance predicted by the 
priming model fitted the participant’s data better than the model with 
endogenous control, and concluded that RT switch costs were largely 
attributable to interferences. In all, these normative models are concerned with 
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a specific aspect of the information process in task-switching studies, and 
generally do not consider effects from parallel processes. 
In contrast, process models incorporate multiple processes within the 
model, and the computations are carried out in time. Notable process-based 
models for task-switching include (1) Altmann and Gray's (2008) Cognitive 
Control Model (CCM), which is  an activation based production system model 
implemented in the ACT-R system (Anderson, 1996), (2) Brown et al.'s (2007) 
conflict control model, and (3) Gilbert and Shallice 's (2002) interactive 
activation model. Both latter two models were connectionist models.  
Altmann and Gray's (2008) CCM model simulated a sequence of distinct 
cognitive processes. The model relied on symbolic representations, such as 
symbolic memories (‘Odd’) and production rules (e.g. ‘retrieve task goal’). The 
retrieval of memories and the implementation of production rules are governed 
by mathematically-based activation functions. These activation functions 
allowed the network to produce non-linear behaviours since multiple symbolic 
representations could receive activation at a given time point, and thus the 
production rules did not necessarily follow a strict sequence. For example, in 
task-switching, the triggering of a task goal (e.g. parity) will send activations to 
the associated task concepts (e.g. to even-odd), which in turn will send 
activations to the associated stimulus (even or odd) and responses (e.g. left or 
right). Although a wrong production rule can be triggered due to the spread of 
activations across multiple associated representations, the system overall relies 
on sequential executions of production rules, in the form of ‘if-then’ structure. 
Thus, the model embodies many assumptions on the specificity and time 
course of each production rule. Finally, although parallel spreading activation is 
allowed in the model, only one production rule is triggered at one time.  
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In contrast to the production system process models, Brown, Reynolds, 
and Braver (2007) constructed a multi-module, multi-layer connectionist model 
for conflict control, with relatively complex firing thresholds and decay functions 
for the units in each layer (Fig. 1.2). The network architecture is modular with 
distinct processing layers corresponding to different cortical structure—a 
perceptual layer, hidden layer, prefrontal cortex layer (PFC), multiple types of 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) layer, output layer and so on. The model 
simulated letter/number classification tasks, as in Rogers and Monsell's (1995) 
study, in which the participants were pre-cued to classify a letter-digit compound 
(e.g. ‘X9’) either by parity of the digit, or by the consonant/vowel of the letter, 
using overlapping response sets. The model fractionated ACC into distinct 
functions represented by different processing layers. The model focused on the 
effects of these ACC-associated layers in inter-trial conflict control. It could 
account for not only the n-1 switch effect, but also higher-order effects (e.g. n-2 
repetition or n-2 switch effects). However, for the purpose of our studies, which 
did not measure higher-order inter-trial effects, the model may be unnecessarily 
complex at this stage of investigation. 
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Figure 1.2. Schematic illustration of Brown et al. 's (2007) connectionist model 
for conflict control. The model comprised multiple modules (e.g. input, cue, prefrontal 
cortex, different forms of anterior cingulate cortex function), with feedforward 
connections between the processing layers. The figure was adopted from the original 
paper by Brown et al. 's (2007). 
 
Gilbert and Shallice’s model offer a simpler and more conceptually 
parsimonious task-switching model (Gilbert & Shallice, 2002), based on the  
interactive activation framework developed by McClelland and Rumelhart 
(1981). The model was designed to simulate switching between a dominant 
word-naming and a non-dominant colour-naming task using Stroop-based 
stimuli (Fig. 1.3). This model involved a connectionist network with units and 
fixed weight connections. As in Brown et al.’s (2007) model, there were distinct 
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processing layers such as a perceptual input layer, a task encoding layer, and 
an output layer, but the overall architecture was substantially simpler. The 
mathematical functions in Gilbert and Shallice’s model were also fairly straight-
forward—the units in this model had continuous and accumulative activation 
values (i.e. each unit is an accumulator of the activations in the associated 
units), and there was little learning (other than the temporary primes) or 
representational transformation in the model. In addition to the presence of 
feedforward connections, as in Brown et al.’s model, there were also lateral 
inhibition connections between the units in the same processing layer. The 
purpose of these lateral interactions was to facilitate selection among multiple 
units (i.e. favouring one unit over the others). A more detailed description of 
Gilbert and Shallice’s task-switching model will be presented in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 1.3. Schematic illustration of Gilbert and Shallice’s (2002) connectionist 
model for task-switching with colour/word Stroop tasks. The model comprised three 
main processing layers (task demand, input, and output). The lateral connections among 
units in the task demand and output layer are not shown in the figure. The figure was 
adopted from the original paper by Gilbert and Shallice (2002). 
 
Despite the simplicity of the mode’s activation functions and the 
architecture, many task-switching associated phenomenon were successfully 
captured by Gilbert and Shallice’s model, such as switch costs and priming 
effects. The model was also able to reproduce the cost asymmetry observed 
between competing tasks (i.e. larger switch cost to one task than the other), due 
to the larger top-down signal to compensate for the weaker non-dominant task, 
compared to the smaller top-down control for the stronger dominant task. Other 
forms of asymmetric switch costs were also explored, such as asymmetric costs 
caused simply by differences in connection weights. 
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The attraction of Gilbert and Shallice’s model for us is its context-
sensitivity. This means that the model can be easily adapted to different 
experimental contexts, as has recently been done by others (e.g., Cooper et al., 
2018; Sexton & Cooper, 2017). Additionally, since the model involves 
connection weights, it can potentially be adapted to model development since 
development in a connectionist network normally involves weight changes 
(Mareschal, 2010). For these reasons, the interactive activation model of task-
switching by Gilbert and Shallice will be adapted for the behavioural studies in 
the current thesis.  
1.8 Overview of studies and models presented in the thesis 
To summarise, although the current literature generally reports cognitive 
inflexibility in young children in experiments that involved a switch in task, 
developmental studies with experimental designs comparable to adult studies 
often paint a different picture by reporting mixed findings. However, the use of 
unfamiliar tasks and of pass/fail performance measures may both have led 
researchers to underestimate young children’s cognitive flexibility. This leaves 
open to the question whether developmental difference in cognitive flexibility 
can be observed with continuous measures that tap into the efficiency in goal 
reconfiguration and in overcoming interferences in simple and familiar tasks, 
and additionally, in a multisensory environment. In this thesis, I will combine 
experimental behavioural work with connectionist computational modelling to try 
to resolve these questions.  
Our studies focused on children aged 4 and 6 years, since previous 
developmental research has identified this as a period of extensive 
development in cognitive flexibility and control. Crucially, our studies also 
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include an adult comparison group to ensure that the tasks are suitable for a 
wide range of ages, rather than just a specific age group. Three behavioural 
studies were carried out with 4-year-olds, 6-year-olds and adults—(i) a 
unimodal visual task-switching study (unimodal TS, Chapter 2), (ii) a cross-
modal task-switching study with bimodal stimuli (bimodal CMTS, Chapter 3), 
and (iii) a cross-modal task switching study with unimodal auditory or visual 
stimuli (unimodal CMTS, Chapter 4). This is followed by four modelling chapters 
on task-switching (Chapter 5 to 7) and one modelling chapter on the modality 
shift effect (Chapter 8). The thesis will conclude in Chapter 9 that discusses the 
main empirical and computational findings. Each of these is previewed in turn 
below. 
1.8.1 Behavioural studies 
Chapter 2 describes a first unimodal TS study. This study aimed to 
understand whether task-switching associated effects change across 
development. Both pure and mixed task condition were involved in this study.  
The task sets were adapted from Rogers and Monsell's (1995) study in which 
the stimulus was composed of two visual elements, and each element could 
afford either one of the two tasks, or none. The participants were pre-cued to 
detect specific targets, and to respond by pressing a single response button. In 
this unimodal TS experiment, both mixing costs and switch costs on accuracy 
and RT were measured, as well as the overall mean RT and accuracy. A 
preliminary hypothesis was that younger participants would experience greater 
mixing costs and switch costs than older participants, since both measures 
have previously been found to be associated with cognitive control.  
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Chapter 3 describes a bimodal CMTS experiment. This is a variation to 
the unimodal TS study but with bimodal stimulus—that is, one of the two 
elements in the stimulus was a visual input, and the other was an auditory input. 
The tasks in this experiment were similar to those in the unimodal TS in which 
the participants were pre-cued to detect targets from a specific category and to 
respond by pressing a single response button. As with the unimodal TS 
experiment, both mixing and switch costs were measured. In addition to the 
task-associated effects, in this experiment, I also explored the modality shift 
effect (MSE), its interaction with development, and if there was any asymmetry 
in the MSE as reported in Lukas et al (2010) in adults. 
Chapter 4 describes the unimodal CMTS study. This experiment involved 
stimuli and task instructions that differed from the previous two experiments. All 
stimuli were unimodal but the modality of the stimulus changed randomly from 
trial to trial. Here, I examined whether the MSE was a robust phenomenon even 
when no cross-modal distractors were present, and further studied whether 
there was a subadditive effect (or not) when both task and modality switched. 
New target categories were used in the experiment, in order to examine the 
generalizability of previous experimental findings. Unlike the previous two 
experiments, the tasks were not pre-cued thus no preparation window was 
allowed. This allowed the examination of the bottleneck of the attentional 
system when both task and modality changed, since the participants were not 
able to reconfigure either information processes before the stimulus onset. 
These effects were also explored across development. 
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1.8.2 Computational models 
Chapter 5 to Chapter 8 report on computational models of the empirical 
findings in bimodal CMTS (described in Chapter 3). We chose the behavioural 
results in bimodal CMTS to be our main focus for the modelling work because it 
encompassed the largest number of different experimental conditions 
investigated in the current thesis—pure trials, repetition trials, switch trials, 
modality-shift trials, modality-repetition trials, and asymmetric pathways (i.e. 
modality-response compatibility). These different experimental conditions 
allowed us to explore information processes relevant to those trials. 
Chapter 5 includes the bulk of the details on how our models were 
adapted from Gilbert and Shallice’s (2002) original task-switching model. The 
models in Chapter 5 were the simplest in architectural complexity, and were 
designed closely to the models described by Gilbert and Shallice. The model 
architecture involved both fixed feedforward connections and temporary priming 
connections between the stimulus and the task attribute. This chapter 
introduced different network ages (Young, Middle and Old) that were 
architecturally identical but different in connection weights. The models in 
Chapter 5 captured RT mixing costs, RT switch costs, and RT priming costs on 
switch trials, but failed to produce the correct error profiles. Moreover, all RT 
costs were substantially larger in the younger networks than in either the Middle 
or Old networks.  
Chapter 6 explores other reactive mechanisms that might be particularly 
relevant to our behavioural study. The first mechanism is involuntary reactive 
task retrieval. Tasks may be retrieved reactively without the mediation of top-
down control since both task attribute and the stimuli themselves are closely 
aligned in the representational space (e.g. a dog picture on a ‘dog detection’ 
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task). This reactive mechanism is modelled by introducing additional fixed 
connections between the stimulus units and the corresponding task attribute 
units. The second mechanism is involuntary reactive response from the 
previous primed stimulus-response association. This reactive response was 
modelled by introducing priming connections between the stimulus units and the 
response units at the end of the trial. The models in Chapter 6 were successful 
at reducing RT switch costs and increasing errors in younger networks, but 
these effects (i.e. cost reduction and error increase) soon achieved an 
asymptotic level. The simulation results were still some way away from the 
observed behavioural data.  
Chapter 7 introduces additional decay functions and additional 
parameters that simulated individual differences between networks. The models 
assume that the activity to both task relevant and irrelevant attributes starts to 
decay once the task cue disappears—task-relevant attribute becomes less 
excited, and task-irrelevant attribute becomes less inhibited. Although task 
attributes decayed after stimulus onset, the networks could probabilistically re-
update the task attribute units during the stage of response settling. This 
intermittent task update is conceptually equivalent to verbal self-reminder. The 
models assume that the variation of update probability was a matter of 
individual difference, and not of between-age difference. The chapter also 
explores whether different ages might be more or less likely to employ a 
reactive task strategy or a proactive task strategy, which was defined by how 
the participants modulated their control by trial types. In the models, task 
strategies were implemented by varying the top-down signals within a network. 
The addition of decay, update probability and task strategies allowed the 
models to generate greater RT and accuracy variations on all trial types. The 
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models in Chapter 7 explore how the empirical data, which contained various 
forms of inter-group differences and individual differences, can be captured with 
the existing model architecture. 
In contrast to the previous models that explore task-associated effects, 
Chapter 8 presents two different models that explore the modality shift effect 
(MSE), as well as the observed asymmetry of MSE to visual and auditory 
targets. The two models were based on different theoretical accounts for 
MSE—a model based on priming effects (priming model) and a model based on 
carry-over effects from additional modality attribute representations. Both 
models were able to produce a MSE as well as asymmetric MSE patterns in the 
networks that simulated the pure task blocks. However, only the model with 
modality attribute units was able to capture the effect with statistical equivalence 
to the observed behavioural data in the pure blocks. None of the models were 
able to capture the asymmetric MSE patterns in the mixed task blocks. The 
model results suggested that MSE is likely to be a composite effect of multiple 
processes and could, therefore, change with the information processes involved 
in the overall task context. 
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes with a general discussion and with 
suggestions for future research. Specifically, the discussion will focus on the 
empirical findings relating to between-condition mixing/switch costs as well as 
inter-group differences in overall accuracies. This will be followed by a 
discussion of the empirical findings on modality dominance and modality shift 
effects, and whether processes related to modality-specific representations 
were part of an overall task set. These behavioural findings will be explained by 
key mechanisms from the computational models; namely, goal activation, carry-
over effects from task-associated representations, and carry-over effect from 
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modality-associated representation. The discussion will also highlight the 
potential pitfall in defining a task set from the ideal external specification without 
probing into the internal representation of the task set. Any discrepancy 
between the desired and actual representation of a task set can generate very 
different behaviour patterns, particularly in younger participants. Lastly I will talk 
about modality shift effects and why these effects can be elusive and are 
particularly context sensitive. I will also highlight the limitation of the models in 
the thesis, and other additional mechanisms that are worth considering. Finally, 
the thesis will end with the suggestion that future developmental studies should 
address the developmental and individual differences in stable performance, in 
addition to flexible behaviours. 
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Chapter 2. Experiment 1: Unimodal task-switching 
(Unimodal TS) 
The study described in this chapter explores the usefulness of the task-
switching paradigm in understanding cognitive flexibility in 4-year-olds, 6-year-
olds, and adults. More specifically, it explores the use of unimodal visual stimuli 
in a simple target detection tasks. 
2.1 Introduction 
The current study is inspired by the task-switching paradigm commonly 
employed in the adult studies. This paradigm is well-established and involves 
switching frequently between two simple cognitive tasks, each of which requires 
attention to a different attribute of the stimuli presented, such as colour or form 
of a letter sequence (Allport et al., 1994; Gade & Koch, 2007; Meiran & Kessler, 
2008; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubin & Meiran, 2005). Despite the simplicity of 
this task, active cognitive control is still necessary for successful performance. 
The paradigm also allows the comparison between experimental blocks that 
either involve task-switching (i.e. a mixed task block that involves multiple task 
rules) or not (i.e. a pure task block that involves only one task rule) (see 
Chapter 1, section 1.4 for more details). The inclusion of both pure and mixed 
blocks yields two types of processing costs—global mixing cost and local switch 
cost. Global mixing costs refer to the between-block differences in reaction 
times/accuracy when multiple tasks are involved in one block (e.g., mixed block; 
switching between responding to colour and form in the sequence), compared 
to a block where only one task is involved (e.g., pure block; responding only to 
colour or form). Importantly, these mixing costs are observed even when the 
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participant is repeating the same task from the previous trial in a mixed block, 
when no attentional shift is required. Local switch costs refer to the differences 
found by comparing task-switch trials with task-repetition trials in a mixed block, 
when attention has to be redirected to activate the new task rule and the 
associated stimulus-response mappings.  
Since the events on pure trials (i.e. in the pure block) and task-repetition 
trials (i.e. in the mixed block) were perceptually equivalent, the differences in RT 
between these trial types were believed to reflect the differences in how the task 
components are represented internally the first place (Los, 1996; Rubin & 
Meiran, 2005; Steinhauser & Hübner, 2005). Specifically, the differences lie 
within the selection difficulty among the mixed task components, as it was found 
that increasing the level of stimulus ambiguity increased mixing costs, but not 
the number of task rules (Rubin & Meiran, 2005; Steinhauser & Hübner, 2005). 
It is believed that additional cognitive processes are involved in managing 
stimulus ambiguity in the mixed block (Tarantino et al., 2016; Wylie et al., 2009).  
In contrast, events on task-repetition trials and task-switch trials are 
different, since on switch trial there is an additional task cue that signals a 
change in task. However, both trials are grounded in the same overall task 
structure (i.e. mixed block). The difference in RT between these two trial types 
are likely to reflect inter-trial dynamics. Specifically, RT switch cost is believed 
to reflect additional cognitive operation in reconfiguring task sets, as well as the 
carry-over effects from the previous trial(s) (for review, see Kiesel et al., 2010).  
Since both mixing costs and switch costs have been associated to 
control mechanisms, it is reasonable to expect that these between-condition 
measures may index developmental differences in cognitive control. Yet, as we 
have discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.4.2), developmental studies on global 
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mixing costs and local switch costs often report mixed findings on the age effect 
(Chevalier et al., 2015; M. C. Davidson et al., 2006; Dibbets & Jolles, 2006; 
Ellefson et al., 2006; Kray et al., 2008; Reimers & Maylor, 2005). However, with 
the exception of Dibbets and Jolles’ study, most of these studies either involved 
children older than 6 years, or report a low overall accuracy with children 
younger than 6 years (i.e. <80%). As a result it remains unclear whether the 
paradigm is also suitable for children as young as 4 years, and whether the 
between-condition mixing and switch costs are useful index of cognitive controls 
in early childhood. 
2.1.1 The current study 
The current experiment was designed not only to measure task-switching 
costs in preschool children, but also to create a paradigm that connects both 
child and adult performance. This was achieved by adopting an age-appropriate 
procedure, with minimal cognitive conflicts, to ensure high accuracy among the 
youngest participants. The task also requires attentional control in order to 
select, maintain and switch between task sets. Despite the low level of task-
difficulty and conflicts, the core principle of the task-switching procedure 
remains. It is hypothesised, therefore, that both mixing costs and switch costs 
will occur. In relation to developmental differences, it is posited that mixing costs 
will reflect the stimulus ambiguity and the demand on sequential selective 
attention. With an appropriate level of stimulus ambiguity, both children and 
adults should have little difficulty in selectively attending to the task-relevant 
attributes, and are therefore likely to exhibit similar mixing costs. An alternative 
to the stimulus ambiguity account is the working memory explanation of mixing 
costs which predicts an effect of development on mixing costs because working 
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memory has a protracted developmental trajectory to adolescence (Gathercole, 
Pickering, Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004).  
We also investigated the effect of development on switch costs. Here, we 
hypothesised that if the switch costs reflect cognitive control processes (e.g. 
task-reconfiguration and/or inhibitory control), then younger participants would 
experience greater switch costs than older participants.   
In the current study, we focused on both preschool children aged 4 and 6 
years, and adults. Given the significant changes in cognitive control in 
preschool years, it is particularly interesting to understand the processing costs 
associated with attentional shifts in this age group.  
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
Eighty-two participants took part in the study: thirty-four 4-year-olds (18 
males, mean age=4.55 years, SD=.26 years), twenty-six 6-year-olds (15 males, 
mean age =6.28 years, SD=.25 years), and twenty-two adults (8 males, mean 
age =29.86 years, SD=9.17 years). Children with outlier performances were 
excluded from the final set of analyses (seven 4-year-olds did not meet this 
inclusion criterion, see Result for details). All children were recruited from local 
primary schools and all testing was conducted in a quiet room at the 
participant’s school. Children were given token rewards (i.e. stickers) at the end 
of each block to maintain their motivations. Each session lasted around 30 
minutes. Adult participants were recruited from the University campus. No 
rewards were given to adults and they were tested in a quiet corner of the 
University campus.  Informed parental consent was obtained for each child 
participant and informed consent from each adult participant in accordance with 
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the University ethics committee guidelines. All participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision and hearing.  
2.2.2 Stimuli and design 
The current study employed an intermittent cued task-switching 
procedure with alternation-runs (i.e., the task switched every four trials). There 
were two detection tasks. Four categories were involved in the stimulus set 
(dog, cat, car and boat). Two of those (dog and car) formed the target set for 
the detection tasks while the remaining two formed the non-target set. The 
detection task involved 10 greyscale real-life photos in each category, totalling 
40 photos. Participants were seated approximately 40cm in front of a 15.4” 
Macbook Pro. Each task was cued explicitly with a line drawing (measured 
approximately 5.5cm x 4.2cm), presented centrally on the screen against a grey 
background before the onset of stimulus presentation. Each stimulus consisted 
of paired photos (each measured approximately 4.5cm x 4cm) chosen randomly 
from the target and the non-target sets (e.g. a dog photo paired with a boat), but 
never from the same category (e.g. there were never two dog photos). The two 
photos were presented centrally in a white rectangular frame measuring 10.5cm 
x 5.3cm. There were four trials after each cue. A smaller version of the cue 
(approximately 3.5cm x 2.7cm) was shown throughout the run, and was placed 
above the rectangular frame. Participants were instructed to respond to the 
stimulus by pressing the spacebar whenever the stimulus contained a task-
relevant target, and to withhold the response if no target was detected. The 
spacebar was marked with a green sticker for saliency. This procedure is similar 
to a Go/No-Go task as the non-target signalled ‘No-Go’ and the target signalled 
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‘Go’. There were two block types in this experiment, pure task blocks (2 blocks, 
40 trials each) and mixed task blocks (2 blocks, 40 trials each).  
An auditory feedback with a cash register ‘kerching’ sound lasting 300ms 
at 32,000Hz, and at approximately 45dB was played through closed-back 
headphones when the participant made a correct positive or a correct 
nonresponse during the testing session. The feedback was immediate for 
correct positive response, and 3700ms after the stimulus onset for a correct 
nonresponse.  
2.2.3 Procedure 
All testing was implemented using Matlab R2014b and Psychophysic 
Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). The 
experiment was divided into three parts—a demonstration session, a practice 
session and the testing session. The demonstration and the practice sessions 
were conducted with Microsoft PowerPoint. Neither the demonstration nor the 
practice sessions were timed, in order to allow opportunities for explanation and 
correction. There were 8 trials each for the demonstration and practice 
sessions, with 4 consecutive trials of the dog game and 4 consecutive trials of 
the car game. The presentation sequence in the demonstration and practice 
trials was pre-determined and the stimuli came from the actual stimulus set. 
Children were told that they were going to play a game that involved looking for 
certain items—whenever they saw a drawing of a dog/or car (task cue), they 
would be playing the dog/or car detection game. On each trial, the child was 
instructed to press the button if they saw a target photo, and to withhold their 
response if no target was present. The experimenter was free to clarify the task 
rules as much as possible during the demonstration phase. At the end of the 
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demonstration the experimenter queried the child about the rules. During the 
practice session, the experimenter gave additional verbal prompts at cue onsets 
(‘This is a dog/car game’) and on each trial (‘If you see a dog/car, press the 
button.’). During practice, the experimenter could also repeat the trial if the child 
made an error. 
The experiment consisted of four blocks. The first two blocks were pure 
blocks, consisting of one task in each block (e.g. one block of the dog game and 
one block of the car game), counterbalanced across participants. The final two 
blocks were mixed blocks, which involved switching between the car and dog 
games every four trials (Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1. Order of blocks in unimodal TS. 
 
Simple auditory feedback was given for correct positive responses and 
correct nonresponses.  A task cue was presented every four trials in both pure 
and mixed blocks. The test phase consisted of 160 trials equally spread across 
the blocks separated by a motivation screen to allow for a rest-break if needed. 
Targets appeared in 60% of the trials in both block types. The task switched 
every four trials in the mixed block: the trials preceded by a task cue in the 
mixed block were switch trials (switching to a different task from the previous 
trial), and the trials not preceded by a task-cue were repetition trial (repeating 
the same task as the previous trial). Sixty percent of the switch trials in the 
mixed blocks were target-positive. Children saw the cue for 3000ms, followed 
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by a 1000ms cue-stimulus-interval (CSI) showing a fixation cross. A stimulus 
appeared in the centre of the screen and remained until a response was made 
or timed out after 4000ms. The inter-stimulus interval (ISI) and response-cue-
interval (RCI) varied depending on the response—for a correct response, the 
interval was 1000ms; for an incorrect response, the interval was 2500ms to 
allow a recovery period. A fixation cross was shown during the ISI and RCI. A 
300ms auditory feedback sound was given for a correct answer (immediately 
after a correct positive response, or 3700ms after the stimulus onset for a 
correct nonresponse). Figure 2.2 illustrates the experimental procedure. 
 
Figure 2.2 Experimental design in the mixed block. CSI: Cue-stimulus interval, 
RSI: Response-stimulus interval.  
2.3 Results 
Both reaction time and accuracy were measured in this study. A series of 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were carried out to determine the between-
subject effect of Age and Gender, and the within-subject effects of Block Type 
(pure vs. mixed blocks), and Trial Types (switch trial vs. repetition trials). The 
first four trials in each block were excluded from the final data since they do not 
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correspond well to a specific trial type (i.e. the first trial in a mixed block was not 
a switch trial; and the repetition trials in a mixed block can be executed without 
referring to multiple task rules). Only correct positive responses were included 
in the RT analyses. Trials with an RT of less than 300ms were considered as 
anticipatory errors and were therefore excluded, and the response window was 
capped at the onset of the auditory feedback (3700ms after the stimulus). The 
current study made no assumption about the distribution of the RT samples for 
each participant. Instead, the mean RTs of each participant were obtained by 
resampling the RT data for 5000 times to bypass the distribution problems 
(Bollen & Stinet, 1990). The case for adopting a bootstrap method is particularly 
valid with the limited RT samples as in the current experiment (Mean number of 
RT samples ranged from 9.95 to 30.38 depending on the condition). The alpha 
level was set at .05 across all planned comparisons. Unless reported otherwise, 
all main effects of Age in the analyses reported below were significant at p<.01 
level.  
When testing such young children, there will always be participants who 
do not adhere to task instructions, for whatever reasons. Rather than choosing 
a pre-defined fixed level of performance as a cut off, we now adopt a cumulative 
probability method that allows the group to determine what the level of 
acceptable performance is by aiming to include ~95% of the participants. The 
level is set at 70% accuracy threshold in terms of a group-level performance. In 
our sample, 94% of participants reached this level of performance (Mean 
accuracy=90.09%, SD=12.88%). The cumulative probability method allows us 
to exclude participants with extreme performance while also letting the sample 
determine what the representative level of performance is. This resulted in the 
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exclusion of seven 4-year-olds, leaving data from 27 four-year-olds (Male=15), 
26 six-year-olds (Male=15), and 22 adults (Male=8) for the analyses. 
2.3.1 General Accuracy and RT on overall performance 
Gender and Age were entered as between-subject factors for the 
analyses of variance on Accuracy and RT. The main effect of Age was 
significant for both Accuracy (F(2,69)=82.86 p<.001) and RT (F(2,69)=9.07, 
p<.001). All age groups achieved high accuracy, but older participants were 
both more accurate and faster than younger participants (4-year-olds:  
Mean(SE)=89.5(1.6)%, 1552(48)ms; 6-year-olds: Mean(SE)=93.3 (1.4)%, 
1211(49)ms; adults: Mean(SE)=98.0(0.4)%, 734(33)ms). There was no main 
effect of Gender on RT (p>.600), or Accuracy (p>.070); nor was there an 
interaction between Age and Gender (ps>.400).  
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2.3.2 Mixing costs 
The mixing cost was determined by comparing performance on the trials 
not preceded by the task cue in the pure blocks, to the repetition trials in the 
mixed blocks. As shown in Figure 2.3, RT was longer and error rates were 
higher in the mixed blocks than in the pure blocks across all age groups.  
 
Figure 2.3 Mixing Cost: Left Panel—reaction time in the Pure blocks and the 
Mixed blocks in different age groups; Right Panel—error rates in the Pure and the Mixed 
blocks. All error bars denote within-subject 95% confidence intervals of means 
(Cousineau, 2005). 
 
Two separate repeated ANOVAs were carried out on RT and Accuracy, 
with Age (4-year-olds, 6-year-olds and adult) as the between-subject factor and 
Block Type (pure vs. mixed) as the within-subject factor. This revealed a 
significant effect of Block Type on both RT (FRT(1,72)=14.99, p<.001, η2=.172) 
and Accuracy (FACCU(1,72)=14.98, p<.001, η2=.172), indicating global mixing 
costs on both RT (Mpure(SE)=1127(44)ms; Mmixed(SE)=1214(47)ms) and on 
Accuracy (Mpure(SE)=94.94(.71)%; Mmixed(SE)=91.62(1.11)%). There was a 
marginally significant Age by Block Type interaction on Accuracy 
(FACCU(2,72)=2.92, p=.060, η2=.075), but not on RT (p>.300). Further analyses 
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revealed that the effect of Block Type on Accuracy was significant for 4-year-
olds (FACCU(1,23)=7.54, p<.020, η2=.247), and 6-year-olds (FACCU(1,25)=8.4, 
p<.010, η2=.251), but not adults, p>.300. 
We also examined the types of errors contributing to the lower accuracy 
in the mixed blocks. Due to the low number of error trials, non-parametric 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests for each age group were conducted to examine the 
number of omission errors (missing targets) and commission errors (false 
alarm). Adults were excluded from the analyses as there was a large number of 
ties (>10). Four-year-olds and six-year-olds did not exhibit significant 
differences in omission error between pure and mixed blocks (ps>.100). In 
contrast, the commission errors were significantly greater in mixed blocks than 
in pure blocks for 4-year-olds (Mdnpure=1, Mdnmixed=5, Z=-2.70, p<.007), and 6-
year-olds (Mdnpure=1.5, Mdnmixed=2, Z=-2.703, p<.007). 
  
 82 
2.3.3 Task-switch costs 
Switch trials and Repetition trials in the mixed blocks were entered into 
the analyses. RTs were longer on the switch trials across all age groups, but the 
accuracy rates were comparable across trial types (Figure 2.4). Two separate 
repeated ANOVAs were carried out on RT and Accuracy, with Age (4-year-olds, 
6-year-olds and adult) as a between-subject factor and Trial Types (repetition 
vs. switch) as a within-subject factor. The participants were significantly slower 
on Switch Trials than on Repetition Trials (FRT (1, 72)=20.59, p<.001 , η2=.222), 
indicating a local switch cost on RT (Mrep.(SE).=1214(47)ms; 
Mswi.(SE)=1341(58)ms). But no significant difference between Trial Types was 
found on Accuracy (p>.500). The Age X Trial Type interaction was not 
significant on either RT (p=.089) or Accuracy (p>.500). 
 
Figure 2.4. Switch Cost: Left Panel—reaction time in the Repetition Trials and 
the Switch Trials in different age groups; Right Panel—error rates in Repetition Trials 
and Switch Trials. All error bars denote within-subject 95% confidence intervals of 
means (Cousineau, 2005). 
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2.3.4 Response-repetition effect 
Only trials that were not preceded by a task-cue were included in the 
analyses of response repetition effect (i.e. pure trials and repetition trials). The 
participants were quicker at making a response when it was preceded by a 
response than when preceded by a nonresponse (Figure 2.5).  A repeated 
ANOVA was carried out with Age (4-year-olds, 6-year-olds and adult) as a 
between-subject factor, and Trial Type (single response vs. repeated response) 
and Block Type (pure vs. mixed) as within-subject factors. The overall ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Trial Type (F(1,72)=42.32, p<.001, η2=.370) 
and Block Type (F(1,72)=10.53, p<.002, η2=.128). Younger children 
experienced a greater response repetition effect than adults (Trial Type X Age: 
F(2,72)=4.26, p<.020, η2=.106). Follow-up analyses revealed that both 4-year-
olds and 6-year-olds experienced a significant response repetition effect 
(ps<.001, η2 >.400), but not adults (p>.050). There was an interaction of Trial 
Type X Block Type (F(2,72)=23.41, p<.001, η2=.245). No three-way interaction 
was found (p>.100). 
The Trial Type X Block Type interaction was further explored using one-
way ANOVAs separated by Trial Type, with Block Type as the within-subject 
factor. These analyses revealed that the effect of Block Type (pure vs. mixed) 
was only evident in the single response trials (F(1, 74)=33.51, p<.001, η2=.312), 
but not in the repeated response trials (p>.600).  This finding suggests that RT 
mixing costs might be largely attributable to RT increase in the single-response 
trials in the mixed blocks, but not in the repeated-response trials, and the 
pattern was similar across all ages. 
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Figure 2.5. Response Repetition Effect in the Pure and Mixed blocks: Single 
Response vs. Repeated Response. Error bars represent within-subject 95% confidence 
intervals of means in Pure and Mixed blocks (Cousineau, 2005). 
2.4 Discussion 
The current study has investigated developmental differences in 
processing costs using a task-switching paradigm with a child-friendly novel 
design similar to a Go/No-Go detection task. The task yielded high accuracy 
rates— with 27 out of 34 in the youngest group achieving a mean accuracy 
score of 89.5% or above. The task was therefore suitable for measuring both 
RT and accuracy scores in children as young as 4 years of age, as well as 
adults. Having established the age-appropriateness of the experimental design, 
the current study investigated the impact of age on mixing cost, switch cost and 
response-repetition.  
Both children and adults were slower in the mixed-task blocks than in the 
pure-task blocks. However, age did not interact with RT mixing costs, 
suggesting that RT mixing costs do not load heavily on cognitive control 
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components known to develop across this age range (e.g. working memory). 
Instead, the current study provides support for the view that RT mixing costs 
reflect some elements of the selection processes involved in multitasking. In the 
current study, the task attributes are easily separable (i.e. the targets were not 
compound stimuli); consequently, there was a reduced demand on selective 
attention. In this context, we found that preschool children did not find it harder 
to manage two tasks than adults, at least in terms of RT costs related to 
switching between tasks. It thus appears that the efficiency in dealing with 
multiple tasks and the ability to attend selectively to simple task attributes are 
present in the preschool years, particularly when the tasks and stimuli are age-
appropriate. This finding is comparable to Dibbets and Jolles's (2006) study, in 
which a child-friendly version of a task-switching experiment also found no age 
effect on RT mixing costs (from 4 to 13 years old). These findings raise some 
questions about the developmental effect on mixing costs reported in other 
studies (e.g. Cepeda, Kramer, & Gonzalez de Sather, 2001; Davidson, Amso, 
Anderson, & Diamond, 2006). In particular, it is unclear if the developmental 
effect on mixing costs reflect developmental differences in cognitive control, or 
instead, reflects experience-dependent understanding of task structures and 
stimulus/response attributes, and/or the efficiency in translating stimulus into 
response execution (c.f. Ridderinkhof, van der Molen, Band, & Bashore, 1997). 
Interestingly, the RT mixing cost was evident only when the response was not 
repeated in the previous trial. Thus, whatever the difficulty in the mixed blocks 
was, it could be overridden easily by the facilitative primes. While the pattern of 
response repetition facilitation was evident across all ages, our analysis showed 
that preschool children experienced a greater response repetition effect than 
adults. This is consistent with Crone et al.'s (2006) finding that children 
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experience a greater effect from transient stimulus-response associations. 
However, due to the lower resolution with Go/No Go procedure, compared to 
the choice procedure, response repetition in our study is an imprecise index of 
the associative primes. In our experiment, priming facilitation could come from 
stimulus value-response associations, stimulus category-response associations, 
task goal-response associations and/or other forms of multi-way associations. It 
is not known if children experience a greater level of priming effect at all levels, 
or from a specific form of primes, compared to adults. 
Although there was no age interaction effect on RT mixing costs, a 
moderate age interaction effect was found for accuracy mixing costs. 
Specifically, 4- and 6-year-olds made more commission errors in the mixed 
blocks than in the pure blocks. If the poorer performance in the mixed blocks 
was due to working memory demands, such that the children had difficulties in 
maintaining the relevant goal state, then we would expect an increase in both 
omission and commission errors. Instead, the increase in commission errors 
alone indicates that the reason behind the errors is due to 4- and 6-year-olds’ 
failure to override responses to task-irrelevant attributes, which could be 
underlain by an inhibitory deficit. The overall result is also consistent with the 
presence of a larger response repetition effect among preschool children than 
adults. Goschke (2000) argued that the level of response inhibition is in 
proportion to the risk of perseverative responses (also see Grzyb & Hübner, 
2013). While this strategic proportional inhibition-to-interference task strategy 
might be well practiced by adults, it might not be robustly employed by children. 
Overall our results suggest that attentional selectivity and interferences are 
dissociable components. Although preschool children may be equipped with the 
requisite attentional selectivity and perform well in multi-task condition, they 
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experienced both greater facilitation and interference from the primed 
associations, as exhibited in the greater response repetition effect and 
commission errors.  
The RT switch costs were also evident across all age groups, replicating 
previous findings that switching to another task-set produces reliable RT costs 
even when allowing a generous preparation time for the upcoming task. Switch 
costs have generally been taken to reflect additional cognitive processes in 
task-set reconfiguration (Meiran, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein et 
al., 2001), and in development, to other general endogenous factors such as 
the ability to reflect on changing situations and to inhibit prepotent 
representations (Cepeda et al., 2001; Diamond et al., 2005). We therefore 
predicted that preschool children would experience greater switch costs than 
adults.  Contrary to our prediction, we found no age interaction with the RT and 
accuracy switch costs, indicating that switch costs are not a sensitive 
measurement of the development of cognitive control. Children as young as 4 
years old were effective at preparing for the alternative task prior to the stimulus 
onset, incurring no cost in accuracy on switch trials as compared to the 
repetition trials.  
Perhaps the combination of a long preparation window, high target 
discriminability and the overall task simplicity allowed any potential 
developmental effects to be minimised. However, other studies using more 
‘traditional’ task design and stimuli have also failed to find an age interaction 
with switch costs ( e.g. color/shape task with participants aged 7 to adults [Exp. 
1], Ellefson, Shapiro, & Chater, 2006). It seems likely that switch costs are more 
sensitive to other factors such as the carry-over effect from pre-switch trials, in 
which the inhibition of the task-set (e.g Mayr & Keele, 2000) and/or the 
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activation of the n-1 task/stimulus has lingered into the switch trial (Allport et al., 
1994). That said, our study demonstrates that young children can clearly switch 
between different goal states given an age appropriate task and context. The 
developmental differences in switch costs observed in other studies may reflect 
differences in carry-over effects rather than the ability to shift between mindsets.  
Overall, the current study has found that 4- to 6-year-olds exhibit mixing 
costs and switch costs in very similar ways to adults. The lack of an age 
interaction effect on switch costs indicates that children as young as 4 were 
able to prepare for the task set prior to stimulus onset; while the absence of an 
age interaction effect on RT mixing costs suggests that, given the current 
design, children experienced a similar amount of stimulus ambiguity as adults. 
In sum, the attentional control necessary to perform at least two tasks and to 
switch between tasks is present in preschool children. Although the attention 
flexibility in switching between tasks is largely present at the age of 4, there are 
still developmental differences uncovered in the current study. Younger children 
appeared to have greater difficulty in overriding an erroneous response that 
resulted in an increase in commission errors in the mixed blocks; relatedly, they 
also experienced greater response repetition facilitation. And finally, as 
expected, younger children were overall slower and less accurate than older 
participants, irrespective to the trial type. It remains unclear why younger 
children are less accurate than adults, despite exhibiting the ability to perform a 
task.    
The primary aim of the current study was to investigate the extent to 
which preschool children exhibit cognitive and attentional flexibility in a multitask 
context, and whether this flexibility, if present, reflects global mechanisms 
associated with task-switching and task maintenance, or rather, reflects other 
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task-specific factors such as the types of stimulus attributes and the ease of 
translating perceptual information into response selection, as well as general 
novelty. Since the current study found no age interaction effects on either 
mixing costs or switch costs, it is likely that previous reports of age interaction 
effects reflect other processes specific to each task context. The range of 
attentional and cognitive processes in different task-switching studies is greatly 
variable, and therefore the cognitive demand to switch task and to multitask can 
differ greatly between experiments and between age groups. However, by 
focusing on the most demanding type of task for preschool children (e.g. those 
that involve novel situation, high working memory and inhibitory demand, and 
complex stimulus-response translations), preschool children’s attentional control 
may be underappreciated. In all, our study suggests that a task-switching 
paradigm itself is insufficient to uncover developmental differences in attentional 
control, and more detailed specifications of processing cost beyond a general 
measurement of mixing costs and switch costs are needed to understand 
developmental differences in cognitive control using task-switching procedures.  
While the current study was inspired by task-switching studies in the 
adult literature, it made some major modifications to the experimental design. 
Most notably, the task took the form of Go/No-Go with a single response, rather 
than the typical two-button choice task. One may argue that changing the 
nature of stimulus-response mappings could have a dramatic effect on task 
conflicts, and therefore masking the developmental differences in cognitive 
controls in dealing with these task conflicts. It is well known that younger 
children are poorer at overcoming prepotent responses (e.g. Ridderinkhof, van 
der Molen, Band, & Bashore, 1997; Simpson et al., 2012; Wright & Diamond, 
2014). Stimulus-response conflicts are often inherent in the task-switching 
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paradigm as most studies employed choice tasks with bivalent response sets. 
At least one adult task-switching study employed Go-NoGo similar to the 
current study and found sizeable switch costs (Schuch & Koch, 2003). It was 
also found that switch costs were dependent on the response execution of the 
n-1 trial, where a response was necessary to elicit switch costs. Nonetheless, 
both choice and Go/No-Go designs show a consistent pattern of processing 
costs. When the level of task difficulty and conflicts are aligned across age 
groups, there is no strong reason to believe that an age effect on mixing costs 
and switch costs, if present, would be affected by the decision to adopt Go-
NoGo or choice tasks.  
In summary, the current study found that preschool children have the 
attentional flexibility to switch between two competing tasks, incurring no 
greater between-condition costs than adults. When focusing on RT measures, 
we found that preschool children did not exhibit greater difficulty at multitasking, 
nor at moment-to-moment shifts between two different task goals, when the 
tasks and stimuli were age-appropriate. Our findings suggest that the age 
effects reported in cognitive flexibility may derive from resolving task conflicts 
and/or differences in age-related familiarity with the stimuli and the testing 
context, rather than difficulties in task switching per se.  
In Chapter 3, I will explore whether the findings in the unimodal TS study 
still hold in a multisensory environment, using a cross-modal task-switching 
study (bimodal CMTS). The bimodal CMTS in Chapter 3 is procedurally 
equivalent to the unimodal task-witching study in this chapter, making it suitable 
for direct comparison. Finally, in addition to the task-associated effects 
described here, our next chapter also explores modality-associated effects such 
as modality dominance and the modality shift effect (MSE). 
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Chapter 3. Experiment 2: Cross-modal task-switching 
with bimodal stimuli (bimodal CMTS) 
The current study in this chapter aims to extend the task-switching 
paradigm to a multisensory context to align better with the real world. Our 
previous unimodal task-switching study using a simple detection tasks found 
significant mixing costs and switch costs in all age groups; however, the costs 
were not moderated by development. It thus appears that young children were 
as effective as adults in both managing multiple tasks and switching between 
tasks, at least in a unisensory context. The main objective of the bimodal cross-
modal task-switching (bimodal CMTS) is to establish that both mixing costs and 
switch costs persist in different experimental contexts, including in a 
multisensory environment, and that both children and adults still exhibit 
comparable costs in these between-condition measures. Additionally, the 
current study will explore modality-associated effects, namely modality shift 
effect and modality dominance. 
3.1 Introduction 
In this study, we explored whether task-associated effects in task-
switching paradigm can be found in multisensory environment. The main aims 
of the current study are to (1) replicate the task-associated effects (mixing and 
switch costs) commonly found in unimodal task-switching paradigm, (2) explore 
the effect of response repetition in different trial types, (3) understand the costs 
in shifting between modalities, and (4) investigate modality dominance with 
bimodal stimuli. All these three research objectives will be explored from a 
developmental standpoint. 
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Our previous unimodal task-switching experiment showed that young 
children did not exhibit a larger between-condition mixing and switch costs, 
compared to adults. Our results suggest a relatively mature ability in multi-
tasking and in adaptively responding to environmental changes in young 
children. However, the experimental paradigm with tasks in a unisensory 
environment often involve involuntary effects such as stimulus-response primes 
that may otherwise obscure the cost related to endogenous control in goal shifts 
and goal representations. 
As we have seen in unimodal TS, response-repetition has a facilitative 
effect in trials where there was no change in task goal. Our unimodal TS 
experiment has shown that this facilitative effect was greater in repetition trials 
in mixed blocks than in pure blocks, and greater yet in children than in adults. In 
fact, the facilitation was so strong that it effectively eliminated mixing costs 
when comparing primed repetition trials (i.e. repeated-response) with primed 
pure trials (Fig. 2.5, Chapter 2). Similarly, RT switch costs might also be due to 
the differences in the priming effects in repetition and switch trials in mixed 
blocks. Past research has documented that response repetition has a facilitative 
effect only when the task repeats, but not when the task changes (Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). This is due to the fact that in switch trials with repeated 
responses, there is a change in the associative prime as the stimulus was 
previously associated to a different task goal on n-1 trial. Therefore, it is likely 
that, similar to the absence of RT mixing costs between primed pure and 
repetition trials in the unimodal TS experiment, a major source of RT switch cost 
was to do with the differences in priming effects (indexed by response 
repetition) in repetition and switch trials in mixed blocks. In this experiment, we 
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will examine response repetition effects in different trial types to confirm that 
priming facilitation is indeed constrained by task. 
Since differences in primes are likely to contribute to the overall between-
condition costs, one advantage of using cross-modal task procedures is the 
possibility of controlling for the effects of these task-unrelated involuntary 
processes, at least at the level of perceptual stimulus. If switch costs in the 
unimodal TS experiment largely reflected the activation of a supramodal task 
goal, then switch costs should persist in CMTS, even after within-modal priming 
facilitation in repetition trials is controlled for. With cross-modal task-switching 
procedure, we can explore whether switch costs are indeed goal-related and 
replicable. 
Additionally, the present study also explored the other form of attentional 
shift, namely shifting between modalities. Modality shift effect (MSE) refers to a 
slowed response when shifting attention from a different modality, compared to 
attending to the same modality. Currently it is not known about whether MSE 
can also be a useful index for the development of multisensory attentional 
control.  
There are reasons to speculate that young children may exhibit a 
different MSE from adults. Specifically, young children appear to deploy 
attention differently from adults on tasks where independent, potentially 
inhibitory, cross-modal attention processes are needed (i.e. as opposed to 
multisensory integration)  (e.g. Barnhart, Rivera, & Robinson, 2018; Leary & 
Sloutsky, 2013; Nava & Pavani, 2013; Robinson & Sloutsky, 2004; Thomas, 
Nardini, & Mareschal, 2017). On such cross-modal tasks young children often 
exhibit auditory dominance when attending to audiovisual information, whereas 
adults typically exhibit visual dominance. The modality dominance effect is the 
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phenomenon in which the information in the dominant modality overshadows or 
degrades the information in the non-dominant modalities. Adult visual 
dominance is well established. For example, Colavita (1974) asked participants 
to make modality-based choice responses on auditory-only, visual-only or 
audiovisual stimuli. On audiovisual trials, adults often missed the auditory 
element and made visual-based errors (Colavita, 1974; Koppen & Spence, 
2007; Ngo, Sinnett, Soto-Faraco, & Spence, 2010; Sinnett, Spence, & Soto-
Faraco, 2007). In comparison, young children typically exhibit auditory 
dominance on Colavita-type tasks (Nava & Pavani, 2013; Wille & Ebersbach, 
2016), and other induction and detection tasks (Leary & Sloutsky, 2013; 
Robinson & Sloutsky, 2004; Sloutsky & Napolitano, 2003).  
Most research on modality dominance has focused on discrete 
performance measures such as modality-based errors or other modality-based 
decisions, because both auditory and visual elements in the bimodal stimuli are 
typically task-relevant targets. However, modality dominance on continuous 
measure, such as RTs, has also been reported (Nava & Pavani, 2013; Sinnett, 
Soto-Faraco, & Spence, 2008). In Sinnett et al.’s (2008) RT-based experiment, 
the participants were presented with unimodal auditory, unimodal visual and 
bimodal stimuli intermixed in a series of trials, and were asked to detect targets 
in one modality only (i.e. auditory-target block vs. visual-target block). On 
bimodal trials, the cross-modal information is redundant and not task-
associated. Intriguingly, the cross-modal effects were different between auditory 
and visual conditions. Compared to the unimodal targets, visual target detection 
was quicker with a redundant cross-modal auditory distractor, whereas the 
auditory target detection was slower with a cross-modal visual distractor. This 
study found the coexistence of visual dominance (i.e. interference) on auditory 
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processing as well as auditory facilitation on visual processing. Given that 
young children are reported to have auditory dominance in error-types and in 
induction learning (Nava & Pavani, 2013; Robinson & Sloutsky, 2010; Sloutsky 
& Napolitano, 2003), it is unclear whether this auditory dominance would slow 
down visual processing in children, or, facilitate visual processing as found in 
adults. 
If young children and adults exhibit different modality dominance, they 
may potentially exhibit different patterns of MSE. One reason for why MSE may 
change as a function of modality dominance is because an asymmetric cost is 
often observed when two processes vary in strengths. For example, an 
asymmetric cost has been reported in task-switching studies when switching 
between word and colour tasks with Stroop task stimuli (Allport et al., 1994). 
Although the asymmetry cost at the task-set level is also possibly caused by 
greater cognitive control on the weaker task and not simply by the asymmetry in 
task strengths (Gilbert & Shallice, 2002), at this stage, it remains unclear how 
modality dominance may interact with MSE. 
The first aim of the present study is to replicate the task-associated 
effects found in the unimodal TS study (Chapter 2)—namely, a significant main 
effect of mixing cost and switch cost, but no significant developmental 
differences in these costs. Secondly, the current study aimed to understand the 
constraints of RT facilitation from involuntary inter-trial events. Thirdly, since the 
current study employed bimodal stimuli, it also allows for the investigation of 
RT-based auditory dominance in children and visual dominance in adults. The 
final aim is to explore the development of the MSE, since no developmental 
studies have been carried out in this area. In sum, this experiment investigates 
the cost of switching between different tasks, of shifting between visual and 
 96 
auditory modalities in a multisensory environment, and the effect of modality 
dominance on modality shift effects. 
3.2. Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-four 4-year-olds (16 males, mean age=4.57 years, SD=.23 year), 
25 six-year-olds (16 males, mean age=6.60 years, SD=.28 year) and 26 adults 
(9 males, mean age=28.51 years, SD=8.26 years) participated in this 
experiment. All children were recruited from state-funded primary schools in the 
Greater London, UK, and all testing was carried out in a quiet room at the 
participant’s school. All adult participants were recruited from the University 
campus, and all testing sessions were carried out in the testing lab. Informed 
parental consent was obtained for each child participant and informed consent 
for each adult participant in accordance with the University ethics committee 
guidelines. Children were given a token reward (i.e. stickers) at the end of each 
block and a certificate at the end of the study. Adult participants received course 
credits for participating in the experiment. All participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision and hearing. A unimodal baseline task was carried 
out with a subset of randomly selected participants (11 4-year-olds, eleven 6-
year-olds, and 10 adults). Children with outlier performances were excluded 
from the final set of analyses (9 4-year-olds did not meet the inclusion criterion, 
see Result for details). Each session lasted around 30 minutes. 
3.2.2 Materials 
As with the previous unimodal TS study (Chapter 2), the current study 
employed an intermittent cued task-switching procedure with alternation-runs 
 97 
(i.e., the task switched every four trials). Most testing sessions were carried out 
on a 15.4” MacBook Pro (Mid 2012 release). However, 20 out of 26 adults 
received the experiment administered on a 13” MacBook Air (2013 release) due 
to equipment shortage. The main differences between the two laptops are the 
screen size and processing speed. To address the issue of screen size, the 
image sizes were calibrated to the same dimensions in centimetres in both 
apparatuses. Processing speed of the system was not thought to be an issue 
since adult subjects were much quicker than children; the differences in RT 
caused by processing speed were negligible when comparing performances 
between age groups. Participants were seated approximately 40cm in front of 
the laptop. 
The experiment consisted of detection tasks with explicit task cues. 
There were four categories of animals presented in the game—dog, bird, cat, 
and sheep. For each participant, two of the animal categories were target 
animals, and the remaining two animal categories were neutral distractors (i.e. 
not associated with any task goal). Half of the participants played bird-dog 
detection games while the other half played cat-sheep detection games. The 
participants were asked to monitor both visual and auditory inputs since the 
target animal could appear randomly in either modality. They were asked to 
press the Apple Magic Mouse (i.e. single response key) highlighted with a green 
sticker upon relevant target detection, and withhold the response if no relevant 
target was present. 
Tasks were explicitly signalled by multimodal cues before the onset of 
stimuli. The task cues consisted of a line drawing measuring 8cm x 6.7cm and a 
spoken word at approximately 65dB (e.g. dog drawing with spoken word ‘Dog’). 
The duration of the visual element of the cue was 3000ms, however the 
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duration of the auditory element was between 630ms to 750ms as the word was 
only spoken once. There were 10 different greyscale photos measuring 
approximately 5.3cm x 4.5cm, and 10 different animal sounds measuring 
approximately 70-75dB, for each animal category (e.g. a ‘cat’ set contained 10 
different cat photos and 10 different meows). All stimuli were audiovisual and 
consisted of one visual element and one auditory element randomly selected 
from the four animal sets. The visual and auditory elements of the bimodal 
stimulus were always from different categories (e.g. a dog picture paired with a 
cat sound). A continuous neutral water sound was played in the background at 
approximately 45dB throughout the experiment, in order to match the 
continuous presentation of visual information that occurs in these types of 
experiments. 
Figure 3.1 shows the sample stimuli in the experiment. The visual 
elements of both cues and stimuli were presented centrally on the screen inside 
a white presentation window measuring 15.8cm x 10.6cm against a grey 
background. To minimise working memory demand, a smaller version of the 
task cue measuring 4.5cm x3.7cm was placed above the presentation window 
as a reminder throughout each trial. The participants were instructed not to look 
at the peripheral task reminder unless needed. All auditory elements were 
played through a child-friendly closed-back headphone to both ears at around 
70-75dB. A task cue was shown every four trials.  
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Figure 3.1. Experimental design in the mixed blocks. CSI: Cue-stimulus interval, 
RSI: Response-stimulus interval. All stimuli were bimodal with one visual element and 
one auditory element. Trials with a red border were examples of target-positive trials .  
 
An auditory feedback with a cash register ‘kerching’ sound lasting 300ms 
at 32,000Hz, and at approximately 45dB was played through closed-back 
headphones when the participant made a correct positive or a correct 
nonresponse during the testing session. The feedback was immediate for 
correct positive response, and 3700ms after the stimulus onset for a correct 
nonresponse.  
In addition to the audiovisual stimuli in the experimental condition, a 
baseline condition was completed out with a subset of the participants. Using 
the same stimulus sets as in the experimental conditions, the baseline condition 
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involved a unimodal detection tasks with a single target category in each block. 
The aim of the baseline condition was to test the baseline speed for target 
detection without cross-modal distractors. Performance in the baseline condition 
will be compared against performance in the pure blocks with cross-modal 
distractors, in order to examine any modality dominance effects caused by the 
concurrent cross-modal events. The baseline condition involved four blocks—a 
unimodal visual block and a unimodal auditory block for each target category 
(e.g. bird-visual, bird-auditory, dog-visual, dog-auditory), with the order of the 
target modality counterbalanced across participants. The task cues were 
unimodal—a visual cue for the visual block and an auditory cue for the auditory 
block. In the auditory block, a fixation cross was presented in the centre of the 
screen when the auditory cue and stimuli were presented. In the visual block, 
the same continuous background neutral water sound was played at 
approximately 45dB throughout the experiment. 
3.2.3 Procedure 
All testing was implemented using Matlab R2014b and Psychophysic 
Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). The 
experiment was divided into four parts—a sound familiarisation session, a 
demonstration session, a practice session and the testing session. A subset of 
the participants also underwent a fifth baseline session at the end of the 
experiment. The baseline session was always carried out at the end in order to 
prevent practice effects in the main experimental condition—although, as a 
result, practice from the main experimental condition might have compromised 
the results obtained in the baseline condition. 
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The sound familiarisation, demonstration and the pre-testing sessions 
were conducted using Microsoft PowerPoint. Neither of these sessions was 
timed, in order to allow opportunities for explanation and correction.  
3.2.3.1 Sound familiarisation session 
Although all stimuli were likely to be familiar to all ages, because the 
photos and sounds were chosen carefully to be as transparent as possible, it 
was still a concern that the participants might be unfamiliar with some of the 
sounds. Therefore, the aim of the sound familiarisation session was to 
maximise the likelihood that the participants were able to identify the animal 
categories correctly by the sounds. The session was for demonstrative purpose 
only and the participants did not need to respond in this session. However, they 
were instructed to remember the sounds and were told that the sounds would 
appear in the game later on. There were two blocks of sounds—one for each 
target category. The experimenter explicitly stated which animal category the 
sounds were from at the beginning of the block (e.g. ‘I am going to show you 
sounds from different birds. Listen carefully.’). At the beginning of each 
presentation the experimenter gave a reminder of the category of the sound 
(e.g. ‘Here comes another bird.’). Each sound lasted for 4 second. All 10 
sounds from each target category were presented in the session. 
3.2.3.2 Demonstration and practice session 
There were 8 trials each for the demonstration and practice sessions, 
with 4 consecutive trials of one task (e.g. bird) and 4 consecutive trials of the 
other task (e.g. dog). The presentation sequence in the demonstration and 
practice trials was pre-determined and the stimuli came from the actual stimulus 
set. Children were told that they were going to play a game that involved looking 
 102 
for certain animals—whenever they were shown the task cue (e.g. audiovisual 
task cue), they would be playing the bird/or dog (or cat/or sheep) detection 
game. On each trial, the child was instructed to press the Magic Mouse if they 
saw or heard the target animal, and to withhold their response if no target was 
present. The experimenter was free to clarify the task rules as much as possible 
during the demonstration phase, and to use communicative gesture (e.g. 
‘pointing to the bird’), verbal query (e.g. ‘Did you hear a bird?’) and verbal 
encouragement where appropriate. At the end of the demonstration session, the 
experimenter queried the child about the rules (e.g. ‘What should you be looking 
for when you see the cartoon drawing of a bird?/ How do you tell the computer 
when you find it?’). The duration of each stimulus was roughly 4 seconds, but 
the slides were manually controlled by the experimenter. 
There were four trials for each task in the practice session. During the 
practice session, the experimenter gave additional verbal prompts at cue onsets 
(‘This is a bird/dog game’) and on each trial (‘If you see or hear a dog/bird, 
press the button.’). If the participant made an error, the experimenter could 
repeat the trial. No participants were excluded as a result of performance in the 
practice session; all participants proceeded to the testing session regardless of 
the performance during the practice session. 
3.2.3.3.Testing session 
The experiment consisted of six blocks, with 168 trials spread evenly 
across the blocks separated by a motivation screen between blocks to allow for 
a rest-break if needed. The first two blocks were pure blocks, consisting of one 
task in each block, with the order of the tasks counterbalanced across 
participants. The final four blocks were mixed blocks, which involved switching 
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between the two tasks every four trials. There were 56 trials in the pure blocks, 
and 112 trials in the mixed blocks.  
A task cue was presented every four trials in both pure and mixed blocks. 
Trials in the pure blocks involved only one task rule. In the mixed blocks, the 
task switched every four trials, resulting in two trial types. The trials preceded by 
a task cue in the mixed block were switch trials (switching to a different task 
from the previous trial), and the trials not preceded by a task-cue were repetition 
trial (repeating the same task as the previous trial). Children were shown the 
audiovisual cue for 3000ms, followed by a 1000ms cue-stimulus-interval (CSI) 
showing a fixation cross. The visual element of the stimulus appeared in the 
centre of the screen, and the auditory element of the stimulus appeared 
bilaterally to both ears. The stimulus was terminated when a positive response 
(i.e. button-press) was made or timed out after 4000ms (nonresponse). The 
inter-stimulus interval (ISI) and response-cue-interval (RCI) varied depending 
on the response—for a correct response, the interval was 1000ms; for an 
incorrect response, the interval was 2500ms to allow a recovery period. A 
fixation cross was shown during the ISI and RCI. A 300ms auditory feedback 
sound was given for a correct answer (immediately after a correct positive 
response, or 3700ms after the stimulus onset for a correct nonresponse).  
Targets appeared on 64.3% of the trials in either pure blocks (36 out of 
56 trials) or mixed blocks (72 out of 112 trials). Half of the targets were visual 
targets and the other half were auditory targets. In the pure blocks, only one 
target set appeared in each block (e.g. for participants who were assigned bird-
dog as target sets, in the ‘Dog’ pure block, the bird stimulus set was not used, 
and vice versa). In the mixed blocks, there were different types of target trials—
uni-selection trials in which only one element was from either target sets and 
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the other element was from the neutral sets, and bi-selection trials in which both 
elements were from the target sets. Among the 72 target-positive trials in the 
mixed blocks, 52 target were uni-selection trials, and 20 were bi-selection trials. 
In both conditions, the visual elements and auditory elements of the bimodal 
stimulus were from different animal categories. 
3.2.3.4 Baseline session 
As mentioned previously, only a subset of participants completed the 
baseline session with unimodal stimuli. The experimental procedure was similar 
to the pure blocks in the main experiment. There were four blocks in the 
baseline session—one unimodal visual and one unimodal auditory block for 
each of the two target category pairs (e.g. bird-dog). The first two blocks were of 
the same task (e.g. bird-visual and bird-auditory), and the latter two blocks were 
of the other task (e.g. dog-visual and dog-auditory). The order of the blocks by 
stimulus modality was counterbalanced across participants (e.g. the visual block 
followed by the auditory block or vice versa). Each block began with the 
unimodal task cue (e.g. bird drawing), followed by 12 trials in each block. The 
target appeared in 50% of the trials (6 out of 12 trials). All cue duration, stimulus 
duration, CSI, ISI and RSI were the same as in the main experiment. 
3.3 Results 
Both reaction time and accuracy were measured. A series of analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) were carried out to determine the between-subject effects 
of Age and Gender, and the within-subject effects of Block Type (pure vs. mixed 
blocks), and Trial Types (switch trial vs. repetition trials). The first four trials in 
each block were excluded from the final data since they do not correspond well 
to a specific task condition or trial types (i.e. the first trial in the mixed blocks 
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was not a switch trial; and the repetition trials in the mixed blocks can be 
executed without reference to multiple task rules). Only correct positive 
responses were included in the RT analyses. Trials with an RT of less than 
300ms were considered as anticipatory errors and were therefore excluded, and 
the response window was capped at the onset of the auditory feedback 
(3700ms after the stimulus).  
The current study made no assumption about the distribution of the RT 
samples for each participant. Instead, the mean RTs of each participant were 
obtained by resampling the RT data for 5000 times to bypass the distribution 
problems (Bollen & Stinet, 1990). The case for adopting a bootstrap method is 
particularly valid with the limited RT samples as in the current experiment. The 
alpha level was set at .05 across all planned comparisons. Unless reported 
otherwise, all main effects of Age in the analyses reported below were 
significant at p<.01 level.  
As with the previous unimodal TS study, the exclusion criterion was 
based on group-level performance to determine what the level of acceptable 
performance is when including ~95% of the participants. Group-level 
performance was at 70% accuracy so that, in our sample, 95.04% of 
participants reached this level of performance (Mean accuracy=89.63%, 
SD=11.91%). This cumulative probability method allows us to exclude 
participants with extreme performance while also letting the sample determine 
what the representative level of performance is. This resulted in the exclusion of 
5 4-year-olds, leaving data from 29 four-year-olds (Male=13), 25 six-year-olds 
(Male=16), and 26 adults (Male=9) for the analyses. 
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3.3.1 Overall Accuracy and Reaction Time (RT) 
3.3.1.1 Group Effects (Age, Gender and Target Set) 
To test for group effects, between-subject factors of Gender, Target Set 
(set 1: bird-dog; set 2: cat-sheep), and Age were entered into a multivariate 
analyses of variance (MANOVA) on RT and Accuracy. There were no 
significant interactions among the variables (Fs<2.45, ps>.090), and no 
significant effect of Gender on either dependent measure (F(1,68)<.20, 
ps>.600). There was no significant effect of Target Set on RT (F(1,68)=3.0, 
p>.080) or Accuracy (F(1,68)=.11, p>.700). There was a significant effect of 
Age on RT (F(2,68)=79.43 p<.001) and Accuracy F(2,68)=49.78 p<.001). As 
expected, older participants were both more accurate and faster than younger 
participants (4-year-olds: Mean(SE)=83.9(1.4)%, 1632(52)ms; 6-year-olds: 
Mean(SE)=94.5(0.6)%, 1170(43)ms; adults: Mean(SE)=98.1(0.4)%, 
848(40)ms). 
3.3.2 Task-associated costs 
3.3.2.1 Mixing Cost 
Task-associated mixing costs were determined by comparing the 
performance between trials in the pure blocks, and repetition trials in the mixed 
blocks. Since task cues were presented every four trials in both pure and mixed 
blocks, to control for the cueing effect, only trials not preceded by the task cue 
were analysed. The number of RT data samples obtained in the pure blocks 
was Mean(SD)=20.6(3.0), and for the mixed blocks was Mean(SD)=44.6(4.8). 
The mean Accuracy and RT on pure trials and mixed trials (i.e. repetition) did 
not reveal any consistent mixing effect in any age groups (Fig. 3.2). 
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A mixed model ANOVA was carried out with Block Type (pure vs. mixed-
repetition) as a within-subject factor, and Age as between-subject factor, on the 
dependent measures of RT and Accuracy. There were no significant effects of 
Block Type on either RT or Accuracy (ps>.500); nor interactions between Age 
and Block Type on Accuracy (p>.800), although there was a trend on RT 
(p=.068). The marginal interaction between Age and Block Type in RT 
appeared to be driven by the longer RT in the mixed blocks in 6-year-olds; 
however, no overall mixing effect on RT was found across the age groups.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Mixing Cost: Reaction time (left-panel) and error rates (right-
panel) in the Pure blocks and the Mixed blocks (i.e. repetition trials) in different 
age groups. All error bars denote within-subject 95% confidence intervals of 
means (Cousineau, 2005). 
3.3.2.2 Switch Cost 
The accuracy switch cost was calculated by comparing the repetition 
trials and switch trials in the mixed blocks (see Figure 3.3). The RT switch cost 
was calculated by comparing the modality-shift task-repetition trials (MSTR) and 
switch trials in the mixed blocks (due to the intermittent task cue, modality 
shift/repetition cannot be indexed on switch trials). Comparing switch trials with 
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MSTR trials allowed within-modal priming facilitation on repetition trials to be 
controlled for. The results were analysed with a mixed model ANOVA with Trial 
Type (repetition vs. switch) as the within-subject variable, and Age as the 
between-subject variable, on dependent measures of RT and Accuracy. The 
number of RT data samples obtained for switch trials was Mean (SD)=13.9(1.8), 
and for repetition trials was Mean (SD)=8.9(1.6). 
There was a significant main effect of Trial Type on RT (F(1,77)=5.34, 
p=.024, η2=.0.65), but no interaction between Age and Trial Type on RT 
(p>.100). Figure 3.3 shows that RT was longer on switch trials than on 
repetition trials, indicating a reliable switch cost in RT. 
There was also a significant main effect of Trial Type on Accuracy 
(F(1,77)=31.70, p<.001, η2=.293), and an interaction with Age (F(2,77)=4.756, 
p<.011, η2=.110). The interaction between Trial Type and Age on Accuracy was 
followed up with repeated ANOVA tests separated by age groups. The result of 
this analysis revealed a significant effect of Trial Type in 4-year-olds 
(F(1,28)=6.37, p=.018, η2=.185), a much larger effect in 6-year-olds 
(F(1,24)=30.67, p<.001, η2=.561), but no significant effect in adults 
(F(1,25)=3.16, p=.087, η2=.112). However, descriptive statistics show that all 
ages exhibit a trend for a larger error rate on switch trials than repetition trials 
(Fig. 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3. Switch Cost: Reaction time (left-panel) and error rates (right-panel) 
on Repetition trials and Switch trials in different age groups. All error bars denote 
within-subject 95% confidence intervals of means (Cousineau, 2005). 
 
3.3.2.3 Response priming effects (RR) 
The response priming effects were explored with stimulus-led primed 
trials (vs. unprimed trials) in pure and repetition trials, and response-led primed 
trials (vs. unprimed trials) in switch trials. In pure and repetition trials, a trial was 
considered primed if the target stimuli on two consecutive trials were both (1) 
associated with a correct button-press (thus a repeated-response), (2) of the 
same category but not necessarily of the same value (e.g. the same picture), 
and (3) of the same modality. In switch trials, it was not possible to define 
primes in the same way since the previously responded-to target would be a 
nontarget, and therefore most likely a nonresponse on switch trial (i.e. no RT 
recording). Instead, a primed switch trial simply refers to any correct response 
preceded by another correct response (both involving button-press), regardless 
of whether there was a stimulus repetition. With these definitions in mind, there 
are two types of trials—a primed response trial and an unprimed response trial. 
Our behavioural result shows that this response priming has an RT facilitative 
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effect in pure and repetition trials, and a lack of facilitation or a cost in switch 
trials (Fig. 3.4). The direction of the effects is consistent to past literature. 
 
Figure 3.4. Response priming (RP) effect on different trial types in bimodal 
CMTS behavioural experiment. On pure and repetition trials, the RP effect was stimulus- 
led (RT differences between unprimed single-response trials and primed repeated-
response trials with the same stimulus category-modality); on switch trials, the RP effect 
was response-led (RT differences between single-response vs. repeated-response). 
Positive values indicate RP facilitation and negative values indicate RP cost. Error bar 
indicates 95% CI. 
 
The results were analysed with a mixed ANOVA with Trial Type (3 levels: 
pure, repetition and switch trials) and Response Prime (primed response vs. 
unprimed response) as the within-subject variable, and Age as the between-
subject variable, on dependent measure of RT. The main focus here was the 
effect of Response Prime, which was significant (F(1,77)=16, p<.001, η2=.172). 
There was also a significant interaction between Response Prime (RP) and 
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Trial Type (F(2,154)=20.58, p<.001, η2=.211). No further interactions with 
Response Prime were found (Fs<1.9, ps>.100). 
The interaction between Response Prime and Trial Type was further 
explored by analysing the effect of Response Prime in different trial types with 
multiple paired t-tests (Bonferroni corrected to alpha=.017. There was a 
significant RP facilitation in pure trials (t(79)=4.16, p<.001, one-tailed), and in 
repetition trials (t(79)=8.22, p<.001, one-tailed). There was no significant RP 
cost in switch trial (t(79)=1.80, p=.037, one-tailed). The overall result is 
consistent to past literature on task-switching which found facilitative effect of 
response prime is confined to within-task but not between-task.  
3.3.3 Modality-associated effects 
3.3.3.1 Target Modality 
Target modality denotes which modality the task-relevant target was 
presented in. In the pure blocks, the mean number of data samples for visual 
target was Mean(SD)=15.4(2.2), and for auditory target was 
Mean(SD)=13.2(2.6). In the mixed blocks, the mean number of data samples 
for visual and auditory were Mean(SD)=25.5(2.3) and Mean(SD)=24.8(3.7), 
respectively. Overall, the participants were quicker to visual than auditory 
targets in both pure and mixed blocks (Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6), with the exception 
of 4-year-olds who exhibited similar RTs to either target modalities in the pure 
blocks. The children achieved higher accuracy to visual targets than to auditory 
targets, particularly in the mixed blocks. The Adults showed comparable 
accuracies to either visual or auditory targets. 
A three-way mixed ANOVA with Age as a between-subject factor and, 
Target Modality and Block Type (pure and mixed) as within-subject factors was 
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carried out on accuracy and RT. There were a significant overall main effects of 
Target Modality on RT (F(1, 77)=32.31, p<.001, η2=.296), and Accuracy (F(1, 
77)=7.08, p=.009, η2=.084). However, these were modulated by a three-way 
interaction on RT (F(2, 77)=5.762, p=.005, η2=.130), but not on Accuracy 
(p>.800). 
The three-way interaction on RT was followed up with repeated ANOVAs 
with Target Modality and Block Type as factors, separated by age groups. The 
main effect of Target Modality remained across all age groups (Fs>7.90, 
ps<.010) in the follow-up analyses. The interaction between Target Modality 
and Block Type was significant in both 4-year-olds (F(1, 28)=10.01, p=.004, 
η2=.263) and 6-year-olds (F(1, 24)=4.81, p=.038, η2=.167), but not in adults 
(p>.600). This result suggests that the quicker response to visual targets than 
auditory targets was stronger in the mixed blocks than in the pure blocks among 
young children. 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Mean RT (left panel) and Accuracy (right panel) to visual and 
auditory targets in the pure blocks. All error bars denote within-subject 95% confidence 
intervals of means (Cousineau, 2005). 
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Figure 3.6. Mean RT (left panel) and Accuracy (right panel) to visual and 
auditory targets in the Mixed blocks. All error bars denote within-subject 95% 
confidence intervals of means (Cousineau, 2005). 
 
3.3.3.2 Modality Shift Effect 
The Modality Shift Effect (MSE) is the cost of shifting attention to another 
modality, compared to attending to the same modality. To analyse the MSE, 
trials with a target appearing in the same modality as in the n-1 trial were 
compared with trials with a target of a different modality from the n-1 trial. For 
example, on trials with visual targets, the MSE is the RT difference between a 
visual-to-visual trial (V2V, where the previous target also contained a visual 
target) and an auditory-to-visual trial (A2V, where the previous trial contained an 
auditory target). Only trials not immediately proceeded by the task cues (i.e. 
pure and repetition trials) were analysed since the intervening task cue 
prevented the inter-trial index from being calculated. Furthermore, only 
consecutively correct responses were analysed (i.e. both the n-1 trial and the 
current trial were both correct positive responses). This means that only RT 
were analysed since the main interest here is on the act of attentional shift (i.e. 
information is attended to), but not on the failures to attend. One 4-year-old, two 
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6-year-olds, and one adult did not have any RT data for one of the trial types 
and were thus excluded from the analyses. The mean number of data samples 
is shown in Table 3.1. Results are shown in Figure 3.7. 
 
 
Table 3.1. Number of data samples for each trial type. 
 Pure ______________________ 
Mixed 
______________________ 
 Repetition Shift Repetition Shift 
Visual 3.9(1.0) 2.1(0.9) 6.5(0.9) 5.9(1.0) 
Auditory 4.3(1.1) 4.7(1.5) 6.2(1.2) 3.0(0.9) 
Note: number denotes mean and standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
A four-way mixed ANOVA was conducted with Target Modality (Visual 
vs. Auditory), Modality Transition (modality-shift vs. modality-repetition) and 
Block Type (Pure vs. Mixed) as within-subject variables, and Age as a between-
subject variable. The main interest here is the effect of Modality Transition and 
its interaction with other variables.  
The main effect of Modality Transition was significant (F(1,73)= 22.25, 
p<.001, η2=.234). However, there was also a significant three-way interaction 
among Target Modality, Modality Transition and Block Type. The interaction 
was caused by a reversal in the MSE in the pure and mixed blocks (Figure 3.6). 
In the pure blocks, the MSE cost to auditory targets (V2A-A2A) was reliably 
larger than zero, but the MSE cost to visual targets (A2V-V2V) was not reliably 
different from zero. This pattern was reversed in the mixed blocks, in which the 
MSE cost was reliable on trials with visual targets but not auditory targets. 
There was no further interaction between Modality Transition and other 
variables (ps>.100).  
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Although the data samples were relatively sparse for the analysis of the 
MSE, the result nevertheless showed a clear pattern of interaction between 
MSE and Block Type, which was consistent across age groups. Although the 
modality shift cost in RT was significant in all conditions, the direction of the 
MSE was dependent on the task condition.  
 
Figure 3.7. MSE in RT to visual target (A2V-V2V) and to auditory target (V2A-
A2A), in either pure blocks or mixed blocks. Bold letters denote the target modality. 
Error bars represent 95% CI of means. 
3.3.4 Modality dominance effect 
3.3.4.1 Baseline Analyses 
Eleven 4-year-olds, 11 6-year-olds and 10 adults completed the baseline 
condition. One 4-year-old was excluded from this analysis due to their low 
accuracy scores in the main experiment, leaving 10 4-year-olds in the final 
analysis. All ages achieved high accuracy (4-year-old: Mean(SE)=94.8(1.4)%; 
6-year-old: Mean(SE)=98.8(0.4)%; Adult: Mean(SE)=99.8(0.2)%). As expected, 
younger children were still slower than older participants (4-year-old: 
Mean(SE)=1299(87) ms; 6-year-old: Mean(SE)=896(75)ms; Adult: 
Mean(SE)=630(64)ms). 
3.3.4.2 Cross-modal distractor effect  
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The cross-modal distractor effect was examined by comparing RTs on 
unimodal baseline trials with bimodal trials in the pure blocks (see Figure 3.8). 
As discussed above, the cross-modal distractor effect was used to investigate 
modality dominance. A larger distractor effect of a visual distractor on an 
auditory target than of an auditory distractor on a visual target would imply 
visual dominance. 
To examine the cross-modal distractor effect, a mixed ANOVA was 
carried out with Target Modality (visual vs. auditory) and Condition (baseline vs. 
pure) entered as within-subject variables, and Age as the between-subject 
variable on dependent measure of RT. Accuracy was not examined due to the 
ceiling performance in the baseline condition. There was a significant main 
effect of Target Modality (F(1,28)=48.63, p<.001, η2=.635), but no interaction 
with Age. (p>.700); all ages were quicker at responding to visual targets than 
auditory targets in either baseline or pure blocks (Fig. 3.7). There was also a 
significant main effect of Condition (F(1,28)=30.50, p<.001, η2=.521); RTs were 
longer in the pure blocks with cross-modal distractors than in the baseline 
condition.  
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Figure 3.8. Reaction time to targets in different modalities (visual vs. auditory 
targets) in different age groups. Left-panel: baseline unimodal condition; right-panel: 
pure blocks with cross-modal distractors. All error bars denote within-subject 95% 
confidence intervals of means (Cousineau, 2005). 
 
The modality dominance effect was explored using RT differences 
between unimodal trials and bimodal trials. Figure 3.9 shows the RT differences 
between baseline and pure trials by distractor modalities in different age groups. 
The cross-modal auditory distractor effect decreased with age, whereas the 
cross-modal visual distractor effects appeared to increase with age. This 
transitional pattern from auditory dominance to visual dominance with 
development is in agreement with past literature.  
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Figure 3.9. Cross-modal distractor effect in RT costs to visual targets and to 
auditory targets. The cost was calculated as the differences between bimodal pure trials 
and unimodal baseline trials. Error bars represent 95% CI of means. 
 
The age differences in modality dominance was supported by the three-
way interaction among Target Modality, Condition and Age (F(2,28)=5.85, 
p<.010, η2=.295). The interaction was followed up with two-way repeated 
ANOVAs with Target Modality and Condition, separated by age groups. Only 
adults showed a significant two-way interaction between Target Modality and 
Condition, indicating asymmetric costs between cross-modal auditory and visual 
distractors (to their respective visual and auditory targets). The mean RT costs 
point to visual dominance in adults. Although children did not exhibit significant 
differences between cross-modal auditory and visual distractors, the mean RT 
costs with 4-year-olds did exhibit a trend with a larger auditory distractor cost 
than visual distractor cost (F(1,9)=3.882, p=.080, η2=.301), indicating an 
auditory dominance. The non-significant difference was likely due to a lack of 
power since the sample size in the baseline condition was small. In comparison, 
6-year-old did not exhibit any asymmetric cost between auditory and visual 
cross-modal distractors (F(1,9)=.417, p>.500, η2=.040).  
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In sum, although the baseline condition was carried out with a limited 
number of participants, the overall result supports the idea of a shift from 
auditory to visual dominance across development. 
3.4. Discussion 
The current study started with a simple desire to understand whether 
task-associated mixing costs and switch costs are invariant across unisensory 
and multisensory contexts. If multi-task management and switching between 
tasks both rely mainly on supramodal goal representations, then experimental 
changes that primarily affect perceptual processes should have a limited effect 
on task-associated costs.  
In general, no mixing effect was found in the current study, since both RT 
and accuracy were comparable in pure and mixed blocks. However, there was 
a greater RT mixing cost in 6-year-olds. This result stands in contrasts to the 
results in the unimodal TS study (Chapter 2), where we found both significant 
accuracy and RT mixing costs across all ages. This is surprising since the 
mixing costs in task-switching studies are normally more robust than switch 
costs. To our knowledge,  none of the existing studies that included pure blocks 
reported an absence of mixing cost (e.g. Los, 1996; Poljac, Koch, & Bekkering, 
2009; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubin & Meiran, 2005; Tarantino, Mazzonetto, & 
Vallesi, 2016; Wylie, Murray, Javitt, & Foxe, 2009).  
Two possible accounts may explain the lack of mixing effect reported 
here. The first relates to multisensory attention to bimodal stimulus, and the 
second relates to task structures in pure and mixed blocks. According to the first 
explanation, it is possible that between-task interference is smaller when the 
supramodal task goal is not strongly tied to a specific modality. In this case, the 
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selection demand is smaller with multisensory input since visual and auditory 
processing can be carried out in parallel. Under this scenario, mixing costs may 
largely reflect the differences in lower-level stimulus-response selection, rather 
than the difference in active goal representations between pure and mixed 
blocks. 
An alternative account is that pure and mixed task conditions are not 
necessarily comparable. Indeed, the similarities and differences between tasks 
in the pure and mixed blocks have never been properly addressed. Most 
theories of mixing cost have focused on the representational ambiguity caused 
by task set overlaps in the mixed blocks. They are therefore implicitly based on 
the assumption that the task structures in the pure and mixed blocks are 
comparable. This assumption may be premature since it is entirely possible to 
carry out pure tasks with simple stimulus-response associations and without 
forming an overarching task goal (e.g. colour task). Participants may be more 
motivated to construct a task set with a supramodal task goal, where possible, 
when information interference is consciously perceived. This motivation may 
occur more naturally in the mixed blocks than the pure blocks.  
Without a strong representation of a common task goal, responses to the 
stimulus may be relatively unprepared, as attention may be less finely tuned to 
the relevant stimulus attribute. Evidence in support of this comes from Forrest, 
Elchlepp, Monsell and McLaren (2012) who investigated performance when 
responses were made purely by learning cue-stimulus-response (CSR) 
associations, or through a higher order task structure  (magnitude vs. parity 
judgment on digital numbers). All stimuli and trial sequence were identical in 
both CSR and Task conditions, so the critical difference between the conditions 
was the internal representations of task structures. Both reaction time and error 
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rates were higher on CSR trials than on task-repetition trials, and highest on 
task-switch trials. These results indicate that between-condition comparison is 
dependent on how the tasks are structured, and how information compounds 
are formed in the first place. In the pure blocks, a strong goal representation 
may facilitate performance but is not necessary for accurate performance. In 
comparison, active goal settings often necessary in the mixed blocks. When 
active goal-setting is not present, the reaction time and the accuracy in the pure 
blocks may be compromised, thus reducing the between-condition mixing 
effects.  
At the moment, it remains unclear whether the lack of mixing effects 
found in 4-year-olds and adults was due to multisensory attention factors, 
differences in task structures, or both. Nor is it clear why only 6-year-olds 
exhibited RT mixing costs. Although the underlying mechanisms are unclear, 
the current result suggest that mixing effects are not a universal phenomenon, 
and point to the need to have a clearer understanding of the pure task 
condition. This need is perhaps more pertinent in developmental research, 
where young children may not intuitively construct complex task rules, despite 
having the ability to do so. 
In comparison, both RT and accuracy switch costs were significant in the 
current study, even after controlling for possible perceptual-based facilitations 
on repetition trials. This result indicates that switching between tasks is distinct 
from shifting between modalities. Although the RT switch effect was evident in 
the current study, it did not interact with age. This finding is consistent with the 
unimodal TS experiment (Chapter 2) and continues to suggest that young 
children are adept at switching between tasks with familiar stimuli and that they 
can actively form supramodal task goals. However, the accuracy switch cost 
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was larger in 6-year-olds than in other age groups. It is remains unclear why 6-
year-olds showed larger mixing cost and switch cost than other age groups. 
Although between-condition effects were by-and-large similar in different 
age groups, the overall response time and error rates were still larger in 
younger children than adults, particularly 4-year-olds. What may explain the 
discrepancies between the within-subject measures and between-group 
measures? One possible explanation is that although young children were able 
to construct task representations appropriately (at least in the mixed blocks), 
and exhibit the ability to change behaviours according to task instructions, 
certain developmental constraints prevent them from performing to a high 
consistency. It is not clear if these constraints are associated with domain-
general endogenous control—such as inhibitory control and working memory, 
global development that underpins simple processing speed, or both. 
Our experiment also replicated the result that priming facilitation is 
constrained by task repetition, as the facilitative effect from response prime was 
observed only in pure and repetition trials, but not in switch trials. Although due 
to experimental procedure we could not index stimulus-led primes in switch 
trials, our results are in agreement to past research which shows that primed 
components, such as a repeated response and a repeated stimulus, are 
facilitative only when the task repeats but not when the task switches. 
With regards to modality dominance, the current study found a trend for 
auditory dominance in 4-year-olds and evidence of visual dominance in adults, 
with transitional non-dominance in 6-year-olds. Despite the limited number of 
participants, the direction of modality dominance is in line with past studies. The 
present study differed from past studies by focussing on RT measures rather 
than error-types.  
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Although different ages are likely to exhibit different patterns of modality 
dominance, the Modality Shift Effect (MSE) did not exhibit age-dependent 
patterns of asymmetric costs. In the pure blocks, all ages exhibited a reliable 
MSE to auditory targets, but not to visual targets. In other words, reorienting 
attention to visual targets in the pure blocks appears to be relatively easy, since 
no attentional shift cost in RT was observed. This is not surprising in 6-year-olds 
and adults since responses to visual targets were overall quicker than to 
auditory targets in both baseline and pure blocks, indicating an overall bias to 
visual processing. However, the result is somewhat surprising in 4-year-olds 
since they showed auditory dominance and comparable RTs to visual and 
auditory targets in the pure blocks. A more likely account for the result in 4-year-
olds is that the MSE to visual target was overshadowed by the effect of auditory 
dominance in 4-year-olds, since RTs on both V2V and A2V might be elevated 
due to auditory distractor effects. Further research is needed to understand how 
MSE can be larger to the dominant modality than to the non-dominant modality 
in pure blocks. 
In 6-year-olds and adults, the quicker overall visual processes are likely 
to be due to multiple factors that facilitate visual detection. In the present 
studies (with semantically meaningful stimuli), visual inputs are less likely to rely 
on temporal processing than auditory inputs. As a consequence, the 
identification of visual elements is likely to be quicker than auditory elements. In 
addition to the possible speedier perceptual processing of visual input, stimulus-
response associations are likely to be stronger with visual targets, since visual-
manual mappings have been found to be more compatible than auditory-
manual mapping (Stephan & Koch, 2010). Lastly, the presence of a redundant 
auditory cross-modal distractor may enhance the perception of visual stimulus, 
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at least in adults. For example, Sinnett et al. (2008) reported a shorter RT to the 
visual element in an object-based bimodal stimulus (e.g. cat meow paired with a 
traffic light picture), than to the unimodal visual stimulus. Unlike Sinnett et al.’s 
study, the current study did not find a shorter RT to visual targets with bimodal 
stimulus than unimodal baseline stimulus, and this is likely to be due to different 
experimental procedures. The difference between our study and Sinnett et al.’s 
experiment, is that the participants in this latter study only needed to monitor 
one modality, compared to bimodal monitoring required in the current study. 
Nonetheless, it remains possible that the redundant auditory distractor has 
different effects on adults and children—in adults, cross-modal auditory 
distractor might enhance visual processes; in young children, cross-modal 
auditory distractor might interfere visual processing.  
Thus, the lack of MSE to visual targets in the pure blocks in 6-year-olds 
and adults may be largely due to the favourable visual processes; whereas in 4-
year-olds the lack of MSE to visual target may be more attributable to a large 
auditory distractor effect overshadowing the MSE. Future studies are needed to 
see whether the MSE asymmetry would persist with unimodal stimuli. 
Surprisingly a reversed asymmetry was found in the mixed blocks—a 
reliable MSE to visual targets but not auditory targets. It is not clear what 
mechanisms underlie this reversal of the MSE asymmetry. One possibility is 
that modality-associated processes interacted with verbal task rehearsal in the 
mixed blocks. Although not explicitly documented, 4-year-olds often engaged in 
verbal self-instruction in the mixed blocks during the experiment. Although many 
fewer 6-year-olds and no adults engaged in explicit verbalisation of task rules in 
the mixed blocks, they might still have updated task goals with inner speech. 
Indeed, many studies have documented the role of verbalisation/inner speech 
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as a form of self-cuing in both adults and children. The disruption of 
verbalisation impaired performance in all ages, although the effect was larger 
for children and older adults than young adults  (Emerson & Miyake, 2003; 
Karbach & Kray, 2009; Kray et al., 2008; Kray, Eber, & Lindenberger, 2004). It 
remains to be determined whether inner speech underlies the reversal of MSE.  
Even if inner speech does interact with modality-associated processes, 
how this interaction eliminates MSE to auditory targets and increased MSE to 
visual targets in the mixed condition is far from clear. For example, the 
elimination of MSE to auditory targets could be accomplished in two ways—by 
increasing the baseline RT on modality-repetition trials, or by decreasing the RT 
on modality-shift trials. Similarly, the increase of MSE to visual targets could be 
achieved either by decreasing the baseline RT on modality-repetition trials, or 
by increasing the RT on modality-shift trials. Further research is needed to 
understand the mechanisms underlying the reversal of MSE in the mixed 
blocks.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The present study reports the first cross-modal task-switching study in 
developmental research that we are aware of. Past developmental studies have 
often report mixed findings in terms of the age effects on mixing cost and switch 
cost in unimodal contexts. This is consistent with our finding of a lack of age 
interaction effect on either costs in the present study.  Although both unimodal 
TS and bimodal CMTS studies demonstrate that children as young as 4 years 
of age are equipped with a general ability to switch between tasks, age 
differences in absolute accuracy and RT remained. The overall result thus 
questions whether task-associated endogenous control can be measured with 
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mixing cost and switch cost. Further behavioural studies and perhaps other 
research methods such as computational modelling may shed lights on the 
relations among global development and/or endogenous control, between-
condition and between-trial costs, and the overall performance measures.  
While task-associated switch costs appear robust in either unisensory 
and multisensory environment, in comparison, modality shift effects are 
dependent on task contexts. The MSE in the pure blocks and mixed blocks had 
different directions of asymmetry. Although different modality dominances were 
found in different age groups, the current study was unable to ascertain how 
modality dominance may interact with MSE, due to several confounding effects. 
Because MSE is an inter-trial effect, it is not clear whether the lack of MSE to 
visual targets in the pure blocks was due to the multiple facilitators on visual 
processes that override the MSE, as previous adult research would suggest, or, 
whether it was due to the overshadowing effect of auditory dominance in 
children that elevated the RTs to visual targets. It is possible that different ages 
experienced different facilitation/interference effects in visual processing during 
the pure blocks.  
The most striking finding is the reversal of MSE in the mixed blocks. It is 
not clear what specific task demands in the mixed blocks interacted with the 
MSE, but one plausible candidate is the role of inner speech. However, the 
underlying mechanisms are unclear at this stage.  
Both task-associated effects and modality-associated effects are likely to 
come from complex interactions among different information processes. 
Potentially, modality-associated effects are even more dynamic than task-
associated effects, since they can emerge at different level of processes (e.g. 
encoding speed, stimulus-response compatibility, modality dominance, inner 
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speech and so on). It may be particularly difficult to understand how modality-
specific processes and task-associated processes interact through behavioural 
research method alone. There is also an additional challenge in understanding 
these interactions in a developmental context. Thus, instead of carrying out a 
long series of developmental experiments investigating the interactivity of 
multiple processes, the present thesis turned to computational modelling as a 
way to understand how these task-associated effects and modality-associated 
effects emerge in dynamic connectionist networks. The details and results of 
the computational models for bimodal CMTS study are reported in Chapters 5 
to 8. 
In the next chapter, we will explore task switch effects and modality shift 
effects using unimodal stimuli. The experiment in Chapter 4 involves a different 
experimental procedure, as well as different tasks and stimuli, and the purpose 
of these changes is to understand the generalisability of our findings so far. 
Specifically, the study in Chapter 4 was designed to be more challenging than 
the studies so far, as in the next study both task and modality changed 
unpredictably with no forewarning from a pre-cue. The main objective of the 
study in Chapter 4 is to examine the interaction between task transition 
(repetition and switch) and modality transition (repetition and shift), in order to 
understand the similarity and differences in these two forms of attentional shifts, 
and to appreciate how amodal the overall task sets are. 
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Chapter 4. Experiment 3: Cross-modal task-switching 
with unimodal stimuli (unimodal CMTS) 
The unimodal TS and bimodal CMTS studies in Chapter 2 and 3 
respectively have examined whether younger children experienced greater 
difficulty in switching task goals than adults. Our experiments did not uncover a 
consistent age interaction effect on switch costs and thus, so far, argue that 
young children and adults experience a comparable level of difficulty in 
repeatedly switching between tasks. That said, younger children were still 
overall slower and less accurate on all trial types. So even if task switching 
bears no additional cost compared to adults, their baseline level of performance 
is lower than that of adults. This absence of an age interaction effect on switch 
cost could potentially be explained by factors that facilitated task preparation in 
the previous studies—(i) a long preparation window, (ii) addition task cues on 
switch trials, (iii) fixed trial sequence, and (iv) perceptually-based target 
categories. It then follows that eliminating these favourable factors may reveal 
age modulated differences in switch costs. In this chapter, with a suitable 
modifications of the experimental procedure to remove these possible 
facilitative factors, we will focus on the effect of switching between task goals 
and shifting between modalities with unimodal stimuli. 
In the bimodal CMTS study, we did not find a larger modality shift costs 
(MSE) in children, as compared to adults. However, the MSE measure in the 
bimodal CMTS study could have been affected by modality dominances thereby 
obscuring the true cost of inter-trial modality shifts. Additionally, the MSE was 
not measured on task-switch trials, due to the limitation arising from the 
experimental procedures. Since the modality dominance effect refers to 
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concurrent cross-modal interference from the dominant modality, the 
dominance effect can be supressed by using unimodal stimuli.  
4.1 Introduction 
The differentiation of perceptual systems and the emergence of 
multisensory systems undergo rapid changes in the first 2 years of life (Bremner 
et al., 2012; Lewkowicz & Ghazanfar, 2009), yet different forms of cross-modal 
interaction, such as integration, overshadowing (e.g. modality dominance), 
facilitation, distraction and learning, continue to develop throughout childhood 
(e.g. Brandwein et al., 2011; Broadbent, White, Mareschal, & Kirkham, 2017; 
Matusz et al., 2015; Nardini, Bales, & Mareschal, 2016; Nava & Pavani, 2013; 
Sloutsky & Napolitano, 2003; Thomas, Nardini, & Mareschal, 2017). These 
cross-modal effects can exhibit large task-dependent heterogeneity, often in the 
form of age-dependent asymmetric costs or facilitations. Collectively, these 
studies suggest that cross-modal interactions may happen on many levels of 
processing, although it is much less clear whether all of the processes involved 
are  modality dependent, or, simply task dependent. 
To address these questions, the present study aims to understand how 
amodal the task sets are when the task goals are defined with supramodal 
properties. In addition, the study explores any developmental differences in 
information processing during cross-modal task-switching that might exist 
between young children and adults. In what follows, we first look at the limited 
research on cross-modal task-switching in the adult literature, then give a brief 
overview of the research into attentional flexibility and cross-modal interaction in 
developmental literature, before outlining our study and hypotheses. 
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4.1.1 Cross-modal processes in adult task switching 
Early studies using dual visual and auditory detection tasks suggested 
that visual and auditory processing are largely distinct (Duncan, Martens, & 
Ward, 1997). However, shifting attention to another modality results in reliable 
RT costs (Sutton, Hakerem, Zubin, & Portnoy, 1961), implying that cross-modal 
attentional shifts tap into a common processing resource shared between 
modalities. An alternative explanation is that this modality shift cost is largely 
attributable to task-switching costs (Soto-Faraco & Spence, 2002), since when 
the participants shift attention cross-modally, they also attended to an 
alternative target. One critical question, therefore, is whether the presentation 
modality is just another task attribute like colour and shapes in unisensory task-
switching experiments. One way to test this idea is to look at the interaction 
between different types of attentional transitions (modality vs. task) and 
response transitions. Past research on task-switching has reported that 
response repetition is facilitative only when the task repeats, but not when the 
task switches (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Indeed, Cohen and Rist (Cohen & Rist, 
1992) found that  modality shift effect was only evident when a response was 
executed previously. However, without a well-defined task that bridge across 
the auditory and visual stimuli, any modality associated effect observed may be 
contaminated with task associated effects.  
To date, there have only been a handful of cross-modal task-switching 
studies in which both visual and auditory stimuli shared the same task attribute 
(Hunt & Kingstone, 2004; Murray et al., 2009; Sandhu & Dyson, 2013). As with 
the usual unisensory task-switching procedure, Hunt and Kingston (Hunt & 
Kingstone, 2004) asked participants to switch between two simple number 
choice tasks (odd/even vs. large/small) where the stimulus could be either 
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visual or auditory. They found that task-switching and modality-shifting each 
produced reliable RT costs. While the reaction time on the trials requiring a 
simultaneous modality and task change (modality-shift task-switch trials, or 
MSTS) was the longest, the observed cost was less than the combined task-
switching and modality-shifting costs when added together individually. In other 
words, a subadditive effect to the combined costs was observed. One 
explanation for this finding is that modality-shifting and task-switching are both 
independent but also interdependent, subjected to a common processing 
bottleneck yet facilitated through separable pathways. In contrast, Murray et al. 
(Murray et al., 2009) found a stronger facilitative effect of modality-shifting on 
task-switching, as RT on MSTS was faster than on trials with task-switch alone 
(i.e. with modality repetition). Their experiment involved where/what 
classifications on either man-made or natural objects/sounds. They explained 
the result through both interference and an episodic binding effect between task 
and modality, such that when one index changes (e.g. modality), there is a 
relative advantage when the task changes as well due to relatively reduced 
interference in the network.  
Both Hunt and Kingston and Murray et al. employed unimodal stimuli in 
their studies, but a similar effect can also be found with bimodal stimuli. For 
example, Sandhu and Dyson (Sandhu & Dyson, 2013) employed different 
cueing methods in their study (no-cue, single-cue to either modality or task, and 
dual-cue to both modality and task) and found a general subadditive effect on 
trials with simultaneous modality and task change, although the effect was not 
as large as that reported in Murray et al.’s study (Murray et al., 2009). They also 
found some differences between modality-shifting and task-switching. Modality 
shift costs in RT were only evident in the no-cue condition, whereas task switch 
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costs in RT were reliable in both no-cue and single-cue conditions. Thus, it 
appears that task representations are more complex and only when full 
information is provided would the processing costs be effectively eliminated. 
The result suggested that task-switching and modality-shifting may engage 
different attentional operations, and that modality-shifting appears to be less 
cognitively taxing than task-switching. However, in both cases, RT costs were 
eliminated when both modality and task cues were provided. 
In contrast to the results from cross-modal task-switching studies, a 
complete elimination of processing costs in unisensory task-switching 
experiments was rarely reported, even with univalent stimuli where only one 
task was possible on each trial (Lien, Ruthruff, & Kuhns, 2006; Mayr, 2001; 
Wylie & Allport, 2000). It is therefore important to understand how simultaneous 
change in task and modality reduces and/or eliminates processing costs. 
4.1.2 Attentional flexibility and multisensory development 
As we have seen in Chapters 2 and 3, young children do not necessarily 
exhibit a larger shift cost during task-switching. These result suggest that 
children’s attentional flexibility in responding to environemtal changes is 
relatively well developed in early childhood, although with the caveat that they 
are still more likely to make errors regardless of the external environment. 
Although young children can be as effective at switching between tasks as 
adults, given an age-appropriate task, they may still exhibit cross-modal task-
switching effects different from those of adults due to a developing multisensory 
system. While there is no direct developmental research on cross-modal task-
switching, children and adults show differences in brain activation patterns in 
cross-modal oddball detection. For example, Johannsen and Röder (Johannsen 
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& Röder, 2014) looked at the refractory effect of within-modal and cross-modal 
oddball detection tasks with unimodal stimuli (either sound or picture). They 
found that while young children aged between 4 and 6 showed similar overall 
refractory effects to within-modal target detection, compared to older children 
aged 10 and 12 and adults, the cross-modal refractory effect was different in the 
youngest group. Young children showed cross-modal refractory effects earlier in 
processing as compared to older participants, and the supra-modal interaction 
of cross-modal information was stronger in young children than older children 
and adults. Topographically, younger children also exhibited more activation in 
the frontal region, an area that is heavily implicated in cognitive control, as 
compared to the parietal topography found among older children and adults. 
The result suggests that younger children are more likely to exert endogenous 
influence to direct attention cross-modally, perhaps to overcome for the greater 
neural interference due to the less specialised (i.e. less segregated) short-range 
networks ( Fair et al., 2009; Fair et al., 2007). If so, children may experience a 
greater attentional bottleneck in conditions in which cross-modal attentional 
shifting is required. 
4.1.3 The current study 
The current study is designed to explore whether processing costs in RT 
and accuracy associated with modality-shifting and task-switching reflect any 
developmental changes during early childhood. The current cross-modal task-
switching study employed a simple detection task with a single response key. 
Using a single response key minimises the demands on response selection, 
and ensures that the observed response latency reflects the time needed to 
shift attention at the level of modality and task goal.   
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We make a number of predictions based on the literature reviewed 
above. Firstly, consistent with the previous literature, we hypothesise that both 
task-switching and modality-shifting will produce attentional costs, in both 
children and adults. Secondly, when a child-friendly procedure is used we 
hypothesise that young children can be as effective as adults at switching 
between task goals and selecting the appropriate stimulus attribute to respond 
on. Thirdly, we expected that children will require more endogenous control 
than adults in order to shift attention cross-modally. As a result, we predict that 
younger children will exhibit greater modality shift costs than older children and 
adults. Finally, if younger children require greater endogenous control to shift 
attention cross-modally, they will show additive costs of modality-shifting and 
task-switching, whereas adults will benefit from modality-shifting during task-
switching, and therefore show a facilitative effect or at least subadditive costs 
when switching both task and modality. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Forty-two 4-year-olds, 30 6-year-olds and 24 adults were recruited for the 
experiment. Seventeen 4-year-olds and 4 6-year-olds were excluded from the 
analyses: 5 4-year-olds and 2 6-year-olds were unable to complete the training 
element of the study sufficiently well, and 12 4-year-olds and 2 6-year-olds did 
not pass the baseline accuracy on 70% in the testing session. Consequently, a 
total of 25 4year-olds (Male=12, mean age=4.66 years, SD=.23 year), 26 6-
year-olds (Male=17, mean age=6.57 years, SD=.27 year) and 24 adults 
(Male=13, mean age=27.18, SD=8.21 years) were included in the final analyses 
presented below.  
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All children were recruited from local primary and nursery schools, with 
the exception of nine 4-year-olds recruited separately to the testing lab at the 
research centre. All testing was conducted in a quiet room in the participant’s 
school or in the lab testing room in the research centre. Children were given 
token rewards (i.e. stickers) at the end of each block to maintain their 
motivations. Each session lasted around 25 minutes. Adult participants were 
recruited from the University campus. No rewards were given to adults and they 
were tested in a quiet room of the University campus. All participants had 
normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing.  
4.2.2 Stimuli and design 
The experiment consisted with two different detection tasks: an animal 
detection task cued by a drawing of a barn house, and a musical instrument 
detection task cued by a drawing of musical notes. The targets in the animal 
detection task were various animal pictures and animal sounds, and the targets 
in the musical instrument task were various pictures of musical instrument and 
musical sounds. The targets could be presented in either modality and all trials 
were unimodal (i.e. only a sound or an image was presented). Task cue 
(approx. 2.2cm x 1.9cm) and the stimulus were presented simultaneously (Fig 
4.1). 
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Figure 4.1. Schematic illustration of experimental design. All stimuli were 
unimodal (either just a sound or just a picture). The experiment involved switching 
between musical instrument task cued by the musical symbol on the roof, and an animal 
detection task cued by the barn sign on the roof. ISI (inter-stimulus-interval) was 
1000ms for a correct response, and 2500ms for an incorrect response. 
 
There were 10 different colourful pictures (approx. 3.8cm x 3.8cm) and 
10 different sounds (approx. 60dB; 42,000 Hz) in each target category (animal 
vs. musical instrument). The stimulus timed out after 3000ms if no response 
was made. The target was presented centrally on the screen inside a cartoon 
drawing of a house (11.4cm x 11.4cm). The task cue was presented above the 
target as a banner of the house. The inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) was 1000ms 
for a correct response, or 2500ms for an incorrect response. A continuous 
background neutral water sound was played at approximately 45dB throughout 
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the experiment, in order to match with the continuous presentation of visual 
information. The participants received no feedback for the responses. 
The experiment involved 120 trials separated into 5 blocks (24 trials per 
block). Tasks changed unpredictably in each block, with a 60% chance of a 
correct target appearances (i.e. the number of correct target appeared on 72 
trials). Stimulus modality was chosen randomly with an equal probability. The 
experimental manipulation resulted in a number of cells for four specific trial 
types: modality-repetition task-repetition (MRTR, M=16.5, SD=3.7), modality-
repetition task-switch (MRTS, Mean=17, SD=3.9), modality-shift task-repetition 
(MSTR, Mean=19, SD=2.8), and modality-shift task-switch (MSTS, Mean=19.5, 
SD=3.1).  
The experiment was administered on a MacBook Pro Retina with 
1440x900 pixels, run on 2.3 GHz Intel Core i7. Child-friendly closed-back 
headphones were used for presenting the auditory stimuli. The participants 
made a response by pressing the central spacebar highlighted with a green 
sticker. Both accuracy and response times were measured. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
Children were seated approximately 45cm in front of the laptop. The 
experiment was divided into four parts—a category session, a demonstration 
session, a practice session and the testing session. The category, the 
demonstration, and the practice sessions were conducted with Microsoft 
PowerPoint. The dependent measures of RT and accuracy were recorded only 
in the testing session, which was implemented using Matlab R2014b and 
Psychophysic Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 
1997). 
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4.2.3.1 Categorization, Demonstration and Practice Sessions 
The categorization session was designed to make sure that the children 
understood the categories of the stimuli. There was an auditory categorization 
task and a visual categorization task, each consisting of 10 trials of 
pseudorandom presentation of music and animal sounds/pictures. The 
participants were asked to verbalise whether the sound/picture they were 
presented with was an animal or a musical instrument. The experimenter made 
sure that the participant named the category (animal vs. music) and not the 
actual label of the animal or the musical instrument. The participants who made 
more than 2 errors in either task were excluded from participating in the test 
trials used for analyses but were congratulated and given certificates for 
participating like all other children.  
The demonstration and the practice session each consisted of 4 trials of 
each task (total 8 trials). The first two trials of each task in the demonstration 
were target trials (one visual target and one auditory target) and the last two 
trials were non-target trials (one visual non-target and one auditory non-target).  
Before the demonstration trials began, children were shown a slide with 
two houses and were given the instruction as following, ‘we have two different 
houses here. This house over here is a music hall (pointing to the music hall). I 
know it is a music hall because it has this symbol on the roof (pointing to the 
task cue). Can you see the symbol on the roof?’ The experimenter waited for 
the child to answer. ‘In the music hall, different music is being played. If you find 
yourself in the music hall, I want you to look for music for me. You might see it 
in the house, or you might hear it in your ears, but whenever you find music in 
the music hall, I would like you to tell the computer by pressing the green button 
(indicating the space bar highlighted with a green sticker).’ A similar instruction 
 139 
was given for the barn house where the participants were instructed to look for 
animals instead. 
The first 4 demonstration trials were examples of the music hall game. A 
target trial was shown and the experimenter would say ‘Oh here is a music hall 
(pointing to the cue). We are looking for music.’ The experimenter would pause 
for approximately 1 to 3 seconds depending on whether it was a visual stimulus 
or an auditory stimulus. ‘Now tell me, did you see/hear a musical instrument?’ 
The experimenter would go over the trial again if the participant gave an 
incorrect answer. After getting the correct affirmative answer, the experimenter 
told the participant to press the spacebar to let the stimulus into the house if it is 
a music instrument, or to wait and do nothing it is an animal (participants were 
also told that if the animals got into the music hall, they would make a mess 
inside the music hall; and the equivalent story for the ‘barn house’ game was 
that if music was being played in the barn house, it would wake up the sleeping 
animals.).  
In the practice session, the experimenter told the participant ‘Now I want 
you to have a little practice before we start the real game.’ When the first trial 
came up, the experimenter hinted, ‘Oh it is a music hall/ barn house. If you find 
a musical instrument/ an animal, press the button’. The hints were given on 
every trial until the experimenter was confident that the participant understood 
the rule. There were 8 trials in the practice session, and 4 TS (task-switch) trials 
and 4 MS (modality-shift) trials presented in a predetermined but unpredictable 
sequence to the participants. 
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4.2.3.2 Testing Session 
During the testing session, the participants were given trials that were 
randomised according to task and modality. The experimenter told the 
participants that they should respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
For the first four trials the experimenter gave verbal reminders to the 
participants. The verbal reminder was, ‘Here is a music hall/ barn house. If you 
see/hear music/animal, press the button.’ A total of 120 trials were equally 
separated into five blocks by a motivational screen offering a rest-break if 
needed. Children saw the simultaneous presentation of a task cue and the 
stimulus for a maximum of 4000ms or until a response was made, followed by a 
variable inter-stimulus-interval (ISI), dependent on the responses—for a correct 
response, the interval was 1000ms; for an incorrect response, the interval was 
2500ms to allow a recovery period (Fig 4.1). A fixation cross was shown during 
the ISI. The response window was kept between 300ms and 3800ms after the 
stimulus onset. The lower bound was designed to exclude anticipatory response 
and the upper cap was designed to allow for a 200ms gap to process motor 
feedback (i.e. disappearance of the stimulus and the refreshed screen). 
4.3 Results 
Both reaction time and accuracy were measured in this study. The 
between-subject factor was Age and the within-subject factors were Task 
Transition (Task Switch vs. Repetition), Modality Transition (Modality Shift vs. 
Repetition), and Response Transition (Response Single vs. Response 
Repetition). The first trial in each block was excluded from the final data since 
these trials do not correspond well to a specific trial type (i.e. it is not a 
switch/repetition of task/modality). Only the correct positive trials were included 
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in the RT analyses. The current study made no assumption about the 
distribution of the RT samples for each participant. Instead, the bootstrapped 
mean RTs of each participant were obtained by resampling the RT data for 
5000 times thereby ensuring that the data was normally distributed (Bollen & 
Stinet, 1990). The case for adopting a bootstrap method is particularly valid with 
the limited RT samples as in the current experiment. The alpha level was set at 
.05 across all planned comparisons. Unless reported otherwise, all main effects 
of Age in the analyses reported below were significant at p<.05 level.  
4.3.1 Overall accuracy and RT 
Figure 4.2 shows the reaction times (RT) and the accuracy of each age 
group. All ages achieved high accuracy—4-year-olds (88%±1.6) 1, 6-year-olds 
(95.9%±0.5), and adults (97.9%±0.7). Younger participants were slower than 
older participants—4-year-olds (2005ms±65), 6-year-olds (1595ms±58), adults 
(1020ms±39). 
Preliminary analyses using univariate ANOVA were carried out to 
investigate the between-subject effects of Age on RT and Accuracy. There was 
a significant effect of Age on both RT (F(2,69)=84.42, p<.001, η2=.710) and 
Accuracy (F(2,69)=25.25, p<.001, η2=.423). Post-hoc t-tests (Bonferroni 
corrected to alpha=.017) on RTs showed significant differences among all 
pairwise comparisons (4-year-old vs. 6-year-old, t(49)=4.692, p<.001); 6-year-
old vs. adults, t(48)=8.093, p<.001; 4-year-old vs. adult, t(47)=12.814, p<.001). 
Only 4-year-olds were significantly less accurate than the older participants (4-
year-old vs. 6-year-old, t(49)=4.633, p<.001; 4-year-old vs. adult, t(47)=5.492, 
                                            
1 All cited errors are standard errors of means. 
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p<.001). There was no significant difference in accuracy between 6-year-olds 
and adults (6-year-old vs. adults, t(48)=2.343, p=.025, n.s.) .  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean RTs and error rates in each age group. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals of means. 
4.3.2 Target modality 
4.3.2.1 Reaction Time 
We first looked at whether there were any age differences in how visual 
and auditory stimuli were processed. Mean values showed that the participants 
were quicker when responding to visual targets (1520ms±58) than to auditory 
targets (1580ms±57) (see Fig 4.3). Two-way mixed ANOVA was carried out 
with Target Modality (visual vs. auditory) as the within-subject factor and Age as 
a between subject factor. The main effect of Target Modality was significant, 
(F(1,72)=6.52, p=.013, η2=.083) demonstrating that responses to visual targets 
were quicker than to auditory targets. There was no Target Modality by Age 
interaction in RT (p>.700). 
4.3.2.2 Accuracy 
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Figure 4.3 shows that the accuracy was higher for visual targets 
(95.75%±0.88) than auditory targets (92.55%±1.3). The main effect of Target 
Modality was supported in the two-way ANOVA with Target Modality as the 
within-subject factor and Age as the between-subject factor (F(1,72)=13.15, 
p<.001, η2=.154). The main effect of Target Modality was moderated by an 
interaction between Target Modality and Age (F(2,72)=4.32, p=.017, η2=.107). 
The interaction was followed up with separated analyses within each age group, 
which showed that only 4-year-olds were significantly less accurate to auditory 
targets than visual targets (F(1, 24)=9.30, p=.006, η2=.279), all other groups 
showed no difference in accuracy between targets of either modality (ps>.100). 
 
Figure 4.3. Reaction Time and Error Rate to Visual and Auditory Targets. Error 
bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals of means (Cousineau, 2005). 
4.3.3 Modality-shifting and task-switching 
4.3.3.1 Reaction Time 
Mean RTs were longer on TS (task-switch) trials (1584ms±58) than TR 
(task-repetition) trials (1519ms±56) (see Fig 4.4); and longer on MS (modality-
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switch) trials (1570ms±57) than MR (modality-repetition) trials (1532ms±58) 
(see Fig 4.5).  
The effects of modality-shifting and task-switching were analysed with a 
three-way mixed ANOVA with Age as the between-subject factor, Modality 
Transition and Task Transition as within-subject factors. The main effect of Task 
Transition was significant (F(1,72)=25.111, p<.001, η2=.259), as well as the 
main effect of  Modality Transition  (F(1,72)=4.541, p=.037, η2=.059). There was 
no interaction either between the effect of Task Transition and Age (p>.400); 
nor between the effect of Modality Transition and Age on RT (p>.400). 
We hypothesised that shifting modality would benefit switching task, and 
expected to find an interaction between Modality Transition and Task Transition. 
Contrary to our prediction, there was no interaction between Task Transition 
and Modality Transition on RT (F(1,72)=.96, p>.300, η2=.013), nor was there a 
three-way interaction  between Task Transition, Modality Transition  and Age 
(p>.300).  
4.3.3.2 Accuracy 
Mean accuracy was greater on TR trials (94.41%±0.80) than on TS trials 
(93.34%±0.84), and the effect of Task Transition on Accuracy was significant 
(F(1,72)=4.345, p=.041, η2=.057, see Fig 4.4). In contrast, the effect of Modality 
Transition on Accuracy was not significant (p>.200, see Fig 4.5). There was no 
further interaction between Task Transition and Modality Transition 
(F(1,72)=2.30, p>.100, η2=.032), nor a three-way interaction with Age (p>.300). 
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Figure 4.4. Reaction time and error rates on Task-Repetition vs. Task-Switch 
trials. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals of means (Cousineau, 
2005).   
 
Figure 4.5. Reaction time and error rates on Modality-Repetition vs. Modality-
Shift trials. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals of means 
(Cousineau, 2005).   
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4.3.4 Cross-modal task-switching (CMTS) cost vs. combined cost 
While the task-switching effect was similar in both the modality-shift trials 
and the modality-repetition trials, the effect of CMTS might manifest itself not in 
terms of a reduction of TS cost, but as a cost subadditive to the combined TS 
and MS effects. To understand this, we calculated the CMTS cost and the 
combined cost. The CMTS cost is the RT differences between MSTS trials and 
MRTR trials. The combined cost is the overall cost of TS cost (RT differences 
between MRTS trials and MRTR trials) and MS cost (RT differences between 
MSTR trials and MRTR trials). Mean RTs showed that the CMTS costs and the 
Combined costs were very similar (Fig 4.6). 
 
Figure 4.6. Cross-modal Task-Switching Cost and Combined Cost in reaction 
time in different age groups.  Error bars represent standard error of means. 
 
A two-way mixed ANOVA was carried out on Cost Type as the within-
subject factor (CMTS cost vs. combined cost) and Age as the between subject 
factor. The result returned no significant main effect of Cost Type (p>.300), nor 
any interaction with Age (p>.300). The overall result failed to find any facilitative 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
4-year-old 6-year-old Adult
Re
ac
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
Co
st
 (m
s)
CMTS Cost
Combined Cost
 147 
effect of CMTS on task-switching, or as a subadditive cost to the combined TS 
and MS costs. 
4.3.5 Response-repetition on task-switching and modality-shifting 
Mean RTs indicated that the participants were quicker at responding 
when the trial was preceded by a response (Response Repetition, RR) than 
when it was not preceded by a response (Response Single, RS). Figure 4.7 
shows the effect of Response Transition in different Trial Types (task-repetition, 
task-switch; modality-repetition, modality-shift). 
The effect of Response Transition was analysed with the respect of Task 
Transition with a three-way mixed ANOVA (within-subject factors: Response 
Transition and Task Transition, 2 levels each; between-subject factor: Age). 
Only correct responses were analysed. The mixed model showed that there 
was a significant main effect of Response Transition (F(1,72)=15.899, p<.001, 
η2=.181), which was superseded by a significant higher-order interaction 
between Response Transition and Task Transition (F(2,72)=5.28, p<.024, 
η2=.068). There was no further interaction with Age (p>.400). 
The interaction between Response Transition and Task Transitions were 
followed up by analysing the effect of Response Transition on TS trials and TR 
trials separately, with all ages collapsed together. The effect of Response 
Transition was only evident on the TR trials (F(1,74)=19.83, p<.001, η2=.211), 
but not on TS trials (F(1,74)=1.81, p=.182). The interaction indicates that when 
the task repeated, responses were faster on the RR trials (1451ms±56) than on 
the RS trials (1545ms±57); in contrast, when the task switched, response times 
were similar on the RR trials (1564ms±60) and on the RS trials (1592ms±58). 
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The result is consistent with the past literature that response repetition is only 
facilitative when the task repeats, but not when the task switches. 
Similarly, Response Transition was also investigated with the respect of 
Modality Transition (Response Transition and Modality Transition were entered 
as within-subject factors, and Age as a between-subject factor), on RTs of 
correct responses. While the main effect of Response Transition remained 
significant (p<.001), in contrast to the interaction between Task Transition and 
Response Transition, there was no two-way interaction between Response 
Transition and Modality Transition (p>.500). This demonstrates that responses 
were faster on the RR trials than on the RS trials irrespective to modality 
transition. There was no further interaction with Age (p>.200). 
 
Figure 4.7. Response Repetition (RR) Effect under different attentional transition. 
Left panel shows RR effect and Task Transition; right panel shows RR effect and 
Modality Transition. RR: Response-Repetition; RS: Response-Single. Error bars 
represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals of means (Cousineau, 2005).   
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4.4 Discussion 
Using a novel task-switching procedure that involved unpredictable task-
switching and modality-shifting, the current study found reaction time costs 
associated with task-switching and modality-shifting. The patterns and the 
magnitude of either task-switching or modality-shifting costs were similar across 
all ages, as young children did not exhibit larger RT and accuracy costs than 
adults. The lack of a strong age effect on task-switching cost from preschool 
years is consistent with our previous unimodal TS and bimodal CMTS studies 
(Chapter 2 and 3), as well as other developmental studies (Dibbets & Jolles, 
2006; Huizinga et al., 2006; Peng, Kirkham, & Mareschal, 2018; Wolff, 
Roessner, & Beste, 2016). However, past studies, including our previous 
studies, generally involved a long preparation window which may have 
obscured the age differences in the preparation component of task-switching. In 
the current study, advanced preparation was not encouraged as the task cue 
and the stimulus onset were synchronous. Even under this challenging 
condition, we did not observe any age interaction with either task-switching or 
modality-shifting costs. As the current study involved participants with a large 
age range, the lack of age interaction with any mode of attentional shift is 
particularly striking. The overall result illustrated that children as young as four 
were adept at switching attention between modalities and between tasks. 
Although we found no differential age effect on the size of the attentional 
shift cost (for both task transition and modality transition), children were still 
slower and less accurate than adults. It is not clear what contributes to the 
overall lower performance in young children. One possibility is that different 
cognitive processes involved in task switching may have different timescales for 
maturation. For example, Weeda and colleagues (Weeda, Van der Molen, 
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Barceló, & Huizinga, 2014) have suggested that processes that contribute to 
proactive interference from the competing task set may mature relatively early, 
whereas the preparation and top-down component may have a longer 
maturation timescale. It remains possible that although young children in our 
experiment did not exhibit greater within-subject performance costs by transition 
types, they were nonetheless more likely to be unprepared than adults for the 
upcoming task, resulting in lower overall accuracy and longer RT than observed 
in adults.  
Our main interest was to investigate whether there are developmental 
differences in the facilitative or subadditive effects of cross-modal task-
switching, through which we can have a glimpse into the organization of 
information processes in different age groups. Specifically, we hypothesised 
that younger children would experience a greater attentional bottleneck and 
show additive costs to shift attention between modality and task. This 
hypothesis was based on past findings reporting that younger children showed 
greater engagement with the frontal network when shifting attention across 
modalities, consequently suggesting a more effortful switch of attention through 
top-down mechanism (Johannsen & Röder, 2014). In contrast, adults would be 
more likely to have a more mature segregated system to deal with information 
interference, and exhibit a cross-modal task-switching benefit as compared to 
the combined cost. To our surprise, we found no age interaction in the pattern 
of cross-modal task-switching cost. Furthermore, there was no evidence of a 
facilitative or a subadditive effect of cross-modal task-switching, in which 
modality-shift benefits task-switching, in any of the age groups. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study that reported an absence of benefit of 
simultaneous task and modality change.  
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Our result suggests that a common attentional resource between task-
switching and modality-shifting is engaged during the current experimental 
paradigm. The result lends partial support to the previous studies that modality-
shifting and task-switching are at least somewhat interdependent (Hunt & 
Kingstone, 2004; Sandhu & Dyson, 2012). Although our result did not report a 
subadditive effect, it remains possible that parts of the processing pathways can 
be independent. One explanation for the disparate finding between the current 
and the past findings may be that the level of cost/benefit from a cross-modal 
event is dependent on the selection processes among the intermixed 
components between task sets. If the benefit of modality-shift on task-switch 
trials stems from the reduced interference among the inter-trial information 
pathways, it may not be surprising that the degree of benefit is also dependent 
on the degree of pathway overlaps. Tasks with a greater degree of intermixed 
components between task sets may afford more opportunities for the cross-
modal facilitative/ subadditive effect to emerge. The current study is relatively 
low in the selection demand from the intermixed representations, in either 
modality, task or response, as compared to other choice-based cross-modal 
task-switching studies with bimodal inputs, overlapping task attributes and 
responses. As a result, cross-modal facilitation may have little to act on to 
alleviate the already-small interference. 
In task-switching studies, task transition has a cost-benefit relation with 
response repetition; response repetition benefits performance on task-repetition 
trials, but impedes performance on task-switch trials (Meiran, 2000; Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995; Wylie, Javitt, & Foxe, 2004). The phenomenon can be explained 
by primed S-R event on the previous trial. When both response and task 
repeats, there is a priming facilitation from the previous S-R event. In contrast, 
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when the task switches, the same response activates the irrelevant S-R event, 
creating a competition between the current and the previous S-R events 
(Waszak et al., 2003). A similar pattern of response repetition effect was also 
found in the current study, as the benefit of response repetition was only evident 
on task-repetition trials, but not on task-switch trials.  
In contrast, modality transition did not show the same constraint on 
response repetition as task transition. Response repetition was facilitative to 
reaction time regardless of whether the target modality was the same or 
different from the target modality on the previous trial. This indicates that 
modality is not an important constituent in the S-R event, or perhaps in the task 
representation itself, in the present study. Although a previous study on 
modality shift effects suggests that modality is a constituent of the S-R event 
(Cohen & Rist, 1992), without a well-defined task that encompasses both 
auditory and visual modalities, it is not clear if the effect comes from modality-
specific or task-specific components. Our result shows that, when the task goals 
are supramodal, modality information does not necessary form part of the 
episodic profile. This also implies that the processing cost associated with 
modality-shifting is likely to differ from the costs associated with task-switching, 
as modality-shifting is unlikely to change the whole S-R event as task-switching 
does. Importantly, both young children and adults showed similar interactions 
among response transition, modality transition and task transition. This 
indicates that both children and adults processed task, modality and response 
information in a comparable manner, formed similar mental representation of 
the task context, and are likely to engage the same cognitive operations in 
cross-modal task-switching tasks. 
 153 
In the next few chapters I will present a series of connectionist 
computational models of performance in the bimodal cross-modal study 
(Chapter 3), since the study measured multiple task-associated and modality-
associated effects measured (see Chapter 1, section 1.8.2 for the overviews of 
computational models in each chapter). These models will explore the effect of 
different information processes in each network age (Young, Middle and Old 
networks), and attempt to understand how different performance measures (RT, 
accuracy, mixing effect, switch effect, priming cost, priming facilitation, and 
modality shift effects) relate to the model parameters. The models will also 
address how individual differences may emerge at each network age.   
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Chapter 5. Computational models of task-
switching (Model 1) 
5.1 Gilbert and Shallice’s Interactive Activation (IA) Network 
Interactive Activation (IA 1 ) is a cognitive computational model with 
parallel processing units. The model was first proposed by McClelland and 
Rumelhart (1981) to investigate the effect of feature detection in word 
processing. It was later adopted by Gilbert and Shallice (2002) to investigate 
task-switching effects in Stroop tasks. Specifically, they were interested in the 
RT cost associated with switching to an alternative task, and the asymmetry of 
switch costs from one task to the other. The model has been successful in 
proposing the plausible mechanisms for the cognitive component of switch cost, 
and the carry-over interference of switch costs through priming interference. 
Thus, it has already proven to be valuable  in elucidating the multiple 
components of task- and switch- related processes in adults. 
Gilbert and Shallice’s IA model specifies different levels of cognitive 
processing—a perceptual level, a task attribute level, a top-down control level, 
and a response level. Each level has a specific number of units, assigned with a 
specific attribute. With a specified architecture, the units are interconnected 
within the same level and/or between different levels. The connections between 
the units have fixed weights. Moreover, each unit in the model behaves like a 
simple accumulator of the incoming inputs—the activations are passed around 
                                            
1 Glossary of terminology throughout this thesis can be found in the 
Appendix A 
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directly within the network without passing through non-linear unit activation 
functions that govern the ‘on/off’ status of the unit.  
In Gilbert and Shallice’s IA model, the network was divided into two main 
pathways, each associated with a specific task (colour vs. word task pathways, 
see Fig. 5.1). There were several layers of representations—(i) a percept 
stimulus input layer with units representing stimulus attributes (in this case 
either a word or a colour), (ii) a top-down control input layer with a single input 
source representing top-down control, (iii) a task attribute layer (or task-demand 
in their model) with two units representing either a colour task or a word task, 
and (iv) a response layer with units associated with either the colour task 
pathway or the word task pathway. Some of the units (top-down unit and 
percept stimulus units) were simply input units. These units had their activations 
clamped to a specific input value when required. Other units such as task 
attribute units and response units were processing units with continuously 
updated activation throughout the trial. 
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Figure 5.1. Interactive activation in Gilbert and Shallice’s task-switching 
model (2002).  
 
Gilbert and Shallice’s task-switching model has several advantages for 
the investigation of cognitive processes. Firstly, the model architecture with 
theory-led cognitive components allows easy visualization of the interactions 
among different processing levels. Being able to visualize the model also 
means that the principle assumptions about the architecture can be based on 
behavioural observations. For example, Gilbert and Shallice built temporary 
priming connections in the model to account for priming costs on switch trials. 
Secondly, the model assumes simple functions of the processing units, with a 
minimal transformation of the inputs, thereby limiting the assumptions of 
different processing levels. Thirdly, the model can be easily adapted to other 
types of task-switching experiments, and is sensitive to the contextual factors 
that may influence performance. By differentiating the associative connections 
between tasks, stimuli and responses, it is possible to build a task environment 
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corresponding to a specific behavioural experiment, rather than a generalized 
form of cognitive operation associated with switching between tasks. 
Adopting the basic principles of the Gilbert and Shallice’s IA model, I will 
describe a series of task-switching models designed to capture the results of 
the bimodal CMTS study (Chapter 3). The different architectures of my models 
will correspond to specific task contexts in bimodal CMTS. In the next section, I 
will outline the architectural details of Model 1. The basic architecture details of 
Model 1, which is the closest to Gilbert and Shallice’s task-switching model, has 
the fewest assumptions on the information processes and the interactions 
within. The objective of Model 1 is to understand the basic dynamics within a 
relatively constrained architecture, and their relations to the response outputs 
on different trial types (pure, repetition and switch trials). Unless otherwise 
specified, the basic architecture and parameter setting in Model 1 will hold for 
all subsequent models described in the later chapters. 
5.2 Network Architecture 
5.2.1 Overview of Model 1 
In Model 1, pure and mixed tasks were modelled with different network 
structures, resulting in mixed network (left network in Fig. 5.2) and pure network 
(right network in Fig. 5.2) architectures1. As in Gilbert and Shallice’s Model, 
there were distinct layers of processing units in either the pure or mixed 
networks—a Percept Stimulus (PS) layer, a Response Output (RO) layer, a 
Task Attribute layer (TA) and a Top-down signal (Top) layer. Model 1 was 
                                            
1 All parameters setting used in the simulations in Chapter 5 are listed in 
Table 5.1 at the end of chapter. 
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organized with feedforward connections that feed inputs from both the PS and 
the TA units into the RO units. There were also lateral interactions through 
inhibitory connections among the units in the same processing layer. The 
function of the lateral interaction is to implement a selection process within the 
same processing layer (i.e. favouring one unit over the rest). Unit activations 
change by gathering evidence (i.e. incoming input) through the connected units. 
In addition to these fixed feedforward connections, there were temporary 
priming connections that simulated the inter-trial priming effect (dashed lines in 
Fig. 5.2). These priming connections were used to model carry-over effect in 
Gilbert and Shallice’s model. The network runs through several updating cycles 
to gather evidence from the associated units. A response is deemed to have 
been made when the activation value of a response unit exceeds a set 
threshold.  
Since a task-switching study focuses on participants’ existing ability to 
switch between tasks, learning was not thought to be an important factor 
contributing to the overall performance. Therefore, all networks were 
constructed with the assumption that the participants in our studies understood 
the task instruction, and could form an appropriate internal representation of the 
overall task set. To reflect this non-learning nature of performance, all network 
was hand-wired. There was no stochasticity in the network other than adding a 
small amount of noise drawn from a normal distribution to the activation values 
on each processing cycle. The result is that the responses were by and large 
deterministic (i.e. pre-determined). Thus, in Model 1, the networks should 
achieve near ceiling performance; any error occurring would be the result of 
noise accumulation during the response settling process, rather than the direct 
 159 
consequence of incorrect weight setting. All parameters are listed in Table 5.1 
at the end of Chapter 5. 
In the next few sections, I will describe the processing units, the 
connectivity within the network, as well as the governing functions within the 
network. Finally, I will detail the temporal operations of the networks. 
 
Figure 5.2. Model 1 architecture—Left: mixed networks; Right: pure networks. 
The networks have 4 layers: Task Attribute (TA) layer, Response-Output (RO) layer, 
Percept-Stimulus (PS) layer, and Top-down input. The dashed line represents temporary 
priming connections between PS units and TA units form on n-1 trial. See Figs 5.3 to 5.5 
for details of the network units and operations. 
5.2.2 Input units and processing units 
The units in the networks can be defined as either input units or 
processing units.  The input units have fixed values and are not subject to 
updates. The input units in our networks are the Percept Stimulus units (PS) 
and the Top-down signal (Top). In comparison, processing units are activation-
based units and are subject to constant updates from the feedforward inputs 
and lateral interactions with the units of the same processing level. The 
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processing units are the Task Attribute units (TA), and the Response Output 
units (RO). Each unit is detailed below. 
The Top-down signal (Top) is conceptualised as a domain-general 
endogenous signal to the lower-level processes. The Top signal sends a fixed 
value of input to the task-relevant TA unit. A greater Top signal excites the TA 
unit more strongly. The Top signal is clamped at a fixed value (e.g. Top=6). 
The Task attribute units (TA) denote different task goals. In the pure 
condition, there is only one TA unit, since there is no competing task in the pure 
condition. In the mixed condition there are two TA units—one TA representing 
the ‘to detect Dog’ task and one TA representing the ‘to detect Bird’ task. These 
are processing units, which means that they continuously update the unit 
activation through gathering evidence from the associated units across 
successive processing cycles. The activation of a TA unit is synonymous with 
multiple cognitive operations including, but perhaps not limited to, cue 
presentation, cue-encoding, and the identification of task-relevant attributes. 
The activation value of the TA units is bounded between [-1 1].  
The Response Output (RO) level contains four units in the mixed 
condition—a ‘Dog-Yes’ (DY) unit signifying a positive response to the dog 
category, a ‘Dog-No’ (DN) signifying a nonresponse to the dog category, a ‘Bird-
Yes’ (BY) unit signifying a positive response to the bird category, a ‘Bird-No’ 
(BN) signifying a nonresponse to the bird category. In the pure task, there are 
only two RO units signifying either a ‘Yes’ response or a ‘No’ response, since 
there is only one target category.  
The Percept Stimulus units (PS) refer to perceptual inputs in different 
modalities (e.g. visual and auditory). In the behavioural experiment, all stimuli 
were bimodal and consisted of one auditory input and one visual input. There 
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are four different PS units—Dog-Visual (DV), Dog-Auditory (DA), Bird-Visual 
(BV) and Bird-Auditory (BA). These units, if active, have value clamped at 1. 
The same units are present in both pure and mixed networks. 
In the mixed task of the bimodal CMTS experiment, both bird and dog 
stimuli were part of the target sets, while the cat and sheep stimuli formed the 
neutral set. Since all stimuli were bimodal, the use of target sets and neutral 
sets allow the formation of different trial types—target+neutral (e.g. DV+neural 
auditory), target+nontarget (DV+BA), or neutral+neutral. The neutral stimuli are 
not modelled here as it is assumed that the neutral information was easily 
ignored at the outset because it was not associated with any response set. 
Although one could argue that a neutral stimulus is associated with a ‘No’ 
response, it is not clear which ‘No’ response out of the competing response sets 
it should be associated with. It seems far more likely that the neutral information 
was instead ignored and thus that very little selection was involved. As a 
consequence, the stimuli on the simulated trial in the mixed network is either bi-
selection (choosing between PS inputs, e.g. DV or BA), or uni-selection (only 
one PS input is present, e.g. BA).  
The same logic is not applied to the pure networks. In the pure networks, 
the PS units from the nontarget animal category are essentially neutral input 
(e.g. bird PS units are neutral in the pure networks for Dog task). However, the 
inclusion of the neutral inputs is necessary for two reasons: firstly, including 
nontarget stimuli is necessary for regulating the probability of target 
appearance, and secondly, it is necessary to expand the response decision 
space to both ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ for a good match to the behavioural context. 
Consequently, all trials in the pure network involve uni-selection stimuli (either 
target ‘DV’ or nontarget ‘BV’ present). Despite including the neutral PS units, 
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the neutral PS units do not produce competition during the settling process, 
since there is no competing response set.  
5.2.3 Network connectivity 
5.2.3.1 Fixed feedforward connections 
As mentioned previously, all fixed connection weights are hand-wired. 
Both PS units and TA units have feedforward excitatory connections into the 
RO units. The network architecture can be classified into two main task-
associated pathways—a pathway associated with the dog detection task, and a 
pathway associated with the bird detection task. Each PS unit is connected to 
both Dog and Bird response sets (Fig. 5.3). According to the experimental 
instructions, a stimulus input can be associated with two response categories—
(a) a positive detection to Task A, or (b) a negative detection to Task B (e.g. a 
‘Dog’ input can be interpreted as ‘presence of a dog’ and ‘absence of a bird’). 
Therefore, each stimulus input is associated with two different response sets. 
The connections between PS and RO have asymmetric pathways by 
modalities. Specially, the connection weights from visual percept stimulus 
(PSVIS) are stronger than the connection weights from the auditory percept 
stimulus (PSAUD). This is due to the observation that all ages were quicker in 
responding to visual targets than auditory targets in the bimodal CMTS study. 
This asymmetry is applied to both pure and mixed networks.  
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Figure 5.3. Feedforward connections between Percept Stimulus layer and 
Response Output layer in (a) mixed networks and (b) pure networks. Black connections 
represent stronger visual PS-RO pathways; grey connections represent weaker auditory 
PS-RO pathways. 
 
Task attribute units have excitatory feedforward connections to the RO 
units of the corresponding categories. The connection strengths are the same 
between the two task-associated pathways (TADOG to RODY&DN vs. TABIRD to 
ROBY&BN pathways); however, within each category pathway, the connection 
weights are different for the ‘Yes’ pathway and for the ‘No’ pathway. Task 
attribute units are strongly connected to the corresponding ‘Yes’ units, since the 
task instruction was to make a positive response for target detection, and 
weakly connected to the corresponding ‘No’ units (Fig. 5.4). Therefore, there is 
a bias towards making a positive response. This asymmetry is applicable to 
both pure and mixed networks. 
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Figure 5.4. Feedforward connections from Task Attribute (TA) units to Response-
Output (RO) units in mixed networks—stronger connections to the corresponding ‘Yes’ 
units and weaker connections to the corresponding ‘No’ units. The lateral inhibitory 
connections are symmetrical between the TA units. In pure networks, one of the task-
associated pathway is omitted. 
 
5.2.3.2 Lateral Inhibition connections 
Units at the task attribute level and the response output level have 
reciprocal lateral inhibition connections to the other units in the same level. 
Mayr and Keele (2000) have argued that when two tasks are competing against 
each other, selection of the task-relevant attribute is likely to be accompanied 
by the inhibition of the competing task-irrelevant attributes (Mayr & Keele, 
2000). At the response output level, it has been suggested that, on stop-signal 
tasks, there are likely to be inhibitory interactions between go and stop 
responses to facilitate response decision (Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, & Schall, 
2007; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). The inclusion of lateral inhibition also 
promotes settling among the RO units and increases the likelihood that only one 
response output reaches the response threshold. 
The lateral inhibition connections between the TA units are symmetrical 
(Fig. 5.5, upper panel), since the tasks are presumed to have equal strengths. 
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The lateral inhibition connections are also symmetrical between the response 
sets (RODOG vs. ROBIRD), but are asymmetrical within the response set (Yes/No) 
(Fig. 5.5, lower panel). Competing response sets (RODOG vs. ROBIRD) strongly 
inhibit each other, thereby enabling the network to settle into one response set 
only. In comparison, the ‘Yes’ unit strongly inhibits the ‘No’ unit within the same 
response set (e.g. ROBY strongly inhibits ROBN). It is assumed that once the Yes 
unit is activated, it is relatively easy to inhibit the ‘No’ unit. In contrast, the ‘No’ 
unit only weakly inhibits the ‘Yes’ unit within the same response set. As a 
consequence, settling to a ‘No’ response requires a greater number of cycles. 
This asymmetric inhibition is also an optimal strategy for bi-selection trials. Bi-
selection trials involve stimuli with two competing PS units (e.g. DA paired with 
BV). On these trials, even when an appropriate task is selected, the competition 
between the RO units within the response set is strong since the PS units send 
positive input to both Yes and No responses with the same response set. 
Selection is optimised if the processing is biased towards the ‘Yes’ response. 
The stronger lateral inhibition from Yes to No, coupled with the stronger TA unit 
to ROYES pathway, means that the network requires weaker evidence from the 
perceptual stimulus to make a ‘Yes’ response than a ‘No’ response on bi-
selection trials. 
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Figure 5.5. Lateral inhibitory connections in the mixed networks. Upper network 
shows the symmetrical lateral inhibitions between TA units. Lower network shows lateral 
inhibition between RO units—strong inhibitory connections between response sets; 
strong inhibitory connection from ‘Yes’ to ‘No’, and a weaker inhibitory connection 
from ‘No’ to ‘Yes’ within a response set. In the pure networks (not shown here), there is 
no lateral inhibition at TA level, and only the asymmetric lateral inhibition within the 
response set. 
 
5.2.3.3 Priming connections between PS and TA (PS2TA) 
Other than the fixed excitatory and inhibitory connections mentioned 
earlier, there are also temporary feedforward connections from the PS units to 
the TA units (Fig. 5.2, dashed line). These connections create the n-1 stimulus-
task primes. These connections are formed through hebbian-like learning 
mechanism between the activated PS unit(s) and the TA units (both activated 
and inhibited units) at the end of each trial. These temporary connections are 
the only connections that undergo associative learning; however, unlike learning 
that results in fixed structural changes that affect all future behaviours, the 
learning here lasts for one trial only. The same priming connections were also 
present in Gilbert and Shallice’s models, and were crucial to account for the 
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interference component of switch costs. If any identical percept stimulus unit is 
reactivated on a following trial, the percept stimulus unit(s) will send activation 
to the task attribute unit(s) relevant to the n-1 trial. It should be noted that both 
excited and inhibited TA units have temporary priming connections with the PS 
units, and therefore the primes can either have positive input or negative input 
to the TA units.  
On a task-repetition trial, the priming effect is facilitative since it 
increases the activation of the relevant task attribute, and decreases activation 
of the competing TA unit. In contrast, on a task-switch trial, the priming effect 
would be interfering since the prime is likely to send positive input to the 
competing TA unit, and negative input to the task-relevant TA unit.  
The priming connection weights are the product of the activation values 
between the PS and TA units at the end of the n-1 trial (Equation 1).  
𝑊"# = Irate×𝑎#×𝑎"       (Equation 1) 
The aj is the activation of the PS unit, and the ai is the activation of the 
TA unit. Irate is the learning rate of the weight change, which determines the 
magnitude of the priming effect. These connections are rewired, rather than 
updated, after each trial. Therefore, the memory of the connection lasts for one 
trial only. Since our studies only looked at n-1 trial effect, no other assumptions 
are made about other potential higher-order trial sequence effects, although 
higher order effects might be present. 
5.2.4 Temporal dynamics and unit update functions of the model 
The network operates with a set of functions and operational parameters. 
In this section I will illustrate the temporal dynamics of a trial. The information 
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processes within the network are largely parallel; however, there are still distinct 
events to match with the experimental procedure. 
As with the experiment, each trial starts with a long preparation window. 
During the preparation window, the Top unit sends input to the task-relevant TA 
unit, while all other units remain inactive (i.e. unit activation=0). Past studies 
have suggested that task-preparation is a two-stage process (Mayr & Kliegl, 
2000; Monsell, Yeung, & Azuma, 2000)—during the preparation window, the 
participants only prepare for the abstract goal-setting (e.g. ‘to detect Dogs’), but 
the specific rules governing the response set are only activated after the 
stimulus onset. Thus, during the preparation window, only the task-relevant TA 
unit, which corresponds to the task goal, is updated through Top input. The 
competing TA unit is updated through lateral inhibition. RO units and PS units 
are inactive (activation=0) during this period. The longer the preparation 
window, the greater the activation of the task-relevant TA unit is, and the 
greater the inhibition of the task-unassociated TA unit. TA units are updated 
with the unit update function detailed in the subsection 5.2.4.1. 
After the preparation window, one (i.e. in case of uni-selection) or two 
(i.e. in case of bi-selection) PS units  are activated and the value of the PS unit 
is clamped at 1 throughout the trial. Once the PS units are activated, all unit 
updates are carried out in parallel. The RO units are updated at each update 
cycle until the response threshold is reached in one of the RO units. The 
number of update cycles is taken as a measure of reaction time.  
Before the next trial begins, TA activations are assumed to decay. The 
decay is modelled with a squashing parameter (Squash), that reduces the 
magnitude of the TA activation to a certain percentage of the original level. In 
the current model, there is no formal commitment to what the squashing 
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parameter represents in cognition. For example, it could represent cognitive 
effort associated with not perseverating in a specific task representation, or 
natural memory decay, or both. The squashing function applies to both excited 
and inhibited TA units. In comparison, all units other than the TA units are set to 
an inactive state of ‘0’.   
5.2.4.1 Unit update function 
The activations of all processing units (TA and RO) are capped between 
a minimum of ‘-1’ and a maximum of ‘+1’. The net inputs (Neti) to the unit ‘i’ is 
simply all the products between the connection weight (Wij) and the input unit ‘j’ 
activation value and with a pre-defined bias as a threshold (i.e. the amount of 
positive input required to positively update the unit, i.e. -3 in the models) 
(Equation 2).  
𝑁𝑒𝑡" = 𝑊"#		×	unit 'j' activation+# + 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠    (Equation 2) 
The change in activation (Δ𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) of the unit ‘i’ follows equation (3) 
and (4) below. The ‘act’ in the equation refers to the current activation value of 
the unit ‘i’. The step is the rate of the activation update, which is a pre-defined 
positive value (i.e. 0.0015 in our models). The unit update function has the 
notable characteristic that, given a specific net input (and a pre-defined step), 
the Δ𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is dependent on the difference between the current activation 
and the min/max values. If the difference is large, then the Δ𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is larger 
than when the difference is small. In addition to the activation updates caused 
by the inputs, noise ‘u’ bounded between [-1, 1] is added to the activation of unit 
‘i’ at each update cycle. The noise is drawn from normal distribution with a fixed 
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standard deviation (i.e. 0.006) around a mean of zero. The standard deviation of 
the distribution determines how noisy the system is.  
𝐼𝑓	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑁𝑒𝑡"	𝑖𝑠	𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒:	𝛥𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝	×	𝑁𝑒𝑡"	×	 𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡" + 𝑢"
          (Equation 3) 
𝐼𝑓	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑁𝑒𝑡"	𝑖𝑠	𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒:	𝛥𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝	×	𝑁𝑒𝑡"	×	 𝑎𝑐𝑡" − 𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝑢"
          (Equation 4) 
5.3 Comparison with Gilbert and Shallice’s model 
Gilbert and Shallice’s model had asymmetric connections between the 
two pathways associated with the competing tasks—stronger connections 
between the task attribute unit and the corresponding response units for the 
dominant task (i.e. word task), and weaker connections between the task 
attribute unit and the corresponding response units for the nondominant task 
(i.e. colour task). In our behavioural experiment, the participants switched 
between two animal detection tasks. It was assumed that the tasks had a 
similar level of difficulty, so an asymmetry between task pathways would not be 
appropriate in our case. However, our model did include other forms of 
asymmetric pathways, such as stronger pathway between TA and ROYES than 
RONO, and stronger pathways from visual stimulus than auditory stimulus. 
The models in the current thesis and Gilbert and Shallice’s model 
differed in more ways than just the asymmetric pathways. In their model, in 
addition to the feedforward excitatory connections from the task attribute units 
to the corresponding (i.e. of the same task) response units, there were also 
inhibition connections from the task attribute units to the competing response 
output units. These inhibitory connections were selective in nature, so could be 
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thought of as functionally similar to an inhibitory control mechanism. In addition 
to the feedforward excitatory and inhibitory connections, there were also 
excitatory feedback connections from the response output units to the 
corresponding task attribute units. Gilbert and Shallice argued that this 
feedback mechanism simulated the effect of ‘attentional capture’ – i.e. of 
naturally drawing attention towards the representations associated to the 
stimulus itself. However, preliminary tests with our simulated models suggested 
that neither the inhibition feedforward connections nor the excitatory feedback 
connections were imperative for the overall performances. Additionally, these 
connections have much weaker theoretical justifications in the task-switching 
literature, at least in the case of ‘attentional capture’. Although inhibitory control 
may be a candidate mechanism in successful task switches, as we have seen 
in Chapter 1, many inhibition phenomena could be explained by processes that 
are not associated with inhibitory control, such as selection processes. For 
these reasons, our models only included excitatory feedforward connections 
from task attribute layer to response output layer. 
5.4 Simulation Schedule 
All parameters setting used in these simulations are listed in Table 5.1 at 
the end of Chapter 5. 
5.4.1 Simulation objectives 
The aims of the simulation are (1) to examine whether mixing costs (pure 
task vs. mixed task) and switch costs (repeating task vs. switching task) can be 
successfully captured by Model 1, and (2) to understand what parameters are 
critical for inducing these between-condition differences. It is important to note 
that Model 1 was not intended to explore modality-associated effects. Although 
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the model includes asymmetric modality pathways in order to reflect the 
patterns observed in the behavioural data better, the main focus of this 
computational model was purely on task-associated performances. As we have 
seen in unimodal CMTS reported in Chapter 4, supramodal task goals in cross-
modal context are largely amodal, and therefore task-associated effects and 
modality-associated effects should be investigated independently. 
It is also worth pointing out that although pure networks have outwardly 
similar looking network architectures to those of the mixed networks, they differ 
in several important ways. In the pure networks, the response space extends to 
neutral elements, which are not present in the mixed networks. That said, the 
inclusion of a ‘No’ response in the pure network is purely practical (so that the 
probability of target appearances can be regulated and that it will be possible for 
errors to occur). There is no competition between task sets in the pure networks 
so the responses are by and large made through stimulus-response 
associations. In comparison, mixed networks do have competition between 
different task elements implemented by separating TA and RO into two 
pathways each. The PS units are associated with both tasks thereby creating a 
complex interplay between bottom-up and top-down influences in the mixed 
condition. Thus, Model 1 explores whether the differences between pure task 
performance and mixed task performance is due to the competition (or lack 
thereof) between task pathways. 
With regards to switch effects, it was noted above that RT switch costs in 
the Gilbert and Shallice’s simulations is due to both n-1 residual TA activations 
and priming effects. Errors were also more likely on switch trials than on task 
repetition trials in their model. However, the error rates in their model were very 
low (<5%) so a floor effect may exist in their model. In our behavioural 
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experiment, 4-year-olds’ mean accuracy on all trial types was less than 90%. 
Consequently, it is not clear if the simple pure and mixed networks will be able 
to replicate the developmental differences in both RT and accuracy observed in 
different age groups. 
The simulations were therefore carried out in two phases—(i) an initial 
phase of parameter searching using Model 1A, and (ii) a phase exploring 
developmental differences using Model 1B. In Model 1A, I examined how 
performance could be affected by different free parameters in the default (Old) 
networks. The free parameters in the first phase were: the preparation interval, 
the Top signal, and the priming rate. In the second phase, using Model 1B, I 
introduced different network ages by varying the weights of the fixed feedfoward 
connections, and tested the aforementioned free parameters in the resulting 
networks of different simulated ages.  
5.5 Model 1A: Searching for the Parameter Space 
All reported simulations in Model 1A were run with 25 networks with 
default fixed connection weights (see Table 5.1, at the end of the chapter). The 
number of network “subjects” matches with the number of participants in the 
behavioural studies. There was one block of 48 trials for the pure networks and 
3 blocks of 48 trials (total 144 trials) for the mixed networks. All stimuli were 
selected randomly with a 60% probability of target appearances, consistent with 
the behavioural experiments. In the pure networks, all stimuli were uni-selection 
stimuli (i.e. only one PS unit was activated). In the mixed networks, the stimuli 
could be either uni-selection stimuli or bi-selection stimuli (i.e. one visual and 
one auditory PS units are activated).  
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In mixed networks, the task switched on every other trial, which is 
different from the behavioural study where task switched every 4 trials. In Model 
1A, the task-relevant TA unit was already highly activated on the first repetition 
trial, and the TA activation values did not change much with an additional 
repetition trial. Although the frequency of task-switches can potentially be a 
mediating factor for task performance, this did not appear to be the case in our 
experiments. Children exhibited comparable performances in bimodal CMTS 
(task switched every four trials, Chapter 3) and unimodal CMTS study (task 
switched randomly, Chapter 4). 
The first trials of each block were excluded from the analyses to avoid 
the first trial effect (i.e. resulting in long RT or error due to very small TA 
activation). As in the behavioural experiment, RT analyses were restricted to 
correct Yes responses only. In the behavioural experiment, responses were 
binary valued (either a button-press or not), and no differentiation of response 
sets was possible. In comparison, in Model 1A, a correct response was 
recorded only if the RO unit was a correct response value (e.g. Yes or No) from 
the correct response set (e.g. RODog). 
5.5.1 Model 1A: Baseline Result 
Before reporting the simulation results, it was necessary to ensure that 
the model could perform the required tasks. To examine this, the initial 
simulation was run with zero noise. At noise=0, all responses are deterministic 
and therefore the model should be able to achieve 100% accuracy, which was 
indeed the case.  
The initial model showed comparable RT on Pure and Repetition trials, 
and longer RT on Switch trials (Fig. 5.6, orange bars). In other words, there was 
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an RT switch cost but no RT mixing cost. This was due to the fact that both 
Pure networks and Mixed networks had the same fixed connection weights, 
resulting in comparable RT. Although we reported no reliable RT mixing costs in 
the bimodal CMTS experiment, both the unimodal TS experiment and past task-
switching studies have generally reported mixing costs. Therefore, it was not 
clear if the lack of mixing costs in our study was due to factors related to the 
multisensory environment. As Model 1A focused on task-associated effects, 
instead of interactions between task-switching and modality-shifting, it was 
deemed relevant to induce RT mixing costs to begin with, in order to further 
understand how mixing costs can be modulated by different parameters. 
Therefore, to address the issue of a lack of RT difference between pure 
and repetition trials, all feedforward connection weights in the pure network 
were strengthened so that processing in the network would be quicker (Fig. 5.6, 
yellow bars). A quicker and stronger connection from the PS units and the RO 
units is justifiable since it is foreseeable that translating perceptual information 
into action should be relatively easy in the pure condition, since there was no 
task or response ambiguity from the stimulus (at least when cross-modal 
attentional shift is not considered).  
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Figure 5.6. Baseline performance of mean RT (cycles) (bars) and Accuracy (lines) 
at zero noise. Orange bars represent simulations with equal weight settings in pure and 
mixed networks; Yellow bars represent simulations with stronger PS2RO and TA2RO 
weights in pure network than in mixed network. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
5.5.2 Model 1A Result: Top signal 
Having established the architecture for Pure networks and for Mixed 
networks, I proceeded to explore the effect of the Top signal. In this section, the 
networks were run with from minimal signal to very strong signal (4 to 40) with a 
default preparation window (150 cycles). The results are presented in Figure 
5.7.  
5.5.2.1 Reaction Time  
Although a stronger Top signal reduced RT on both pure and repetition 
trials, the effect was asymptotic beyond a certain level of Top signal. In 
comparison, modulating the Top signal had a direct and significant effect on the 
RT on switch trials. Compared to repetition trial, the TA activation on switch trial 
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was relatively low. We conclude that a significant part of the switch cost has to 
do with how active the task-relevant TA unit is. Thus, a higher Top signal could 
reduce the amount of RT switch cost; at a very high signal (Top=40), RT switch 
costs were effectively eliminated. 
5.5.2.2 Accuracy 
Accuracy was greater with a higher Top signal on all trial types. Like its 
effect on RT, the effect of Top strength on accuracy was most evident on switch 
trials, with an increased Top signal leading to increased accuracy. Nonetheless, 
even at a very low Top signal (Top=4), the accuracy on switch trials was close 
to 90%.  
 
Figure 5.7. Mean RT (cycle) and accuracy on the different trial types (Pure, 
Repetition and Switch Trial). Bars show RT (cycles) and lines show accuracy. Error bars 
represent 95% CI. 
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5.5.3 Model 1A Result: Preparation Window 
5.5.3.1 Reaction Time.  
The models were run with different preparation windows (50 cycles, 150 
cycles, 230 cycles and 400 cycles), with a moderate Top signal (Top=6). Longer 
preparation windows would give the network greater time to excite the task-
relevant TA unit. The effect of modulating the preparation window was similar to 
that of the Top signal as a longer window reduced RT on all trials. On pure and 
repetition trials, the effect of increasing the preparation window became 
asymptotic beyond 150 cycles; in contrast, on switch trials, the effect of 
increasing the preparation window continued even at a very long window (400 
cycles) (Fig. 5.8).  
5.5.3.2 Accuracy.  
Modulating the preparation window had little effect on the accuracy in 
pure and repetition trials. This is because the task-relevant TA unit was already 
highly excited at the beginning of the trial and no further update was necessary 
to ensure a correct task set was selected. In contrast, the accuracy on switch 
trials was modulated by the preparation window. While the accuracy was 
greater with a very long preparation window than a reduced one, the differences 
between the two was not substantial. However, the accuracy fell sharply when 
the preparation window was very small (50 cycles).  
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Figure 5.8. Mean RT (cycle) and accuracy on the different trial types (Pure, 
Repetition and Switch Trial) with different preparation windows (50, 150, 230, 400). 
Bars show RT (cycles) and lines show accuracy. Error bars represent 95% CI.  
5.5.4 Model 1A Result: Stimulus-Task Priming 
Our behavioural analyses in Chapter 3 explored priming effects with 
relation to either stimulus-led response-prime in pure and repetition trials (i.e. a 
trial was considered primed if the two consecutive trials contained stimuli from 
the same modality and the same target set), or response-led response-prime in 
switch trials (i.e. a trial was considered primed if two consecutive trials both led 
to a button-press). The different definition for primes in switch trials was due the 
fact that a previously responded to target would be a nontarget on switch trial. 
The behavioural result shows that response-prime had a significant facilitative 
effect in pure and repetition trials, and a relative (nonsignificant) cost in switch 
trials (see Fig. 5.9 for behavioural result). This is consistent to past literature on 
task-switching—a facilitative effect in repetition trials and a cost in switch trials.  
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Our analyses did not reveal an age effect on the size of priming effects. Note 
that the priming cost in switch trial was likely to be an underestimate since our 
behavioural study was unable to index stimulus-led primes on switch trials, due 
to nonresponses on primed switch trials.  
 
 
Figure 5.9. RT Priming effect on different trial types in bimodal CMTS 
behavioural experiment. On pure and repetition trials, the priming effect was stimulus-
led (RT differences between unprimed trials and primed trials with the same stimulus 
category-modality); on switch trials, the priming effect was response-led (RT differences 
between single response vs. repeated response). Positive values indicate priming 
facilitation and negative values indicate priming cost. The figure is the same as Fig. 3.4 
in Chapter 3. 
To explore whether a stimulus-task priming component can capture 
priming facilitation on pure and repetition trials and priming cost on switch trials, 
the networks were run with different priming rates.  
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As described in the network architecture (Section 5.2.2.4), temporary 
connections are formed between the PS unit(s) and the TA units at the end of 
each trial (or PS2TA primes). The priming connections are the product between 
the activation value of the TA units and the PS units on n-1 trial, specified by a 
fixed learning rate (lrate) that determines the magnitude of the weight changes 
(see Equation 1). In the current simulation, we varied this learning rate (lrate) as 
a free parameter. The default networks (preparation=150, Top=6) were run with 
different priming lrates (0, 1 and 3). 
Different priming lrates did not modulate the overall RT and accuracy in 
any of the trial type (Fig. 5.10). However, when separating the primed and 
unprimed trials for each trial type, there was a small priming cost on the switch 
trials; furthermore, the priming cost was larger for greater priming lrates. There 
was no priming facilitation on pure and repetition trials (Fig. 5.11). 
 
Figure 5.10. Mean RT and Accuracy of different trial types with different 
priming Irates (no prime=0, moderate prime=1, high prime=3). Bars show RT (cycles) 
and lines show accuracy. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
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Figure 5.11. Priming effects on different trial types. Bars represent networks run 
with different PS2TA priming lrates (1, 3).  The y-axis shows the RT differences 
between unprimed trials and primed trials (unprimed - primed). Positive values indicate 
priming facilitation, while negative values indicate priming cost.  
 
It was also possible that whether a priming effect was observed or not 
was dependent on the size of the Top signal. Since both priming input and Top 
input act on TA units, a large Top signal might overshadow the priming effect. It 
thus follows that if the Top signal was small, the contribution from priming 
facilitation/interference would be relatively large. To examine this, the model 
was run with lrate=1 on different Top signals. Indeed, the result showed that 
when the Top signal was small (Top=4), there was a much larger RT priming 
cost on switch trials, than with a medium to strong Top signal (Fig. 5.12). 
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Figure 5.12. Priming effects on networks with different Top signals. Bars 
represent networks run with different Top signals (4, 6, 10, 40) at prime rate=1. The y-
axis shows the RT differences between unprimed trials and primed trials (unprimed - 
primed). Positive values indicate priming facilitation, while negative values indicate 
priming cost. 
 
Although the simulations revealed priming costs on switch trials, 
consistent with past research, they failed to reproduce the facilitative effect of 
priming on pure and repetition trials. On pure and repetition trials, the TA 
activations were sufficiently large so there was little facilitative effect from the 
prime mediated through TA units. It is possible that there are different sources 
of primes, some of which have a more direct influence on responses. One such 
prime may be a stimulus-response compound not mediated by task 
representations. 
In the next section, I will further explore how the aforementioned free 
parameters (Top signal, preparation window and priming lrate) modulate 
performance in different network ages.  
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5.7 Model 1B: modelling Age in the networks 
In the previous section I have explored how performance on each trial 
type was affected by Top input, preparation window, and PS2TA primes by 
running the simulations on a default network. This default network with initial 
fixed connection weight in Model 1A is adopted as the Old network setting, from 
which the younger networks are derived with different fixed feedforward 
weights. It is well documented that children have a slower processing speed 
than adults (Hale, 1990; Kail, 1991). This age difference in processing speed 
was modelled by varying the speed of translating perceptual and Top inputs into 
responses, with a faster speed in older networks than younger networks. To 
accomplish this, younger networks are assumed to have weaker feedforward 
connections to the RO units than older networks. Specifically, these 
connections are TA-RO and PS-RO fixed feedforward connections (see Table 
5.1 for weight settings). 
All simulations of different network ages (Young, Middle, Old) were run 
with 25 network subjects, each with the same number of trials as in Model 1A. 
Unless specified otherwise, the networks were run with standard parameter 
(Preparation Window=150 cycles, Prime rate=1, Top=6). 
5.7.1 Model 1B: Overall performances 
As in the previous simulation, different network ages were first run with 
zero noise to examine if the connection weights are appropriate for the given 
tasks. All networks were run with the same Top signal (Top=6) and preparation 
window (150 cycles). The result shows that all networks were able to achieve 
100% accuracy when noise was zero, thus confirming the appropriateness of 
the connection weight settings. 
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5.7.1.1 Reaction time and accuracy 
The networks were subsequently run with noise to examine the 
performance in a more naturalistic condition. These results are shown in Figure 
5.13. Younger networks were slower on all trial types, which is consistent with 
the behavioural result. Although younger networks showed greater overall RT, 
they also showed greater overall accuracy. It appears that a slower processing 
speed (i.e. weaker connection weights) allowed more time for the networks to 
accumulate appropriate inputs for responses, since the network naturally needs 
to go through more cycles to settle onto a response. The developmental 
differences in accuracy differ from the behavioural result, where younger 
children were overall less accurate.  
 
Figure 5.13. Mean RT (cycle) and accuracy on the different trial types (Pure, 
Repetition and Switch Trial) at different network ages. Bars show RT (cycles) and lines 
show accuracy. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
5.7.1.2 RT mixing effect and switch effect 
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The between-condition differences such as RT mixing cost (repetition vs. 
pure) and RT switch cost (switch vs. repetition) were also examined (Fig. 5.14). 
Younger networks showed a greater RT mixing cost and RT switch cost. The 
developmental effect on the between-condition costs was not consistent with 
the behavioural result where younger children did not reliably exhibit a larger RT 
mixing cost or RT switch cost than adults.  
 
Figure 5.14. RT Mixing Cost (cycle) and RT Switch Cost (cycle) at different 
network ages—Old, Middle and Young. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
5.7.2 Model 1B: Top signal 
Networks of all ages were run with increasing Top signals (Fig. 5.15). 
This had a similar effect across all network ages. Greater Top signals reduced 
RT on all trials, but the effect was most evident on switch trials. As a result, RT 
switch costs were smaller with a greater Top signal. Since a very strong Top 
signal can effectively eliminate the between-condition costs, this may imply that 
the lack of age effect at the level of between-condition costs observed in the 
behavioural data was due to younger children employing a stronger Top signal 
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than older participants. However, this appears unlikely since a stronger Top 
signal would also improve accuracy and young children were much less 
accurate than adults in the behavioural experiment. 
 
Figure 5.15 Mean RT (cycle) and accuracy in networks with different Top signals. 
Bars show RT (cycles) and lines show accuracy. Error bars represent 95% CI. Left to 
right: Old, Middle, Young networks.  
5.7.3 Stimulus-task priming (PS2TA primes) 
The effect of priming on overall performance on each trial type was 
relatively negligible across all network ages (Fig. 5.16). However, when looking 
at the priming effects arising from within a condition (i.e. within each trial type), 
PS2TA primes resulted in RT priming costs on switch trials. A greater priming 
cost was observed with higher priming lrate, particularly in younger networks 
(Fig. 5.17). There was no evidence for priming facilitation on pure and repetition 
trials from PS2TA primes.  
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Figure 5.16. Mean RT (cycle) and accuracy in networks with different PS2TA 
priming rates (0 to 3). Bars show RT (cycles) and lines show accuracy. Error bars 
represent 95% CI. Left to right: Old, Middle, Young networks.  
 
 
Figure 5.17. Mean priming effects in RT on different trial types in different 
network ages. Left panel shows networks run with low prime rate (PS2TA prime=1), and 
right panel shows networks run with high prime rate (PS2TA prime=3). Error bars 
represent 95% CI. 
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5.8 General Discussion 
Model 1 results suggest that different causes may underlie mixing effects 
and switch effects. With regards to mixing effects, it appears that the differences 
in structural setting between the pure and mixed networks (such as connection 
weights) may account for the effect, rather than competition at the task-set level 
per se. Since neither Top signals nor duration of preparation window had strong 
effects on the overall RT and accuracy on pure and repetition trials, mixing 
costs are unlikely to be caused by factors relating to endogenous control. 
Instead, differences in the speed of translating representations into responses, 
through connection weights, may underlie mixing effects. This highlights the 
possibility that mixing effects may be to do with how the task environment is 
constructed in the first place, rather than the direct consequence of the 
interaction among the task-associated elements, such as selection among 
multiple representations. 
In the mixed networks, a greater Top signal and a greater preparation 
window were both effective at reducing RT on the switch trials. This is done 
through increasing the activation of the task-relevant TA unit, thereby reducing 
the competition at the TA level and generating a stronger activation of the 
appropriate response set. In contrast, Top signal and preparation window had 
more limited effects on the RTs on pure and repetition trials. This is because, on 
those trials, the task-relevant TA unit was already excited at the beginning of 
the trial as activation was carried over from the previous trial.  
In sum, RT switch costs were found to be directly associated with factors 
related to endogenous controls, such as the duration of preparation window and 
the strength of Top signal. The effect of preparation is consistent with the 
behavioural finding where a longer window and a transparent task cue reduces 
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switch costs (Koch, 2003; Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). 
An increased Top signal was also effective in reducing RT while improving 
accuracy. Similarly, a participant with more effective top-down control may 
therefore need a smaller preparation window to switch task. 
The second phase of simulation focused on the effect of free parameters 
at different network ages. With weaker feedforward connections, younger 
networks were overall slower on all trial types, consistent with the slower RT(ms) 
observed in children as compared to adults. However, younger networks also 
exhibited a greater accuracy than the older networks. This is in stark contrast to 
the behavioural finding that children were overall less accurate as well as 
slower. Furthermore, younger networks generally exhibited a larger between-
condition RT cost (mixing and switch costs) than older networks. Such 
developmental differences were not found in the behavioural experiments.  
While it is possible to reduce the age effect on between-condition costs 
by eliminating the overall switch cost and mixing cost through a very high Top 
signal, to do so would also go against the common belief that children were 
overall less efficient in top-down control than adults. Furthermore, a high Top 
signal would also result in higher accuracy on switch trials, since it would 
ensure the correct response set was chosen. Although children in our 
experiments did not exhibit greater between-condition processing costs (mixing 
and switch costs), they nonetheless exhibited lower overall accuracy on all trial 
types. A high Top signal would not be consistent with our behavioural findings. 
It is likely that other mechanisms are at play in reducing the effect of age on RT 
switch cost.  
Although the general network behaviours were similar in both young and 
older networks, younger networks were more susceptible to priming costs due 
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to PS2RO primes on switch trials. The greater RT priming costs are likely to be 
due to the slower baseline speed in Young and Middle networks. This is 
because a slower network also means that the primes would go through a 
greater number of cycles during response setting and selection. In comparison, 
the simulations did not uncover any priming facilitation on pure and repetition 
trials, indicating that goal-mediated stimulus-task attribute primes did not further 
promote response setting when the task goal was already highly activated. 
There was also a floor effect in Model, as all networks were resistant to 
errors, despite the occasional errors under extreme conditions on switch trials 
(i.e. very low Top signal or very low preparation window). Counterintuitively, 
younger networks were more accurate than older networks in Model 1. In the 
behavioural experiment, only adults were at ceiling performance across all trial 
types, younger children, particularly 4-year-olds, made far greater number of 
errors than adult participants, including the ‘easy’ repetition trials. Model 1 was 
unable to capture the developmental differences in accuracy.  
In summary, Model 1 was able to capture aspects of between-condition 
RT costs: (1) RT mixing costs may reflect different underlying assumptions in 
information processes. The associative strengths between different 
representations may be stronger in pure condition than in mixed condition, 
despite the stimuli and responses share perceptual and motoric similarities in 
the two conditions, and (2) RT switch costs are directly associated with the 
parameters that relate to endogenous control, such as preparation window and 
Top signal. Therefore, RT switch costs may be a valid measure of cognitive 
control in switching tasks, at least when the accuracy is high (e.g. >90%). Model 
1 was also able to capture some developmental differences: (3) Younger 
networks were slower than older networks due to weaker feedforward 
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connection weights, which determine the baseline speed of a network. (4) 
Younger networks with weaker connections experienced greater RT priming 
costs from PS2TA primes, which is consistent with the past study demonstrating 
a greater automatic priming effects in children than adults  (Ridderinkhof et al., 
1997; Smulders et al., 2005). 
However, Model 1 was unable to capture other notable behavioural 
findings in bimodal CMTS—namely: (1) the lack of developmental differences in 
between-condition RT costs, and (2) priming facilitation in pure and repetition 
trials. Furthermore, (3) Model 1 shows a strong floor effect on accuracy in pure 
and repetition trials, and a smaller floor effect on switch trials. Thus, Model 1, 
with its relatively simple architecture, cannot capture the developmental 
differences in accuracy observed in children and adults.  
In Chapter 6, I will introduce additional connections to the existing Model 
1 and investigate how performance changes when TA units can be activated 
reactively, and how RT priming facilitation may be due to reactive primes that 
are not associated to task attributes. Past literature suggests that young 
children are more likely to respond reactively to perceptual information, and it is 
possible that these reactive processes specific to our experiment masked the 
developmental effect on between-condition costs (e.g. mixing or switch costs) in 
the bimodal CMTS study.  
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Table 5.1 Parameter setting in Model 1 
Parameter Name Old 
 /Default 
Middle Young 
Weights (Pure networks)    
PSVIS unit to RO unit  3.0 2.6 2.2 
PSAUD unit to RO unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
TA unit to ROYES unit 3.8 3.4 3.0 
TA unit to RONO unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
Lateral connections from ROYES to RONO -1.3 -1 - 
Lateral connections from RONO to ROYES -1.0 - - 
    
Weights (Mixed networks)    
PSVIS unit to RO unit 2.7 2.3 1.9 
PSAUD unit to RO unit 2.5 2.1 1.7 
TA unit to ROYES unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
TA unit to RONO unit 1.8 1.4 1.0 
Within-set lateral connection from ROYES to RONO -1.3 - - 
Within-set connection from RONO to ROYES -1.0 - - 
Between-set lateral connections between RODog and 
ROBird 
-1.3 - - 
    
Inputs    
Top signal 4 to 40 4 to 10 4 to 10 
PS units (clamped activation) 1 - - 
Bias -3 - - 
    
Time constraints    
Preparation window 150 - - 
Timeout 600 - - 
    
Other parameters    
Priming lrate between PS and TA [Eq. 1 in Chapter 5] 1 to 3 - - 
Step size [Equation 4&5 in Chapter 5] 0.0015 - - 
Noise2  0.006 - - 
Response threshold 0.2 - - 
Min. and max. activation of TA and RO units -1.0 to 1.0 - - 
Squashing parameter for TA 0.7 - - 
1. The symbol ‘-’ indicates that the setting is the same as in Old network 
2. The number is the standard deviation of a normal distribution with a mean of 0, 
which is used to produce a random noise added to each unit activation update. 
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Chapter 6. Reactive Mechanisms (Model 2) 
Model 2 1  investigates different types of reactive mechanisms. 
Specifically, the simulations presented in this chapter aim to understand how 
task representations can be triggered reactively (Model 2A, Reactive Task 
Retrieval), as well as how responses can be committed reactively through 
priming pathways (Model 2B, Reactive Responses). As was the case in the 
previous chapter, the models in this chapter only explored task-associated 
effects.  
6.1 Model 2A: Reactive Task Retrieval 
Younger children are more likely to switch mental representations 
reactively after detecting change signals, whereas older children and adults are 
more likely to utilise informative cues in advance of the stimulus onset 
(Chevalier et al., 2015; Doebel et al., 2017; Morton & Munakata, 2002). For 
example, transparent task cues have been shown to be particularly helpful for 
young children, as compared to arbitrary task cues (Blaye & Chevalier, 2011). 
This may be due to the fact that a task can be triggered more reactively when 
the task relevant information is already present in the transparent (i.e. strongly 
associated) task cue. In our behavioural experiments, both cues and stimuli 
were fairly transparent and strongly associated with the task attributes (e.g. 
animal categories). Thus, it is likely that both did the task cue, and the stimuli 
(e.g. seeing the ‘Dog’ stimulus reminded the participant to engage in the ‘Dog’ 
                                            
1 All parameters setting used in the simulations in Chapter 6 are listed in 
Table 6.1 at the end of chapter. 
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task) activated the task attribute. Younger participants may have relied more on 
this reactive task set trigger than adults. 
Therefore, Model 2A explores possible mechanisms that activate task 
attributes other than the Top signal. In particular, Model 2A investigated 
whether young networks benefit from reactive activation of task attribute 
representations, even when their Top signal was relatively low. Specifically, we 
aimed to understand whether reactive task retrieval can be effective in reducing 
RT switch costs in younger networks.  
In the next section, I will begin by describing the architecture of Model 2A 
in detail. 
6.1.1 Model 2A: PS to TA Reactive Pathway 
To model the reactive associations that exist between task 
representation and the percept stimulus, additional fixed feedforward 
connections between PS units and the associated TA units are introduced in 
Model 2A (e.g. DV and DA to TADOG, BA and BV to TABIRD, see Fig. 6.1). The 
additional connections are not expected to have an effect on pure trials since 
there is only one TA unit. On switch trials in the mixed networks, the PS-TA 
connections should be facilitative in activating the task-relevant TA unit when 
the target is present, especially when the Top signal is small, but it can also 
introduce competition when a nontarget is present on the switch trial. On 
repetition trials, the cost/benefit may be more limited since the task-relevant TA 
unit is likely to be highly excited and the task-irrelevant TA unit highly inhibited. 
Unlike other fixed feedforward connections where there are developmental 
differences in connection weights, due to the reactive nature of the processes, 
the PS-TA connections are the same across all network ages.  
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There are additional assumptions built into Model 2A with regards to the 
developmental differences between networks. It is assumed that younger 
networks will have smaller (but sufficient) overall Top signal than older networks 
(TopOld=10, TopMiddle=7, TopYoung=5). Finally, in this section, there were 25 
network subjects of each network age. The number of trials was the same as in 
Model 1 (Chapter 5), and the targets appeared with 60% probability. 
 
Figure 6.1. Model 2A Architecture with additional Percept Stimulus to Task 
Attribute feedforward connections (PS-TA). The new connection from the previous 
model is highlighted in red. 
 
6.1.2 Model 2A: Result 
6.1.2.1 Reaction time and accuracy  
The additional PS-TA connections in Model 2A reduced the RT on switch 
trials at all network ages, as compared to networks without the PS-TA 
connections (see Fig. 6.2). As expected, the PS-TA connections had no effect 
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on overall RT and accuracy on pure and repetition trials in any of the network 
ages. This is due to the strong existing TA activation on pure and repetition 
trials, so the additional input from the PS-TA reactive pathway adds little to the 
settling process.  
On switch trials, there was a reduction of RT in Middle and Young 
networks, but not in Old networks. As the Top signals were smaller in Middle 
and Young networks, the relative contribution from PS-TA inputs was larger in 
these networks, as compared to Old networks. However, their faster responses 
on switch trials was accompanied by a reduction in accuracy on switch trials, 
indicating that relying on the bottom-up activation of task representation is not 
the optimal task approach. 
 
Figure 6.2. Mean RT and accuracy in with and without PS-TA reactive pathways 
across different network ages. Orange bars show networks without PS-TA pathways, and 
yellow bars show networks with PS-TA pathways. Left to right: Old, Middle and Young 
networks. Error bars represent 95% CI of means. 
6.1.2.2 Between-condition RT costs 
Without the PS to TA reactive connections, the developmental 
differences in RT switch costs were fairly substantial. The additional PS to TA 
connections reduced RT on switch trials in the younger networks, thereby 
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reducing the developmental differences in switch costs (Fig. 6.3). However, the 
reactive pathway did not eliminate the effect of development on  RT switch 
costs. 
 
Figure 6.3 Mean RT Mixing Cost and RT Switch Cost. Left panel shows costs in 
networks without PS-TA connections; right panel shows costs in networks with PS-TA 
connections (weight=3). Different bars represent different network ages. Error bars 
represent 95% CI of means. 
6.1.3.  Model 2A: Discussion 
Model 2A simulations explored the idea that task attribute 
representations can be reactively activated upon seeing the stimulus, as well as 
through an internal biasing mechanism such as Top signals. The reactive 
pathway through PS-TA connections can be both facilitative of and obstructive 
to task performance. The facilitative effect was observed with smaller RT on 
switch trials with PS-TA connections than those without, particularly when the 
Top signal was small. However, PS-TA input can also have a detrimental effect 
on accuracy. The accuracy cost was caused by the inability of the Top signal to 
override the reactive signal when the task-irrelevant target was present.  
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To model the effect of development, we made a few assumptions in 
terms of the Top signals of different network ages. Older networks were 
assumed to have more efficient top-down control, thus a stronger Top signal 
than younger networks. With these additional assumptions, it was found that 
both Middle and Young networks benefited from the additional PS-TA input on 
switch trials, showing faster responses on switch trials. In contrast, Old 
networks (i.e. larger Top input) did not display such a benefit. 
Model 2A was able to reduce RT switch costs and induced errors on 
switch trials in Middle and Young networks. This model was therefore an 
improvement from Model 1 (Chapter 5). However, despite these improvements, 
the limitations in Model 1 remained in Model 2A; namely, the reversed 
developmental effect on RT switch costs and the floor effects on accuracy in all 
trial types.  
In the next section, we will consider another reactive mechanism—
namely, reactive primed responses.  
6.2 Model 2B: Reactive Reponses 
6.2.1. Model 2B: Stimulus-response primes 
In Model 1 (Chapter 5), we saw that PS2TA (stimulus-task) primes 
resulted in processing costs on switch trials, but that this priming mechanism 
could not account for the facilitative effect observed in the pure and repetition 
trials of  our behavioural experiment. In our bimodal CMTS study, there was 
strong priming facilitation in these two types of trials, particularly in children (Fig. 
5.8, Chapter 5). It is possible that priming facilitation was not mediated by task 
attributes (i.e. TA units); instead, perhaps the response was directly associated 
with the stimulus on the n-1 trial. Therefore, Model 2B will explore the effect of 
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stimulus-response (PS2RO) primes on response facilitation in pure and 
repetition trials, in addition to the strong reactive task retrieval pathway (PS-
TA=3). 
To model this effect, temporary connections were formed between PS 
unit(s) and the RO units at the end of the trial (PS2RO, see Figure 6.4 for the 
network architecture). Thus, in Model 2B, PS unit(s) would send inputs to the 
RO units directly through temporary priming connections, and this priming effect 
would not be mediated by task representation.  
 
Figure 6.4. Model 2B Architecture with additional PS-RO priming connections in 
mixed networks. The new connection from the previous model is highlighted in red. 
 
Like the PS2TA primes, the PS2RO primes only lasted for one trial, and 
had the same governing equation used for PS2TA primes (Eq. 1, Section 5.2.2). 
It is important to note that like PS2TA primes, PS2RO connections can be 
positive or negative, since all RO units (both excited and inhibited units) form 
temporary connections with the PS unit(s). On pure and repetition trials, PS2RO 
primes are most likely to result in response facilitation. On switch trials, since 
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the correct response is always different from the correct response in the n-1 
repetition trial (i.e. different response set), PS2RO primes are most likely to 
induce an additional cost. However, it is not clear whether the cost will be 
exhibited in RT and/or accuracy. 
As with Model 2A, older networks have greater fixed feedforward 
connection weights and Top signals than younger networks. Model 2B was run 
with different priming rates at each network age. The trial number and 
preparation window were the same as in Model 2A. 
6.2.2. Model 2B: Results 
6.2.2.1 Reaction Time and Accuracy 
Figure 6.5 shows the between-condition effect of priming effects on 
different trial types by overall accuracy and RT at different network ages. 
Although there was a slight decrease in the overall RT on pure and repetition 
trials in all network ages, the addition of PS2RO primes on top of the existing 
PS2TA primes did not have a strong effect on the overall RT at any network age.  
Model 2B showed slightly greater variances than Model 2A in accuracy 
on pure and repetition trials,. This may be due to the fact that network 
behaviours are more volatile with increasing numbers of parallel processes. 
Despite this, accuracies on pure and repetition trials were overall similar to 
those in previous models. 
The accuracy on switch trials varied by PS2RO priming lrate and network 
age. The accuracy in Old networks did not change with priming lrate, indicating 
that the networks were overall resistant to priming interference. In contrast, both 
Middle and Young networks showed a gradual decrease in accuracy with 
increased PS2RO priming lrate. The rate accuracy reduction was greater in 
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Young than in Middle networks, indicating that Middle networks were slightly 
more resistant to priming interference than Young networks. 
 
Figure 6.5. Mean RT and Accuracy to different trial types with different PS2RO 
prime rates (1, 2, 3). Left to right: Old, Middle, Young networks. All networks were run 
with a strong reactive task retrieval (PS-TA=3). Error bars represent 95% CI of means. 
6.2.2.2 Priming Effect 
The priming effect was also examined with within-condition comparisons. 
This was achieved by taking the RT difference between unprimed and primed 
trials within each trial type (Fig. 6.6), and comparing it to the behavioural finding 
(Fig.6.7). It was hypothesised that the introduction of PS2RO primes would 
produce a facilitative effect on pure and repetition trials. The simulation results 
confirmed the presence of priming facilitations on pure and repetition trials, and 
priming costs on switch trials. Furthermore, a larger priming lrate resulted in 
greater RT facilitation on pure and repetition trials across all network ages. The 
younger networks exhibited greater RT facilitation from PS2RO primes than the 
older networks, as indicated by the larger RT differences between primed and 
unprimed trials. 
There were priming costs on switch trials, across all network ages. 
However, the relation between the size of the priming costs and priming lrate is 
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less consistent across different network ages. It is therefore possible that some 
of the priming costs in the younger networks were translated into accuracy 
costs instead. 
 
Figure 6.6 Mean priming effects in RT on different trial types. The bars represent 
networks with different prime rates (0 to 3). The y-axis shows the RT(cycle) difference 
between unprimed trials and primed trials (unprimed - primed). Positive values indicate 
priming facilitation; negative values indicate priming cost. Left to right: Old, Middle, 
Young networks. Error bars represent 95% CI of means.  
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Figure 6.7 RT Priming effect on different trial types in bimodal CMTS 
behavioural experiment. The figure is also shown in Chapter 5 (Fig. 5.9). Error bars 
represent 95% CI of means. 
 
6.2.3 Model 2B: Discussion 
 Model 2B was successful at capturing the facilitative effect of 
stimulus primes, through the priming connections between stimulus and 
response. Priming appears to have a larger effect in the younger networks than 
the older networks. In Old networks, the strong Top signal meant that the 
networks would always select the correct response set, despite interferences 
from reactive primes. In contrast, Middle and Young networks had smaller Top 
signal and therefore they were more likely to make incorrect responses when 
the effect from reactive response primes were strong. 
While the Top signal determined whether reactive response primes 
would result in accuracy cost, network age differences in baseline speed 
determined the size of priming facilitation on pure and repetition trials. Since 
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PS2RO primes had direct input into RO units, the RT facilitative effect stemmed 
from the elevated baseline activation of the RO unit in reaching threshold on 
primed trials, as compared to unprimed trials. This RT facilitation was stronger 
in a younger network than an older network due to the relatively larger 
proportional gain in baseline activation in a slower network than a faster 
network (Fig. 6.8). 
 
Figure 6.8 Schematic illustration of speed facilitation (∆  Time) with a raised 
baseline activation in a fast (left) and slow (right) activation accumulator.  
 
The simulation results thus confirm that priming associations could exist 
among different elements within the task structure (e.g. PS2TA and PS2RO, 
although other associations may exist), and that performance could be different 
depending on how the associative compounds were formed. Unlike PS2TA 
primes, PS2RO primes were able to modulate accuracy on the switch trials, 
highlighting that different types of priming effects may be manifested in different 
measures.  
6.3 Model 2: General Discussion 
The models in this chapter explored the possibility that younger children 
did not exhibit greater processing costs due to the facilitation from other reactive 
processes. Model 2A investigated the effect of reactive task retrieval by 
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introducing a parallel processing connection from PS units to their 
corresponding TA units after stimulus onset.  The effect of reactive task retrieval 
was stronger for younger networks than old networks, as only Middle and 
Young networks exhibited a reduction in RT on switch trials; however, this 
speed facilitation was also accompanied by an increase in error.  
The other reactive pathway consisted of the reactive response primes 
(PS2RO). Unlike the reactive task retrieval pathway, where the speed 
facilitation was only evident on switch trials, the reactive stimulus-response 
primes had speed facilitation effects on both pure and repetition trials, but the 
effects were very small. As for reactive task retrieval, reactive response primes 
resulted in decreased accuracy on switch trials, with a larger effect in a younger 
than an older network. Model 2B also showed that stimulus-response speed 
facilitation was larger in a younger network than an older network, due to 
differences in the baseline processing speed at these different ages.  
Although these reactive pathways could reduce overall RT on different 
trial types, they nonetheless did not eliminate the effect of age on between-
condition RT mixing and RT switch costs. In addition, the strong floor effect on 
accuracy in pure and repetition trials remained unchanged in Model 2. On pure 
and repetition trials, the task-relevant TA units were consistently excited across 
the duration of the trial. As a result, there was little room for the network to 
make errors since it would always choose the correct response set.  
Lacking other dynamic functions that can produce stochasticity in 
network performance, Model 2 was unable to capture the developmental 
differences observed in accuracy. It is also possible that the lack of 
developmental differences in between-condition measures (e.g. mixing and 
switch costs) has to do with the variation in baseline performance on pure and 
 207 
repetition trials. As long as these variations are not captured by the model, it is 
not possible to explain why young children exhibited comparable between-
condition costs as adults. Therefore, models with stochastic functions that 
modulate the performance on pure and repetition trials may shed light onto the 
paradoxical phenomenon of lower overall performance in children and the 
absence of developmental effect on mixing and switch costs. This will be 
explored in the next chapter. 
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Table 6.1 Parameter setting in Model 2 
Parameter Name Old 
 
Middle Young 
Weights (Pure networks)    
PSVIS unit to RO unit  3.0 2.6 2.2 
PSAUD unit to RO unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
TA unit to ROYES unit 3.8 3.4 3.0 
TA unit to RONO unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
PS unit to TA unit* 0 or 3 - - 
Lateral connections from ROYES to RONO -1.3 - - 
Lateral connections from RONO to ROYES -1.0 - - 
    
Weights (Mixed networks)    
PSVIS unit to RO unit 2.7 2.3 1.9 
PSAUD unit to RO unit 2.5 2.1 1.7 
TA unit to ROYES unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
TA unit to RONO unit 1.8 1.4 1.0 
PS unit to TA unit* 3 - - 
Within-set lateral connection from ROYES to RONO -1.3 - - 
Within-set connection from RONO to ROYES -1.0 - - 
Between-set lateral connections between RODog and 
ROBird 
-1.3 - - 
    
Inputs    
Top signal 10 6 5 
PS units (clamped activation) 1 - - 
Bias -3 - - 
    
Time constraints    
Preparation window 150 - - 
Timeout 600 - - 
    
Other parameters    
Priming lrate between PS and TA  1  - - 
Priming lrate between TA and RO*  0 to 3 - - 
Step size  0.0015 - - 
Noise  0.006 - - 
Response threshold 0.2 - - 
Min. and max. activation of TA and RO units -1.0 to 1.0 - - 
Squashing parameter for TA unit 0.7 - - 
* Indicates new parameter in the current chapter. 
‘-’ indicates the same setting as in Old networks. 
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Chapter 7. Population-wide dynamic cognitive control 
(Model 3) 
Models 1 and 2 have explored how task performance can be affected by 
different internal (e.g. Top signal) and external (e.g. preparation window) free 
parameters, as well as by variations in the trial-by-trial activation dynamics (e.g. 
priming effects). Despite some success in capturing accuracy variations on 
switch trials at different network ages, performance on pure and repetition trials 
remained largely unchanged with different parameter settings. Since mixing 
effects and switch effects are measured in relation to either pure or repetition 
trials, to account for between-condition costs across different ages, it is 
imperative to have a model that captures performance on these control trials 
well.  
Task performance in the simulations was largely dependent on the model 
selecting the appropriate task-relevant response set (i.e., activating the correct 
TA unit). The main reason for the stability of the model’s performance in pure 
and repetition trials is that the TA units remained highly excited/inhibited 
throughout the trials. However, in real life, task representations may wax and 
wane, particularly when attention is engaged in other cognitive and perceptual 
processes. Thus, on repetition trials, it is possible that the participants made 
errors due to a failure in maintaining the appropriate task-relevant 
representation.  
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The models 1  presented in Chapter 7 explore different dynamic 
mechanisms that may also modulate the task representations in the behavioural 
studies. A series of computational models was developed, with the specific aim 
of understanding the mechanisms that affect performances at the inter-group, 
inter-individual, and intra-individual levels.  
7.1 Introduction 
7.1.1 Overview of mixed networks 
On repetition trial in Models 1 and 2 (Chapters 5 and 6), as the task-
relevant TA unit is always activated and the task-irrelevant TA unit inhibited, 
unsurprisingly, the networks always chose the correct response set. In addition 
to the stability provided at the TA level, there was additional facilitation from the 
n-1 primes, both at the task attribute level and at the response level. One way to 
overcome this consistent activation at the TA level is to introduce a decay 
function. Specifically, the decay function should allow TA units to lose strength 
and gravitate towards a neutral state (i.e. ‘0’ that is neither excited nor inhibited).  
To allow the decay function to work, it is necessary that the Top signal be 
intermittent during the response settling process (Fig. 7.1, left network). The 
idea of intermittent top-down control is consistent with the finding that task 
representation are likely to partially rely on intermittent verbal rehearsal of the 
task rules (Kray et al., 2008, 2004). The probability of a top-down update 
occurring may be a matter of inter-individual difference. Some participants may 
be more likely than others to engage in verbal task rehearsal than others, and 
                                            
1 All parameters setting used in the simulations in Chapter 7 are listed in 
Table 7.3 at the end of chapter. 
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thus exhibit individual differences in task performance within an age group. 
Simulating each network age with systematically different update probabilities 
allows us to understand how these individual differences play out on different 
trial types within the age group, and thus allows us to appreciate population-
wide performance variations. Model 3A specifically investigates the effect of 
update probability on performance at different network ages. 
In Model 3B, we go back to explore the effect of Top signal strengths in 
different network ages. The procedure here is similar to that used with Model 1B 
in which I varied the strength of the Top signal systematically. The difference 
between Model 1B and Model 3B is that, in Model 3B the networks involved TA 
decay and were run using a population approach whereas the networks in 
Model 1B were run with identical networks within each network age. The 
population approach involves creating a sample of networks with different 
update probabilities as proxy for individual differences. For example, network 
subject A may be more likely to update task goal than network subject B (e.g. 
30% vs. 60%), despite both networks belonging to the same network age. The 
result in Model 3B was used to inform the possible range of performance 
variations at each network age with a more realistic sample of network subjects. 
Model 3C further explores the range of task strategies a specific age was 
most likely to employ, through replicating the accuracies on each trial type. This 
is based on the assumption that top-down control is unlikely to be static across 
the duration of the experiment, but is modulated by participants’ understanding 
of the overall task demand and motivations. Specifically, the strength of top-
down control could not only differ with development, but could also be 
modulated by trial type. Several researchers have proposed the differentiation 
between a proactive versus a reactive task approaches (e.g., Braver, 2012; 
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Cragg & Chevalier, 2012; Doebel et al., 2017). These different approaches are 
likely to reflect a combination of developmental constraints and task strategies. 
In Model 3C, I will examine the most likely task strategy employed by different 
age groups, and attempt to shed light on the paradoxical observation of lower 
overall accuracy yet no reliable between-condition costs observed in the 
behavioural studies. 
7.1.2 Overview of pure networks  
The pure networks in Models 1 and 2 are similar to mixed networks in 
that both have a higher level task attribute representation. The inclusion of a 
task attribute unit was effective in speeding up responses in pure networks 
because the RO units received multiple inputs. However, without the TA unit, 
the task could still be successfully carried out by simple stimulus-response 
associations. Although Model 2 (Chapter 6) produced some errors, the number 
of errors was negligible. In the behavioural experiment, younger participants 
produced more errors than the older participants. This is an important 
dimension of the behaviour that needs to be captured. 
One potential explanation might be that younger children did not form a 
task representation, unlike the older participants who did form such a 
representation, since the bottom-up information was sufficient to complete the 
task. However, they still committed a large number of errors in the pure blocks. 
Forming a task representation is likely to lead to better on-task performance. 
Indeed, without a task representation, the resulting bottom-up approach may be 
more vulnerable to internal and external task-irrelevant intrusions that have a 
negative effect on behaviour. This scenario may be more likely to occur in the 
pure condition than the mixed condition. This is because the participants might 
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be more likely to actively form task goals if they are imperative for successful 
task performance. In the mixed condition, goal representations are necessary in 
order to achieve high accuracies. In contrast, the participants might not actively 
from task goals in the pure condition because these are not an imperative 
element in the overall task structure.  
In Model 3, I explore how pure networks perform when there is no task 
attribute in the model architecture. In the computational model, instead of 
serving as a facilitator for task performance, the internal input (i.e. the Top 
signal) may instead cause interference because it does not act upon a higher 
level representation. Without a TA unit, pure networks have network 
architectures that differ fundamentally from those of the mixed networks. 
According to this view, the mixing costs observed in the behavioural 
experiments may reflect fundamental differences in information processes 
between pure and mixed tasks. For these reasons, the performance variation in 
the pure trials is of interest on its own.   
In this chapter, all network in the pure condition were simulated without 
TA units (Fig. 7.1, right network). Instead, internal signals were sent directly to 
the RO units, with a stronger signal to RO ‘YES’ and a weaker signal to RO ‘NO’ 
to reflect a bias towards pressing the “YES” response button. To differentiate 
between the Top signals to TA units in the mixed networks and the internal 
interference in the pure network, I will refer to the signal in the pure network as 
the ‘Intrinsic signal’.  
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Figure 7.1. Model 3 Architecture with intermittent (dashed lines) Top and 
Intrinsic signal in mixed (left) and pure (right) networks, respectively. Note that in the 
pure network there is no task attribute layer. The right-most graph illustrates PS2RO and 
PS2TA priming connections. 
7.2 Model 3A: Update probability 
In this section, I will focus on Model 3A, which explores the effect of 
different update probabilities of the Top signal after the preparation window. 
These update probabilities are assumed to reflect inter-network differences 
within each network age, and therefore individual differences within an age in 
the experiment. 
7.2.1 Model 3A: Basic assumptions 
Update probability refers to the probability of Top/Intrinsic signal sending 
activation on a particular update cycle. For example, at 10% update probability, 
a Top/Intrinsic signal occurs with 10% probability during the response settling 
process. In mixed networks, update probability is assumed to reflect inter-
individual differences (as opposed to inter-group differences such as age) in the 
likelihood of engaging with self-reminders. In the behavioural experiment, many 
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4-year-olds appeared to understand the utility of self-reminders. Therefore, the 
likelihood of using explicit tactics such as self-reminders or inner-speech was 
not considered to be age-dependent in our experiment. In mixed networks, this 
intermittent top-down update occurred only after the preparation window was 
over. During the preparation window, top-down updates to TA units were 
constant since the only activity at hand was to encode and to retrieve task rules. 
In between updates, both excited and inhibited TA units decay with the 
squashing parameter on every cycle. The squashing parameter is the same as 
the one used for TA units at the end of the trial. This function allows the TA 
activations to wane without changing the valence of the activation.  
Since, in between updates, the TA units do not undergo the activation 
updates outlined in Equations 2 and 3 of Chapter 5, no input propagated from 
either the PS-TA fixed connections or from the PS2TA primes, between top-
down updates. As with Model 2, the Top signal varied by network age as proxy 
for developmentally linked constraints on top-down control (Old=10, Middle=6, 
Young=5).  
Unlike in previous models,  the TA units were omitted in the pure 
networks since the tasks could theoretically be carried out without task attribute 
representations. Instead, the Intrinsic signals were sent to the RO units directly. 
There was a larger Intrinsic signal towards the ‘Yes’ response than the ‘No’ 
response, with a ratio of 1:0.4. The strength of the Intrinsic signal (interference) 
to Yes and No was set to 5 and 2, respectively, across all ages.  
In Model 3A, all network ages were simulated with increasing update 
probabilities as a free parameter (0% to 100%). Model 3A involved 25 network 
subjects in each simulated condition (i.e. update probability level). The number 
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of trials was the same as in Model 1 and Model 2 (48 trials in the pure condition 
and 144 trials in the mixed condition). 
7.2.2 Model 3A: Result 
7.2.2.1 Pure Networks 
On pure trials (no TA units), networks at all ages exhibited a reduction in 
accuracy as well as RT with increasing update probability of the Intrinsic signal 
(Fig. 7.2). The effect of the Intrinsic signal strength on RT and accuracy was 
much larger for younger than older networks. In Old and Middle networks, the 
Intrinsic signal caused problems for accuracy only if the update probability 
exceeded 50%. In contrast, Young networks exhibited low accuracy at either 
end of the update probability range—at low probability, Young networks could 
make time-out errors (response window=600 cycles), while at high update 
probability, Young networks made errors due to Intrinsic interference. 
7.2.2.2 Mixed Networks 
Top-down update probability did not modulate RTs in either repetition or 
switch trials in Middle and Old networks. In contrast, Young networks 
experienced speed facilitation with a larger top-down update probability in 
repetition trials, but not in switch trials. It is interesting that this RT facilitation 
was restricted to repetition trials, as previous models generally showed that 
switch trials were better facilitated by an additional Top signal than repetition 
trials. It appears that at very low update probability, the RT on repetition trials in 
Young networks was comparable to the RT on switch trials. This indicates that 
Young networks were overall unprepared even on repetition trials. Without 
further update the TA activations on repetition trials were likely to end up at 
similar levels as the those in switch trials.  
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Changes in update probability modulated accuracy on both repetition and 
switch trials in Middle and Young networks. On repetition trials, Middle networks 
showed a reduced sensitivity to changes in update probability as compared to 
Young networks. This is again likely to reflect the quicker response settling and 
stronger TA update that occurs during the preparation window in Middle 
networks than Young networks, consequently leaving a smaller number of 
cycles for the TA activation to decay when the update probability is low. On 
switch trials, the modulation of accuracy in respect to update probability was 
similar between Middle and Young networks, but the accuracy was much lower 
in Young networks than Middle networks across all update probabilities.  
 
Figure 7.2. Mean RT (cycles) (left panel) and Accuracy (right panel) with 
increasing update probabilities of Intrinsic signals in pure networks across different 
network ages (blue-Old; red-Middle; green-Young). 
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Figure 7.3. Mean RT (cycles) (upper panel) and Accuracy (lower panel) with 
increasing update probabilities of Top signals in mixed networks across different 
network ages (blue-Old; red-Middle; green-Young). 
 
Interestingly, there was a reduction in accuracy in Middle and Young 
networks when the update probability was constant (100%). This may reflect a 
critical point in the system where the competition between the TA units was 
relatively strong, despite a relatively high level of TA activation. Further 
examination (not shown here) revealed that there was an increase in 
commission errors to the competing response set on switch trials when the 
update probability was 100%, as compared to when the update probability was 
80% (e.g. RO-DY to PS-BV on Bird task). A high update probability not only 
increases the chance of a successful activation of the task-relevant TA unit on 
switch trials, but it also increases the chance that the task-irrelevant TA 
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activation is relatively high at the end of the n-1 repetition trial. As a result, the 
task-irrelevant TA unit might not be optimally inhibited at the end of the 
preparation window on a switch trial, leaving room for a possible error and a 
slowed RT. Thus, the interaction between the update probability and the trial 
types can result in a critical point where the competition within the system is at 
the highest. 
7.2.3 Model 3A: Discussion 
Model 3A consisted of networks with different update probabilities on 
pure, repetition, and switch trials, at different ages. In the pure networks 
(without TA), the Intrinsic signal was of a fixed value (Intrinsic signal Yes=5/ 
No=2) across all network ages. This signal was intended to represent 
unspecified interference intrinsic to the system. Since pure networks could carry 
out the tasks perfectly with simple stimulus-response associations, the purpose 
of the Intrinsic signal is to examine networks’ resilience to these spontaneous 
intrinsic interferences. Although networks at all ages exhibited speed-accuracy 
trade-offs (i.e. shorter RT and more errors) with increased Intrinsic signal, older 
networks showed greater overall resilience to interference from the Intrinsic 
signal. The resilience to intrinsic interference was due to the stronger task-
relevant S-R connections in the older network, in relation to the strength of the 
Intrinsic signal. Only Young networks exhibited errors caused by timeouts. This 
is in line with the developmental studies which found that children as young as 3 
and 4 years often require a substantially larger response window. In fact, even 
when a sizeable response window is permitted, and even when young children 
do exhibit the ability to respond within this window, there is still a suspicion that 
some occasional errors are due to timeout rather than the experimental 
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variables per se. In many developmental experiments, adopting an exceedingly 
long response window can be problematic since it can affect the dynamics of 
the information processes that may otherwise be of interest. Overall, the current 
model for pure networks offers an explanation as to why young children might 
exhibit the ability to respond in good time yet display the occasional inability to 
respond consistently.    
In the mixed networks, the update probability refers to the likelihood of 
self-reminders. Unlike the speed-accuracy trade-offs in the pure networks, the 
effect of low update probability resulted in performance costs in both RT and 
accuracy (i.e. longer RT and more errors). There was also a clear effect of 
network age on the resilience to changes in the update probability, as older 
networks were more resilient to low update probabilities. This means the range 
of individual differences on RT and accuracy measures decreased as a function 
of network age on different trial types—only Young networks exhibited a large 
range of individual differences in repetition trials (both RT and accuracy); both 
Young and Middle networks exhibited a sizeable range of individual differences 
in accuracy in switch trials; Old networks were overall insensitive to changes of 
update probability. 
This indicates that younger children, particularly 4-year-olds, are more 
likely to exhibit a greater range of individual differences on both RT and 
accuracy, whereas older children, such as 6-year-olds, were more likely to 
exhibit the range in accuracy. Adults were not likely to have a greater 
performance variation on either measure. This observation is consistent with the 
developmental studies, which often observe large individual differences among 
young children of a similar age.  These variations appear not to reflect 
developmental constraints, but rather, individual differences. It is possible that 
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children with different temperaments, motivation, verbal skills or knowledge, 
may engage with the tasks differently. For example, in tasks that require goal-
shifting, despite the fact that all young children have limited capacity to maintain 
the task attributes, some children may remind themselves of the rules more 
frequently than others and perform relatively well compared to their peers. 
In sum, Model 3A was successful in capturing not only the inter-group 
differences in accuracy and RT across all trial types, but also the inter-network 
variations within the same network age. However, beyond the inter-group and 
inter-individual differences already discussed, Braver (2012) has argued that an 
additional mechanism operating at the intra-individual level may also be at play. 
The intra-individual mechanism refers to how the individual approaches the task 
in a given context. The same person may approach the task proactively or 
reactively depending on the context. Indeed, it is possible that 4-year-olds, 6-
year-olds and adults have completely different interpretations of the task context 
and consequently different understandings of task demands. For example, 
adults may understand the task instruction to ‘respond as accurately and as 
quickly as possible’ appropriately, and employ their cognitive control 
accordingly; whereas younger children might not do so. Importantly, differential 
task strategies may have a direct consequence on the subtler measures 
reported in the behavioural data, such as the between-condition effects. In 
Model 3B and Model 3C, I will explore the effect of Intrinsic/Top signal strength 
and explore different types of task strategies at different network ages, by using 
a population approach described in the next section.  
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7.3 Model 3B: Top signal with population approach 
As mentioned earlier, individuals across different ages and individuals 
within the same age may approach the trial types differently, by modulating their 
Intrinsic/Top signal according to the given context. Although in the pure 
networks the Intrinsic signal does not correspond to any task strategy, it 
nevertheless sheds light onto how resilient the system is to levels of 
interference. In the mixed condition, task strategy may have a direct impact on 
the observation of between-condition costs. By understanding how Top signal 
strength modulate task performance, it is possible to speculate about the 
possible task strategies used at different ages. 
7.3.1 Model 3B: Basic assumptions 
Model 3B uses a population approach to capture the variation in 
performance on different trial types. According to this approach, a population of 
networks is constructed by assigning a random update probability to each 
individual network. This differs from Model 3A where the update probability was 
the free parameter of interest, and was changed systematically, in order to 
understand its effect on RT and accuracy at different network age. In Model 3B, 
the update probability is randomly generated for each network (e.g. 45% for 
network subject A, 67% for network subject B and so on for 30 networks at each 
network age). The between-network differences in update probability 
correspond to individual differences in how often the participants engage in self-
reminding tactics.  Since we observed 4-year-olds actively engaging in verbal 
reminders in the experiments, Model 3B does not make further assumptions on 
whether children and adults differ in the frequency of verbal updates. The 
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randomly generated probability setting is used throughout all trials in each 
simulated network.  
The simulations reported here involve 30 network subjects at each age. 
There were 96 pure trials, and 144 trials in the mixed networks with tasks 
changed every other trial. As with the previous models and behavioural 
experiments, targets appeared with 60% probability. There was an increase in 
the number of network subjects in pure task to minimise the possible effect of 
outliers since the simulation result was found to be strongly modulated by inter-
network differences. 
7.3.2 Model 3B: Result 
Adopting a population approach with a random probability of Intrinsic/Top 
signals, Model 3B systematically varied Top signals strengths from 3 to 10 at 
different network ages (Fig. 7.3).   
In the pure networks, older networks appeared to be more resistant 
overall to the high Intrinsic signal strength than the younger networks. There 
was a larger decline in accuracy with a larger Intrinsic signal in the younger 
networks than the older networks. Young networks were consistently lower in 
accuracy for all levels of Intrinsic signal. However, Old and Middle networks 
showed relatively similar accuracy. There was a speed-accuracy trade-off (e.g. 
shorter RT and more errors) on pure trials in relation to the Intrinsic signal. 
Network age effects on RT became smaller with the increasing Intrinsic signal 
strength, to the point of no network age differences in RT with a large Intrinsic 
signal. 
Model 3B shows that with probabilistic updates as inter-network 
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the strength of top down signals. The modulation of accuracy indicates that the 
current model is superior to Model 1 and Model 2, where the accuracy 
variations were largely restricted to switch trials. In mixed tasks, networks at all 
ages exhibited a very similar pattern in response to changes in the Top signal. 
They exhibited increased accuracy and shorter RT with a greater Top signal 
strength. Although there was a very small age effect on accuracy, particularly 
when the Top signal was smaller (e.g. below 6 on repetition and below 8 on 
switch trials), the level of Top signal was a more effective predictor of accuracy 
than network age. In contrast, network age was a better predictor of RT than 
Top signal strength.  
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Figure 7.4. The effect Top signals on different trial types. Networks were 
simulated with population approach (i.e. random update frequency). Top panel shows the 
effect of Top signal on accuracy; lower panel shows the effect of Top signal on reaction 
time (cycles). Network ages: blue-Old; red-Middle; green-Young. 
 
To try to understand why the between-condition switch costs did not 
appear to interact with age in the behavioural experiment is difficult. We can 
perhaps speculate that children of different ages relied on different task 
strategies constrained by their level of cognitive development? In the 
behavioural experiment, the most demanding trials were the switch trials, in 
which an endogenous effort to retrieve the appropriate task representation is 
necessary. Thus, a strong Top signal is most likely to happen on switch trials, 
compared to repetition trials. Although a strong Top signal is assumed more 
likely on switch trials, the ceiling level of Top signal should still vary by age, as 
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in the previous models. A younger network should have a lower ceiling level for 
Top signal, since a high Top signal in younger networks can result in an 
accuracy level higher than that of an older network (see Model 1B, Chapter 5). 
This pattern is inconsistent with the behavioural results.  
On repetition trials, as no task reconfiguration is necessary, only minimal 
endogenous effort is needed to maintain, rather than to reconfigure, the task 
representations. However, how much endogenous effort is employed on 
repetition trials, in relation to switch trials, may be a matter of task strategy. To 
understand what task strategies there are in each age group/network ages, 
Table 7.1 shows the proposed range of Top signal on different trial types at 
each network age, and their respective accuracies. The accuracies with the 
specific Top signal in the networks are compared against the accuracies in the 
behavioural study. Note that each network age has different ceiling Top signals, 
consistent with the previous models (i.e. TopOld=10, TopMiddle=6, TopYoung=5).  
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Table 7.1. Accuracy from the bimodal CMTS study and from simulated result with 
the respective Top signal  
 Behavioural Model 3B 
    Accuracy Intrinsic/Top signal 
Age Pure (%) 
Rep. 
(%) 
Swi. 
(%) 
Pure 
(%) 
Rep. 
(%) 
Swi. 
(%) Pure Rep. Swi. 
Adult 98.1 (3.6) 
98.3 
(3.6) 
98.6 
(1.7) 98-100 93-96 94 5 to 3 5 to 10 10 
6-year-old 94.6 (3.3) 
95.9 
(4.0) 
88.0 
(5.7) 94-100 82-94 86 5 to 3 3 to 6 6 
4-year-old 84.7 (11.2) 
85.9 
(8.1) 
81.8 
(10.3) 83-95 82-92 65-80 5 to 3 3 to 5 3 to 5 
Note: 
1. The values in the parenthesis are SD. Top signal on switch trial is taken as the developmental 
constraint (i.e. ceiling level of signal).  
2. 2. Age denotes both participant and model age (adult=Old network; 6-year-old=Middle network; 
4-year-old=Young network). 
 
7.3.3 Model 3B: Discussion 
Model 3B explored the space of possible performance using a population 
approach by varying update probabilities between networks. Old and Middle 
networks were reasonably resistant to interference from the Intrinsic signal on 
pure trials, exhibiting a sharp decline in accuracy only after the signal was 
greater than 5. Young networks were particularly prone to errors when there 
was additional intrinsic interference to the response outputs in the system. The 
differences in the resilience to intrinsic interference has to do with the ratio of 
the signal between intrinsic interference and the strength of PS-RO 
connections. A weaker relative PS-RO connection allows a greater opportunity 
for errors, since the intrinsic interference can overwhelm the evidence from the 
PS-RO connections. In the mixed networks, all network ages exhibited a similar 
pattern of response to changes in the Top signal. Network age did not strongly 
modulate accuracy on repetition trials, and only moderately so on switch trials. 
In contrast, the network age effect on RT differences was robust across all 
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levels of Top signal. Therefore, reaction time appears to be firstly dependent on 
network age (i.e. connection weights) and secondarily on Top signal. 
The main significance of Model 3B is that, by modelling networks 
capable of expressing individual differences, we are able to capture the possible 
range of accuracies observed within each age group (Table 7.1). Understanding 
the possible range of accuracies is crucial as it reveals the fundamental age-
dependent differences in top-down control and other inter-group and/or inter-
individual differences in task strategies. Two questions remain—(i) is a specific 
age more or less likely to employ a specific task strategy in our experiment?, 
and (ii) does the between-condition measures depend on the differences in task 
strategies, development, or both? To address these questions, in the next 
model (Model 3C), I will explore different approaches to the tasks used in the 
mixed condition by different age groups. I will also demonstrate how the 
simulated results can match the behavioural results. Although the performance 
in the pure condition is not the main focus of Model 3C, since there are no 
specified task strategies, I will nevertheless still explore whether the simulated 
results in this condition match the behavioural data.  
7.4 Model 3C: Task strategies in different population 
7.4.1 Model 3C: Basic assumptions 
Model 3C explores what task strategy networks at different ages might 
employ in the mixed task condition, and what the resulting between-condition 
costs, as well as inter-group differences would be. As with Model 3A, the ceiling 
level of Top signal was predetermined by the network age, with a stronger 
ceiling Top signal used for older networks and a weaker ceiling Top signal used 
for the younger networks.  
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However, within the mixed condition task context, different individuals 
may modulate their cognitive control differently for each trial type. Such 
modulation is assumed to be closely associated with some form of task strategy, 
either consciously or unconsciously. Trials may be approached proactively such 
that a constant high level of control (within what is possible given a specific 
developmental level of competence) was exercised throughout the series of 
trials. This proactive control can be taxing, so perhaps not all participants will do 
so. Alternatively, the participants can approach the tasks reactively, and only 
exert a greater level of control on the most demanding switch trials, but not on 
repetition trials. It is also unclear whether children at different ages will 
approach the tasks differently. For example, it is possible that younger children 
are more likely to approach the tasks reactively than proactively. It is also 
possible that the youngest children did not attempt to engage at all, and only 
employed a bare minimal level of cognitive control necessary for the repetition 
trials. 
As a result, Model 3C employed Top signals specific to a chosen task 
strategy at each network age—proactive, reactive or no strategy. The main 
objective of Model 3C was to test which task strategy can produce the best fit to 
the observed behavioural results. This contrasts with the previous models 
where the focus was on understanding the effect of parameter settings. In the 
mixed networks, the tailored Top signals for each trial type and age follows the 
range in Table 7.1, which were found to capture the accuracies observed in the 
behavioural experiment. All networks were simulated with both reactive and 
proactive strategies, but only Young networks were simulated with the minimal 
‘no strategy’ approach (see Table 7.2 for Top signal setting). In the pure 
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networks, all network ages were simulated with a moderately small Intrinsic 
signal (signal=5). 
Model 3C also adopted a population approach (as in Model 3B); however, 
instead of choosing a random update probability between 0% and 100% as 
inter-individual differences, the range is narrowed to 0% and 60%. The reason 
for this is that the update probability in the mixed condition is conceptualised as 
the likelihood of giving oneself a verbal task reminder. It seems unlikely that the 
participants would constantly engage in this practice, and therefore a large 
update probability may not be appropriate. In the pure condition, when the 
update probability was very large, as shown in Model 3A, there was a very 
strong speed-accuracy trade-off that eliminated the age differences in 
processing speed. Such a scenario was not considered likely in real participants. 
Therefore, it would appear that whatever the likelihood of interference is in the 
behavioural studies, it is unlikely to be much larger than the likelihood of 
processing task-relevant information.   
In Model 3C, there were 96 trials in the pure condition and 144 trials in 
the mixed condition. There were 30 network subjects to each network age
  
Table 7.2. Top signals by task strategies and Intrinsic signals 
 Old Middle Young All 
 Rep. Swi. Rep. Swi. Rep. Swi. Pure 
Proactive 10 10 6 6 5 5 5 
Reactive 5 10 3 6 3 5 5 
No strategy - - - - 3 3 5 
Note:  
Proactive strategy: large Top signals in all trials in mixed task. 
Reactive strategy: a larger Top signal in switch trials than in repetition trials in 
mixed task. 
No strategy: minimal Top signal in all trials in the mixed task. 
 
7.4.2 Model 3C: Result 
Figure 7.5 shows the overall performance at each network age by 
different task strategies. 
 
Figure 7.5. Accuracy and reaction time in networks with different task strategies. 
Left to right: Old, Middle, Young networks. Bars show RT (cycles) and lines show 
accuracy. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
7.4.2.1 Pure trials 
In the pure networks, with a moderate Intrinsic signal, the youngest 
networks exhibited the lowest accuracy and slowest RT. It should be noted that 
all pure networks within each network age were simulated with the same 
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Intrinsic signal, so the only difference between the bars of different colours in 
Figure 7.5 was the population sample, determined by the random update 
probability. While Old and Middle networks showed relatively stable 
performance between the population samples, Young networks exhibited a 
greater range of difference in RT between population samples, and to a lesser 
extent, of accuracy as well. This highlights the fact that young children with a 
relatively weak ability to translate mental representations into motor responses 
exhibit greater effect of individual differences on tasks where a quick stimulus-
response mapping is crucial to the chosen measure than in older participants. 
7.4.2.2 Mixed trials 
The overall accuracy of Old networks in the mixed condition was 
unaffected by task strategy (Fig. 7.5). However, a proactive approach would 
result in RT switch costs since the enhanced top-down control facilitated 
response settling on repetition trials. This interpretation of RT switch costs is 
somehow different from the traditional view, where RT switch costs were 
interpreted with a suboptimal control on switch trials as compared to repetition 
trials (e.g. De Jong, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 
2001). In short, the current model argues that the observation of RT switch 
costs is related to the task strategy used rather than to cognitive control per se. 
The performance of the Middle networks was affected by task-strategy. A 
reactive strategy did not optimise the accuracy on repetition trials. Thus, within 
the developmental constraint of possible Top signal strength, to achieve a 
relatively good performance on repetition trials, a high level of Top signal was 
needed. In the bimodal CMTS experiment, 6-year-olds exhibited the largest 
accuracy switch cost. As discussed previously, RT and accuracy switch costs 
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are most likely with a proactive task strategy than a reactive task strategy, since 
the performance on repetition trials with a proactive strategy is optimal. The 
simulation results suggest that at least some 6-year-olds understood the 
importance of maintaining a good level of task representations through 
proactive cognitive control. Indeed, anecdotally, many 6-year-olds appeared to 
exhibit a high level of self-regulatory behaviours during the experiment. 
The performance of the Young networks was also affected by task 
strategy. The accuracy was lowest with no strategy (i.e. minimal Top signal), 
followed by a reactive strategy and then a proactive strategy. In the behavioural 
experiment, there was no significant difference in accuracy between repetition 
trials and switch trials in 4-year-olds, suggesting that most 4-year-olds 
approached the tasks reactively. In the model adopting a reactive approach 
would also reduce RT switch costs. This is consistent with the lack of age effect 
on RT switch costs observed in the behavioural finding.  
 In the previous behavioural analyses, children who did not pass the 70% 
accuracy threshold were excluded from the analyses. All these children were 4-
year-olds. It is therefore possible that the 4-year-olds with particularly low 
accuracy may have approached the tasks differently, despite having no 
difference in the developmental constraints such as processing speed from 
other 4-year-olds. For whatever reason, these children may not approach the 
task either reactively or proactively. Instead, they exert little top-down control 
over the representation of task attributes, and consequently their responses are 
made primarily by bottom-up stimulus-response associations, reactive PS-TA 
task activations, and other carry-over effects. 
7.4.2.3 Fitting with the behavioural result 
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Figure 7.6 shows the behavioural results and simulation results with the 
task strategies that best matches to the behavioural data. 
The simulation results allow us to speculate as to the most likely task 
strategy used by age level. Figure 7.6 (left panel) shows the bimodal CMTS 
behavioural results with the 70% accuracy exclusion criterion, and the best 
fitting task strategy by network age (right panel). Old networks were assumed to 
approach the task conservatively and employ a reactive strategy, Middle 
networks were assumed to employ a proactive strategy optimised for the 
different trial types, and Young networks were assumed to employ a reactive 
strategy. The overall result appears to be a good match to the behavioural data. 
 
Figure 7.6. Accuracy and reaction time in behavioural experiment (left-panel) and 
the simulated population models (right-panel). Bars shows RT (ms or cycles) and lines 
show accuracy. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 7.7 shows between-condition RT and accuracy costs in the 
behavioural and the simulated results with models of the best fitting task 
strategies mentioned previously (Old/reactive; Middle/proactive; Young/reactive). 
Like with the behavioural results, there was no consistent RT mixing costs when 
comparing the performance on pure trials with performance on repetition trials. 
It is likely that mixing costs are not a valid performance measure if tasks can be 
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structured differently between pure and repetition trials, despite being 
perceptually similar. It may not always be appropriate to compare performance 
across these two trial types if the tasks are conceptualised differently by the 
participants.  
RT switch costs are observed only in Middle networks that adopt a 
proactive task strategy. However, overall, RT switch costs are not modulated by 
network age, something which is also consistent with the behavioural findings. 
Although younger children appeared to have a greater RT switch costs in the 
behavioural result, statistically the differences were not significant. There was 
also no network age effect on accuracy switch cost, as was also observed in the 
behavioural results. It is thus possible that the inconsistency in the between-
condition costs reported across the published developmental research is largely 
due to a combination of different developmental cognitive constraints and 
different task strategies that the children engage to complete a task. 
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Figure 7.7 Between-condition RT (upper panel in blue) and Accuracy (lower 
panel in red) mixing costs and switch costs in different ages. Left panels show the 
behavioural data from the experiment; right panels show the simulated result.  Error bars 
represent 95% CI of means. 
7.4.3 Model 3C: Discussion 
Overall, Model 3C was the most successful model at capturing the 
developmental differences in task performance on each trial type, as well as 
giving an account of how between-condition effects are related to task 
strategies. Model 3C made a few critical assumptions about how different 
network ages may exhibit accuracy variations by strategically varying the 
degree of Top/Intrinsic signals. The specific parameter settings for each task 
strategy were based on the simulation results in Model 3B, which systematically 
explored the space of accuracy in relation to changes in the Intrinsic/Top 
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signals. One could argue that Model 3C over fitted the behavioural data since 
the simulations were carried out after the parameter search (e.g. the Top 
signals in Model 3C were chosen from the range that would result in accuracy 
closely matched to that observed in bimodal CMTS). However, the aim of the 
Model 3C simulation exercise was to illustrate that the observed behavioural 
results can be produced by the strategic modulation of Top input. Something 
that was indeed accomplished. Importantly, we do not make claims that the 
participants of a specific age could only employ that specific task strategy; 
instead, Model 3C merely proposed that the participants of a specific age were 
more likely to employ a particular task strategy under our experimental design. 
It is therefore possible that in a different context, the same participant could 
potentially employ a different task strategy. 
 It appears that there is no linear relation between task strategy 
and network age, since both Old networks and Young networks conceptually 
approached the tasks ‘reactively’. It is possible that adults are just as likely to 
employ a reactive strategy as young children, but for different reasons. Adults 
are likely to approach tasks adaptively but conservatively, exerting only a 
necessary amount of top-down control. In our experiments, tasks were relatively 
easy and therefore adults were able to approach the tasks reactively. In 
comparison, 4-year-olds might approach the tasks reactively because of 
developmental constraints on their core cognitive abilities. Although the switch 
signal (i.e. cue) on switch trials may promote a little boost in top-down control in 
4-year-olds, they nonetheless failed to consistently monitor their performance 
on repetition trials and exert an optimal level of top-down control. Six-year-olds 
were likely to approach the task proactively, since they were highly accurate but 
were still below ceiling accuracy, on repetition trials. Anecdotally, most 6-year-
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olds did appear to concentrate on the tasks during the experiment. Thus, 
proactivity and reactivity of task strategies may not serve as direct evidence of 
the overall cognitive control, particularly when the perceived task difficulty 
differs between groups.   
Model 3C shows that, to really understand what is going on underneath 
the inter-group and between-condition effects, it is important to understand 
where the inter-group, inter-individual and intra-individual differences lie, as well 
as the dynamics of the underlying information processes. The update probability 
was found to be the parameter most likely to drive inter-individual differences in 
Young networks but not Old networks. Moreover, the relative modulations in 
Top signal strength between trial types, conceptualized as task strategy, is 
crucial in accounting for between-condition differences. Although between-
condition effects may not be the most reliable measure for developmental 
effect, particularly in young children, if additional specifications such as task 
strategy are given, they may be a useful predictor for developmental and/or 
inter-individual difference.  
7.5 General Discussion 
Although deterministic models such as Model 1 (Chapter 5) and Model 2 
(Chapter 6) were able to capture the developmental differences in RT, and in 
accuracy on switch trials, without a dynamic mechanism through which the task-
representations are allowed to decay, these models were not able to capture 
the error profiles on baseline trials (i.e. pure and repetition trials). Model 3 
introduced the decay function as well as the update probability function, through 
which populations of networks can be created. In the behavioural experiment, 
although young children generally performed less well than older children and 
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adults, there were also large individual differences within the age group. Having 
a population model is an effective way of capturing these individual differences. 
Indeed, the population approach of modelling was able to capture different 
developmental trajectories of typical and atypical children (Thomas, Davis, 
Karmiloff-Smith, Knowland, & Charman, 2016; Thomas, Knowland, & Karmiloff-
Smith, 2011). In Model 3, the population variation was loosely modelled as the 
probabilities of task updates, without a specific supposition of how different 
network ages varied in their update probabilities. The probabilistic task update 
enabled inter-network differences to emerge in each network ages, and 
therefore were more effective in capturing the overall performance variations 
within the network age.  
The main objective of Model 3 was to investigate how performance 
variations are manifested at inter-group and inter-individual levels. Inter-
individual differences were modelled with update probability, which is loosely 
associated with internally generated self-reminders of the task rules. It was 
found that even if there were large individual differences in update probability at 
each network age, only younger networks would exhibit a large inter-network 
variation in accuracy. The upper limit of Top constraint was considered as the 
inter-group difference by age. Top signal has a direct and strong effect on 
accuracy in mixed tasks, and a moderate effect on the response time. In our 
behavioural study, there was a significant age effect on the overall accuracy, 
and the developmental differences in top-down control may be directly 
associated with the observed difference. Since Top signal also affected 
response speed, this implies that within a specific age range, response time 
may be a valid predictor of the individual differences in top-down control.  
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However, within developmentally appropriate limits, top-down control can 
also vary with task strategy. A simple way of defining task strategy is by how 
much top-down control varies by task context. A task can be approached 
proactively by consistently employing a good level of top-down control 
throughout the duration of the overall task. In this case, the level of control may 
not vary much on a trial-to-trial basis. This task strategy, however, is very 
effortful and taxing of attentional resource. It is possible that when the tasks are 
perceived as easy, a savvier participant may approach the tasks reactively. 
Indeed, the reactive strategy matched our behavioural experiment well in adults 
since they showed only a very small switch cost. It should be noted that the 
explanation proposed here for switch costs is quite different from the traditional 
view of switch cost, in which a large RT switch cost is often seen to reflect 
suboptimal cognitive control on switch trials. Here, I argue that the small RT 
switch costs are likely to be caused by a lower, not greater, cognitive control on 
repetition trials, compared to switch trials. This scenario is perhaps most 
probable if the accuracy on these tasks is at ceiling level, which is often the 
case with adult task-switching studies, and the participants have greater 
freedom to approach the tasks with minimally required (and minimally 
demanding) levels of cognitive control. That task strategy has a direct impact on 
how switch costs should be interpreted may have great implications for how 
cognitive control should be measured with this specific paradigm. However, task 
difficulty is only one factor that may affect task strategy, other factors such as 
temperament and motivations can also be at play.  
In contrast, young children were unlikely to have perceived the tasks as 
‘easy’ since they did not achieve ceiling performance. In my observation, the 
lack of motivation is also not a plausible explanation for their lower performance 
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since most if not all children were highly engaged in the tasks. The type of task 
strategy used by young children is perhaps more likely to reflect both inter-
individual developmental factors as well as intra-individual differences, in 
contrast to just the intra-individual differences in adults. Even with a proactive 
approach, Middle networks could not achieve ceiling performance on switch 
trials. If the simulation results stand, then 6-year-olds’ performance on switch 
trials may be a useful indicator of developmental constraint on top-down control. 
Four-year-olds exhibited a huge variation in performance, with some 
children achieving above 90% accuracy and others barely at chance level. The 
children below 70% accuracy were excluded from the behavioural analyses 
since it was not clear what the underlying reason of this poor performance was. 
Our simulation model would suggest that these children simply were not 
engaging the task by adopting a task-appropriate strategy. Instead,  they 
approached switch trials as they would approach repetition trials, with minimal 
top-down control. In comparison, other 4-year-olds who achieve a good level of 
overall accuracy may be more likely to adopt task strategies by modulating their 
top-down control. Specifically, those who achieved a higher accuracy on 
repetition trials may have some understanding of proactivity. These children are 
also more likely to exhibit a larger switch cost in both RT and accuracy. In 
contrast, young children who did not achieve a good level of accuracy on 
repetition trials were more likely to adopt a reactive task strategy, and 
counterintuitively exhibited a small RT and accuracy switch cost. 
Model 3 demonstrates that pure and mixed tasks can require significantly 
different information processes. Specifically, representation of the pure task 
does not require a higher level representation of task attributes. If this is true, 
then between-condition costs may not be a valid measure of cognitive control 
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and information interference—particularly if different ages approach the pure 
task differently. The results in Model 3A suggest that the pattern of speed-
accuracy trade-off may be one way in differentiating whether the task is 
approached with a higher-level goal representation that includes task attributes 
or not.  
In sum, Model 3 highlights the importance of understanding performance 
variations in relation to factors that affect different levels of comparisons—at 
inter-group level, inter-individual level, and intra-individual level, and of course, 
as well as the information processes specific to each task. 
Models 1, 2 and 3 have progressively captured greater nuances in the 
non-linear interactions among information processes, development and 
inter/intra individual characteristics—Model 1 captured the ideal behaviours with 
a generalisable task-switching paradigm; Model 2 captured context-specific 
processes that were potentially significant to young participants; Model 3 
captured the individual characteristics within each age group. In the next 
chapter, instead of task-associated measures, I will explore how modality shift 
effects could be captured by the model. 
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Table 7.3 Parameter setting in Model 3 
Parameter Name Old 
(Default) 
Middle Young 
Weights (Pure networks)    
PSVIS unit to RO unit  3.0 2.6 2.2 
PSAUD unit to RO unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
Lateral connections from ROYES to RONO -1.3 - - 
Lateral connections from RONO to ROYES -1.0 - - 
Weights (Mixed networks)    
PSVIS unit to RO unit 3.0 2.6 2.2 
PSAUD unit to RO unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
TA unit to ROYES unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
TA unit to RONO unit 1.8 1.4 1.0 
PS unit to TA unit 3 - - 
Within-set lateral connection from ROYES to 
RONO 
-1.3 - - 
Within-set connection from RONO to ROYES -1.0 - - 
Between-set lateral connections between RODog 
and ROBird 
-1.3 - - 
Inputs (Pure networks without TA unit)    
Intrinsic signal to ROYES* 3 to 101 - - 
Intrinsic signal to RONO* 1.2 to 41 - - 
PS units (clamped activation) 1 - - 
Bias -2.5 - - 
Inputs (Mixed networks)    
Top signal 5/101,2 6/61,2 3/51,2 
PS units (clamped activation) 1 - - 
Bias -2.5 - - 
Time constraints    
Preparation window 150 - - 
Timeout 600 - - 
Other parameters    
Priming rate between PS and TA 1 - - 
Priming rate between TA and RO 2 - - 
Step size  0.0015 - - 
Noise  0.006 - - 
Response threshold 0.2 - - 
Min. and max. activation of TA and RO units -1.0 to 1.0 - - 
Squashing/Decay parameter for TA unit 0.7 - - 
Top-down/ Intrinsic signal update probability* 0 to 100%1 - - 
1. For the actual setting in each model, refer to the main text. 
2. Default min/max signal on repetition/switch trials 
* Indicates new parameter in the current chapter. 
‘-’ indicates the same/similar setting as in Old networks 
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Chapter 8. Computational model of the modality shift 
Effect (Model 4) 
In Chapters 5 to 7, the models have focused on the possible information 
processes involved in either pure or mixed task performance. Little attention 
was paid to the processes involved in shifting attention between modalities. In 
the bimodal CMTS experiment (Chapter 3), we found a reliable modality shift 
effect across all ages, and an asymmetry in the modality shift effect (Fig. 8.1). 
Specifically, the MSE in the pure blocks was nonparadoxical, indicating a larger 
cost to the harder auditory targets than an easier visual targets. In contrast, the 
MSE in the mixed blocks was paradoxical, with a larger cost to the easier visual 
targets than to the auditory targets. 
 
 
Figure 8.1. Behavioural Result from existing analyses: Modality shift effect in 
Pure trials (left panel) and Repetition trials (right panel) in the bimodal CMTS 
experiment. Filled bars show the RT differences (ms) between A2V and V2V trials (MSE 
to visual target), and hatched bars show the RT differences (ms) between V2A and A2A 
trials (MSE to auditory target). Error bars represent 95% CI of means (the figures were 
from original analyses in bimodal CMTS, Chapter 3). 
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To understand how robust this paradoxical MSE in the mixed blocks was, 
data from unimodal CMTS were re-visited to confirm this paradoxical MSE. 
Although our computational models did not specifically model unimodal CMTS, 
the results from this study further confirmed our observations. In the unimodal 
CMTS, the stimulus was either visual- or auditory-only, and the experiment 
involved only mixed blocks. The overall performance by target modality in 
unimodal CMTS was similar to bimodal CMTS experiment (relevant to the 
current models). That is, in both experiments, the participants were quicker and 
more accurate in responding to visual targets than to auditory targets, and both 
experiments found paradoxical asymmetry in MSE in mixed blocks, as the MSE 
was larger to the easy visual detection, than the harder auditory detection (Fig. 
8.1, right panel for bimodal CMTS; Fig. 8.2 for unimodal CMTS). In sum, it 
appears likely that the paradoxical MSE in the mixed task is characteristic of the 
situation where tasks are intermixed. 
 
Figure 8.2. Behavioural Result with revisited data: Modality shift effect in 
Repetition trials in the unimodal CMTS experiment. Error bars represent 95% CI of 
means (the figure was from a revisited data analysis). 
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Research on the cross-modal attentional shift effect has often asked 
whether MSE is part of the task-set shift, mediated by task-associated cognitive 
processes, or, whether MSE comes from modality-specific processes (Arnell & 
Jenkins, 2004; Driver & Spence, 2000; Spence, Nicholls, & Driver, 2001). 
Although the previous models did not consider additional modality-specific 
representations, they did include priming mechanisms that may result in a 
modality shift effect. It is possible that the RT was quicker on modality-repetition 
trials, compared to modality-shift trials, due to stimulus primes. If this is the case, 
then the priming mechanism might not only be category-specific (i.e. the stimuli 
from the same target category), but also modality-specific (i.e. within modality). 
According to the priming account of MSE, the asymmetry of MSE is due to 
asymmetric modality-response compatibilities—at least in the pure task. In our 
models, there were stronger connections from the visual PS units to the RO 
units, than from the auditory PS units to the RO units. These asymmetric 
pathways were intended to reflect the quicker translation of responses from the 
visual inputs than from the auditory inputs, as seen in the behavioural results. If 
this priming account is supported, it would suggest that MSE is not distinct from 
task-associated effects such as carry-over primes, and that modality information 
was incorporated as part of the overall task set. 
Alternatively, MSE might reflect processes related to additional parallel 
modality-specific processes. For example, lingering representations about 
information specific to the modality, termed modality attribute (MA), are carried 
over to the next trial and exert influence on how the subsequent stimulus is 
processed. In this regard, the residual activation in the MA representations is 
conceptually similar to the residual activation of the TA representations. The 
difference between MA and TA representations is the level of information 
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processing— TA representations are directly mediated by top-down control—
thus task-associated, whereas MA representations are likely to be triggered by 
perceptual inputs per se—thus relatively task-free.  
In this chapter, Model 4 explores both the priming account of MSE 
(Model 4A), and modality-specific representation account of MSE (Model 4B). I 
will also explore how MSE asymmetry and the reversal of MSE asymmetry 
might be produced within these accounts. 
8.1 Basic assumptions 
In this chapter, a model with modality attribute units (Model 4B) will be 
compared against the model without modality attribute units (Model 4A).  
Cost asymmetry is not something unique to MSE. When two tasks differ 
in difficulty, asymmetry effects have often been reported in unimodal task-
switching studies (e.g. Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Bobb & Wodniecka, 2013; 
Ellefson, Shapiro, & Chater, 2006), although the direction of the asymmetry is 
not always consistent. Gilbert and Shallice’s (2002) model successfully 
captured the asymmetric RT switch costs in these studies. These authors also 
investigated how different types of asymmetry may occur. In their model, 
paradoxical asymmetry refers to the larger switch cost to the stronger task 
(greater connection weights) than to the weaker task. This asymmetry could be 
induced when the Top signal differed greatly in strength for different tasks. In 
contrast, nonparadoxical asymmetry referred to the larger switch cost to the 
weaker task than to the stronger task. This effect was more likely to occur if 
there were large differences in connection weights between task pathways.  
In our behavioural study, the asymmetry in MSE was nonparadoxical in 
the pure blocks, since the cost was smaller (and not significantly different from 
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zero) to the stronger visual pathway, and larger to the weaker auditory pathway. 
As with the nonparadoxycal costs found in Gilbert and Shallice’s model, it is 
possible that with enough asymmetry between the pathway connection weights, 
MSE asymmetry may be created. Alternatively, the MSE asymmetry may be 
caused by additional mediators, such as the representations of modality 
attributes, that can influence how perceptual stimulus is processed. For 
example, the attention might be tuned to the perceptual-based (in contrast to 
task-based) attribute specific to the modality, such as the pitch of the sound, 
due to the previous exposure to that modality attribute.  Thus there may be a 
cost/benefit on modality-shift and modality-repetition trials due to the lingering 
activation of the modality attribute representations. 
While the MSE in the pure blocks may reflect the asymmetry between 
the pathways, or linger modality attribute representations, our behavioural 
experiment showed that the effect was reversed in the repetition trials in mixed 
blocks. Specifically, MSE could only be observed with visual targets, but the 
MSE to the auditory targets was eliminated in mixed blocks.  
The reversal of the asymmetry in the behavioural experiment is puzzling. 
One possible explanation is that the participants engaged in verbal self-
reminders (Blaye & Chevalier, 2011; Kray et al., 2004), which might have 
interacted with modality-specific processes. To model this account of the 
reversal of MSE asymmetry, it is necessary to introduce an additional unit that 
will interact with modality-specific processes Thus, in Model 4B, a unit that 
represents phonological engagement of task goal is added on top of the 
modality attribute units in the mixed networks, in order to model the effect of 
inner speech on modality-specific processes. 
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Model 4 differs from the previous task-based models in terms of 
perceptual stimuli. Unlike our previous models where the stimulus could be both 
uni-selection and bi-selection, all stimuli in Model 4 are uni-selection stimuli (i.e. 
only one PS unit is activated). This is because, although in the bimodal CMTS 
experiment all stimuli were bimodal, the specific activation dynamics in the 
previous models would define the stimuli as either unimodal- uniselection (one 
activated PS unit) or bimodal-biselection (two activated PS units). Consequently, 
there is an imperfect match in stimulus set between the computational model 
and the behavioural experiment.  
This problem can be overcome if all the stimuli in the computational 
model are uni-selection. Thus, the basic assumption of Model 4 is that if a 
stimulus contains a target, then attention will quickly be drawn towards that 
modality, and away from the modality of the neutral distractors. On bi-selection 
trials, it is less clear (even behaviourally) how attention will be deployed 
between the visual and auditory modalities, since both elements would signal a 
response. Consequently, for simplicity, the current model focused on 
understanding the MSE asymmetry with uni-selection stimuli only. 
8.2 Model 4A: Priming account with asymmetric pathways 
Model 4A1 has a similar architecture to that of Model 3C (section 7.4), 
but with a greater asymmetry between the PS-RO pathways, and with a 
constant perceptual input to PS units. To create an effect of asymmetric MSE, it 
is necessary for the PS units to be of continuous value and to have residual 
                                            
1 All parameters setting used in the simulations with Model 4A are listed 
in Table 8.1 at the end of chapter.
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memory of the n-1 trial. If the PS units are clamped at 1, then the modality-shift 
trials will be practically identical to the modality-repetition trials. To avoid this, all 
PS units are initialised to 0.7 to allow scope for PS activation increases as a 
result of a constant perceptual input. As the PS activation is reduced, the 
response threshold was correspondingly increased from 0.2 to 0.3 to extend 
sampling opportunities in the network. This is because a higher response 
threshold generally allows the RO units to have a greater opportunity in 
collecting evidence from the associated processing pathways. If the response 
threshold is set too low, the network will not have enough opportunities to arrive 
to the correct answer. Unlike the residual activation at the TA level at the 
beginning of the trial, there is no residual activation at the PS level. The only 
memory mechanism is priming, and consequently the asymmetric MSE is 
dependent on the modulations of the priming connections.  
When the PS activation is continuous, it is possible that the stronger 
pathway may not derive as much priming benefit from the increase in PS 
activation as the weaker pathway. This is because the response settling will be 
faster and therefore the PS unit is likely to undergo fewer cycles of perceptual 
updates. Thus, the overall MSE effect in Model 4A will be dependent on PS2RO 
and PS2TA primes, modulated by the differential response settling speed in 
each pathway.  
The main objective of Model 4A is to understand whether asymmetric 
MSE can be created without the addition of modality attribute representations. 
There were 30 network subject of each network age. As with the previous 
simulations, only correct Yes responses were analysed. There were four trial 
types in each condition. These are modality-repetition trials (MR) such as V2V 
and A2A, and modality-shift trials (MS) such as A2V and V2A, where the first 
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letter denotes the target modality of the n-1 trial and the second letter denotes 
the target modality of the current trial. As in the behavioural experiment, only 
pure trials and repetition trials were of interest. In the behavioural experiment, 
there were intervening task cues on switch trials so it would not be appropriate 
to analyse MSE on these trials. To compensate for the fewer data points for 
each trial type (MRPure, MSPure,  MRRep, MSRep) compared to task-associated 
trials, we increased the number of total trials from our previous models. In 
Model 4A, there were 160 pure trials and 120 repetition trials.  
8.2.1 Model 4A: Result 
8.2.1.1 RT and Accuracy. 
The results show that overall the networks were more accurate in Model 
4A than in Model 3C (Fig. 8.3), and this is possibly due to relatively slow 
response settling in Model 4A as a consequence of the smaller initial PS 
activations and the raised response threshold. A slower system could result in 
an increase in accuracy since RO units had a greater time window for collecting 
evidence from the information pathways.  
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Figure 8.3. Accuracy and reaction time in Model 3C (left-panel) and Model 4A 
(right-panel). Bars represent reaction time (in cycles) and lines represent accuracy. Error 
bars represent 95% CI of means. 
8.2.1.2 Modality Shift Effect  
Visual processing was much faster than auditory processing in Model 4A 
(Fig. 8.4). This was expected since the PSVis-RO pathway was much stronger 
than the PSAud-RO pathway. The modality shift effects (MSE) to either visual or 
auditory targets are shown in Figure 8.5. With the asymmetric pathway 
strengths, there was a larger MSE to the auditory target than the visual target in 
both pure and repetition trials. This is because the PS activations in visual trials 
were smaller than in auditory trials, since response settling to visual targets was 
fast, and therefore PSVis was not updated as strongly as auditory targets. The 
weaker PSVis activation means that the priming facilitation on the next trial would 
be relatively smaller than the stronger PSAud activation. On repetition trials, as 
there was no additional mechanism in place to modulate the MSE effect, no 
reversal of asymmetry was observed, despite some reduction in the overall 
priming effect. 
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Figure 8.4. Model 4A: Reaction time in cycles to visual targets (blue bars) and 
auditory targets (orange bars) on different trial types and network ages. Left to right 
panels: Pure, Repetition and Switch trials. Error bars represent 95% CI of means. 
 
Figure 8.5. Model 4A: Modality shift effect in Pure trials (left panel) and 
Repetition trials (right panel). Blue bars show the RT differences (cycles) between A2V 
and V2V (MSE to visual target), and orange bars show the RT differences (cycles) 
between V2A and A2A (MSE to auditory target). Error bars represent 95% CI of means. 
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8.2.2 Model 4A: Discussion 
Model 4A demonstrated an asymmetric cost since the MSE cost was 
larger for the weaker auditory pathway than the stronger visual pathway. In 
Gilbert and Shallice’s model, the nonparadoxical asymmetric switch cost was 
caused by the interplay among the asymmetric pathway strengths, the residual 
activation of the TA units and the relatively similar Top signals across two tasks. 
Unlike in their model, Model 4A lacked residual activation since PS units were 
initiated anew on each trial. Instead, differences between modality-shift and 
modality-repetition trials were created through the priming connections. In 
Model 4A, the asymmetric MSE was due to the differences in priming strengths 
arising from the interplay between the asymmetric pathway strengths and the 
PS activation at the end of the trial. On visual trials where the pathway strength 
was stronger, the PS unit was updated for a limited number of cycles, since the 
network settled into a response relatively quickly; in contrast, on auditory trials, 
the PS unit was updated for a greater number of cycles and thus the PS 
activation was greater at the end of the trial. The differential activation of the PS 
units resulted in the differential priming facilitation on different trial types (visual 
vs. auditory trials). It is therefore plausible that the asymmetric MSE effect on 
pure trials in the behavioural experiment reflects a priming effect and thus was 
not different mechanistically from the other task-associated effects discussed in 
the previous models. 
Although Model 4A was able to capture the asymmetric MSE pattern on 
pure trials, there were still disparities between the behavioural results and the 
simulated results. In the behavioural results, not only was the MSE to visual and 
auditory nonparadoxically asymmetric in the pure blocks, but only the MSE to 
the auditory target was reliably different from zero. The reverse was true on the 
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repetition trials in the mixed blocks, where paradoxical asymmetry was 
observed, but only the MSE to visual targets was reliably different from zero. 
With priming connections, the facilitative effect on modality-repetition trials is 
likely to be deterministic. Thus it is unlikely that a mean MSE of zero or a 
reversal of asymmetry could be achieved within the priming account.  
An explanation of the asymmetric MSE based on this priming account 
relied on a few awkward assumptions. For example, in the pure condition, to 
create a mean MSE to visual targets around zero, it would be necessary to 
eliminate or reduce the priming effect on visual trials. This can be achieved by a 
mechanism that reduces the PSVis activation during the settling process; but 
even so, any PSVis activation at the end of the trial is likely to result in priming 
facilitation on MR trials in pure networks. Even more challenging would be to 
reverse the nonparadoxical asymmetry to paradoxical asymmetry, while 
reducing the MSE to auditory targets towards zero. It is not clear how this can 
be achieved with only a priming account of MSE. 
In sum, although asymmetry can be observed with Model 4A, the specific 
patterns of the MSE in the behavioural experiment make it unlikely that MSE 
was wholly due to an asymmetric priming effect. Although priming effects may 
be at play, since the stimuli on MR trials were also from the same stimulus 
category as the previous trial, it cannot account for the overall pattern observed 
in the experiment. Therefore, Model 4B investigates whether MSE can be 
achieved without resorting to a priming account, by removing all priming 
connections and by adding mechanisms that can modulate PS activation with 
residual activations from previous trials. 
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8.3 Model 4B: Modality attribute representations 
Model 4A showed that with just the asymmetry in connection weights, 
without an additional modality-based mechanism that modulates PS activations, 
the resulting asymmetry pattern was not wholly satisfactory. One way to 
modulate PS activation is through attentional biases from the modality attribute 
representations. The rationale here is that when a bimodal stimulus contains a 
target, after sufficient encoding of the stimulus, attention is quickly tuned to the 
modality that contains the target, and away from the modality that contains a 
distractor. It should be noted that this is different from simple activation of 
perceptual-based modality processing, since the representation of modality 
attribute is essentially ‘selected’ based on stimulus saliency. The definition of 
‘modality attribute’ here does not refer to a specific representation. Rather, it 
may encompass all representations that relate to the information presented in 
that modality. This ‘attribute’ may be the visual-spatial/ auditory-spatial aspect of 
the input, as well as features within the stimuli (e.g. greyscale images on the 
screen/ volumes, pitches and temporal dynamics coming from the headphone).  
In addition to understanding the nonparadoxical asymmetry through 
modality attribute representations, an additional mechanism is needed to 
account for the paradoxical asymmetry in MSE in the mixed blocks. Although it 
is currently not clear what mechanisms underlie the change in direction of the 
MSE asymmetry, one mechanism stood out to be most probable—namely 
verbal self-reminders. In Model 3 (Chapter 7), we have already introduced the 
idea of an intermittent Top signal as a form of self-reminders. This self-reminder 
may be presented in the form of verbal rehearsal in 4-year-olds, and inner 
speech in 6-year-olds and adults. This phonological or verbal representation of 
the task goal is likely to interact with modality-specific processes. To model the 
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interaction between verbal representation and modality attribute representation, 
an additional Phonological Engagement unit is introduced in the mixed networks 
only, which will interact with modality attribute units. 
 Model 4B1 reverted back to using the same weight setting as in Model 
3C since the default weight setting was already shown to be appropriate to for a 
range of different simulations. In contrast to Model 4A, there were no priming 
connections between either PS and RO or between PS and TA in Model 4B. 
This is because Model 4B specifically set out to test whether MSE reflects other 
independent processes distinct from the previous task-associated processes, 
including the priming effects.  
The overall architecture of Model 4B is shown in Figure 8.6. The 
additional units and connections in the network are discussed in the following 
section. 
  
                                            
1 All parameters setting used in the simulations with Model 4A are listed 
in Table 8.2 at the end of chapter. 
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Figure 8.6. Model 4B architecture in the pure (right network) and mixed networks 
(left network). Coloured connections are additional fixed connections—purple inhibitory 
connections and orange excitatory connections. PE: phonological engagement unit. Filled 
units are allowed to have activations carried across the sequence of trials.  
8.3.1 Model 4B: Model architecture 
Modality attribute layer (MA) has two units—an auditory MA unit, and a 
visual MA unit. The MA units are connected to the PS units, with an excitatory 
connection from the PS units to the corresponding MA units (e.g. DV and BV to 
MAVIS), and an inhibition connection from the MA unit to the competing PS unit 
(e.g. MAVIS to DA and BA). The inhibition connections from the MA units to the 
cross-modal PS units mean that PS activation is modulated by the competing 
modality, not the associated modality.  
At the theoretical level, having excitatory PS-MA and inhibitory MA-PS 
connections emphasises that the differential attentional bias towards the PS 
units is dependent on cross-modal modulations. We believe that the selection 
between audio and visual inputs in an audiovisual stimulus is more likely to 
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interact with cross-modal representations rather than within-modal 
representations. This assumption is based on the many studies with 
multisensory information that have documented cross-modal effects when the 
stimuli were bimodal, in which the information of one modality could either 
facilitate or interfere the information associated to the other modality, compared 
to baseline unimodal stimuli (Colavita, 1974; Nava & Pavani, 2013; Robinson & 
Sloutsky, 2004; Sinnett et al., 2008). To model this cross-modal influence, it is 
more appropriate to have cross-modal interactions between MA and PS layers. 
As mentioned previously, we do not know what this modality attribute would 
correspond to in real life, but it might be helpful to make an explicit speculation 
for illustrative purpose. For example, if this modality attribute representation in 
the MAAUD unit is the pitch of the auditory input, on A2V trial where MAAUD unit 
carried lingering activation from the n-1 auditory trial, the active memory of this 
‘pitch’ information would weaken (i.e. inhibit) the representation of the visual 
input at the PS level. 
There is also a practical reason for having cross-modal, rather than 
within-modal, interaction between MA and PS. If the connections between MA 
and PS were bidirectional and excitatory, it creates a feedback loop with a 
relatively strong effect from the current stimulus (since the MA to PS feedback 
input would be directly influenced by the current PS unit). This would not be 
appropriate since the modality shift effect is dependent on the modality attended 
to on the previous trial. In comparison, with the inhibitory connections from the 
MA to the cross-modal PS units, the effect from the n-1 MA activation can be 
more keenly felt since on modality-shift trials, the current PS unit does not 
strongly influence the residual cross-modal MA activation from the previous trial 
(although there are still lateral connections through which interactions do occur). 
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The weights of the excitatory connections from PS to MA are the same 
across all network ages. This is because the PS to MA connections were 
assumed to reflect an automatic pop-out effect of the PS units from the target 
set. Once the perceptual-stimulus representation is sufficiently activated, it is 
assumed that this automatic activation of modality attribute representation is the 
same across all ages. In contrast, the inhibitory connections from MA to PS 
units were different in different network ages—older networks had stronger 
inhibitory feedforward connections than younger networks. This is because 
these inhibitory connections were designed to reflect cross-modal selective 
attention with bimodal input, which is assumed to be slower in young children 
than adults.  
As with other processing units, there are lateral inhibitory connections 
between visual and auditory MA units, as well as a bias to the net input.  Both 
pure networks and mixed networks have these additional MA units. 
PS units in Model 4B take on continuous activation values, in contrast to 
the clamped activation of 1 in all previous models (other than Model 4A). The 
PS units are updated with the input from the MA units through the inhibition 
connections that link them. The net effect is a reduction of PS activation if the 
cross-modal MA unit was positive, or an increase in PS activation if the cross-
modal MA unit was negative. For example, if the MAAUD is positive, which is 
likely to be caused by the residual activation from the n-1 trial, and the current 
stimulus is DV (Dog-Visual), then the DV PS unit is expected to decrease in 
activation to such a point that the MAVIS is sufficiently positive (positive inputs 
from DV to MAVIS) to inhibit the MAAUD through lateral inhibition.  
In addition to the input from the MA units, the PS units also receive a 
constant perceptual input since (in the experiment) the stimulus was always 
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present throughout the trial. As a result, there is a natural tendency to maintain 
or to update PS activation, unless the cross-modal MA unit is highly positive. 
Unlike TA units where the activations linger between sequences of trials, PS 
unit activations are initiated anew at the beginning of every trial. The visual and 
auditory PS units are initialised to a different value, with a maximum activation 
for the visual PS units (activation=1), since it was assumed that visual 
information was immediate and complete at the stimulus onset. In contrast, the 
auditory PS units were initialised to a lower value at 0.8 since it was assumed 
that the identification of an auditory input requires a greater level of temporal 
integration than a visual input. The minimum and maximum activations of the 
PS units are set between 0 and 1. The same PS setting and update functions 
were applied to both pure and mixed networks. 
The phonological engagement (PE) unit is an additional unit in the mixed 
networks only. The role of this unit is to represent an engagement of the verbal 
rehearsal, which is assumed to interact with the MA units. The unit is either on 
‘1’ or off ‘0’, depending on whether there is a top-down update, and irrespective 
of the magnitude of the Top signal. This unit is not modelled in the pure 
networks since the network architecture does not involve task representations. 
It is not immediately clear how the PE unit might interact with the MA units; 
however, the behavioural data may provide some clues here.  
An elimination of MSE to auditory targets in the mixed blocks may reflect 
either that (a) there was an additional facilitative effect to the auditory 
processing that overshadowed the benefit of a modality-repetition, or (b) there 
was an additional interfering effect to the auditory processing that 
overshadowed the cost of a modality-shift.  In the case of a facilitative effect to 
auditory targets in the mixed blocks, we may expect the RT difference between 
 262 
visual target detection and auditory target detection to narrow from the pure to 
the mixed blocks (e.g. RT to visual and auditory targets become more 
comparable). There was no such trend in the behavioural data (Fig. 8.7). In fact, 
the difference in RT between visual and auditory target detection became much 
larger in the mixed blocks than in the pure blocks.  
In the second case, the verbal self-reminders may interfere with auditory 
processing. Since phonological representation and auditory processing are 
likely to tap into a common attentional resource, verbal self-reminders may 
eliminate the benefit of modality-repetition. Thus, in accordance with this 
hypothesis, I implemented a negative input from the PE unit to the MAAud unit 
such that whenever the PE unit is activated it sends an inhibitory input to the 
MAAud unit. 
 
  
Figure 8.7. Behavioural Result: Mean reaction time (ms) to different visual or 
auditory targets in different age groups. Left panel: pure blocks; right panel: mixed 
blocks. Error bar represents 95% CI. 
MA Squash is the squashing parameter for the MA units at the end of the 
trial. As with the TA units, a proportion of the activation of the MA units was 
carried on to the next trial. The MA squash parameter determines how much 
residual activation was allowed to remain from trial to trial. 
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In addition to the MA Squash parameter, on nontarget trials, the model 
made no assumption of which MA unit should be activated. In the model, the 
MA activations were set to 0 at the end of the trial if no target was present. 
Resetting the MA units at the end of the nonresponse trials prevented the MA 
activation from growing too strongly over successive nonresponse trials. In the 
behavioural experiment, a correct ‘Yes’ response was taken as evidence that 
the participant had attended to a specific modality, but there was no assumption 
regarding which modality the participant was attending to on nonresponse trials. 
The same rationale was therefore applied to the current model. 
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8.3.2 Model 4B: Network Operations 
Figure 8.8 illustrates the schematic flow of the network operation. 
 
Figure 8.8. Schematic illustration of stages of network operations in Model 4B. 
 
As with the previous models, the simulation started with a preparation 
period with a constant Top input to the TA units. However, in addition to the task 
preparation window, after the stimulus onset, there was an additional 
preparation window for perceptual processing. Unlike the goal activation 
process where the TA units were gradually updated from low initial activation 
values, the PS activations were initialiseded with fixed values at stimulus onset.  
Once the PS activations were initialised, MA representations started to 
interact with the PS units. Specifically, it is assumed that the influence from the 
n-1 modality attribute activation happens at the early stage of perceptual 
processing. The main purpose of the perceptual preparation window was to 
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allow the residual MA activation to modulate PS activations before the response 
settling process started. The duration of the perceptual preparation window is 
critical as to whether the PS activations are influenced by the residual MA 
activations or by the MA activations of the current PS (through lateral inhibition). 
If the perceptual preparation window is too small, the PS units might not be 
updated enough to reflect the status of the n-1 MA activations; conversely, if the 
perceptual preparation window is too long, the PS units might reflect the current 
target modality more than the n-1 target modality. 
The PS units were subject to the influence of the MA units for a number 
of cycles before the response settling commenced. During the perceptual 
preparation window, activations propagations were allowed only between the 
PS units and the MA units, as well as from the constant perceptual input to the 
PS units.  
Once both task and perceptual preparation windows were over, the 
network started settling towards a response. The perceptual input was constant 
throughout the trial, since the percept stimulus was always present in the 
behavioural experiment. The interactions between MA and PS units were also 
constant across the trial. As with Model 3C, the Top signal was probabilistic with 
inter-network differences (e.g. network subject 1 updates TA frequently, 
whereas network subject 2 only updates occasionally). In the mixed network, 
when the Top signal was present, it simultaneously turned on the phonological 
engagement unit (PE) to capture the assumption that top-down updates were 
dependent on the verbal rehearsal of the current task attribute. The PE unit was 
either on ‘1’ or off ‘0’ and it had a small inhibitory connection to the MAAUD unit 
(as mentioned previously). As in Model 4A, the response threshold was 
increased from 0.2 to 0.3 to reflect the smaller PS inputs. 
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There were 30 network subjects to each network age, with 160 pure trials, 
120 repetition trials, and 120 switch trials. As with the previous models and 
behavioural experiments, targets appeared with 60% probability. The number of 
network subjects and the number of trials were increased in Model 4B because 
of the limited number of data for each trial type. 
8.3.3 Model 4B: Result 
The developmental differences in RT observed across all trial types were 
preserved in Model 4B (Fig. 8.9). Moreover, as with Model 4A, young networks 
exhibited higher accuracy overall than Model 3C. The reason behind the higher 
accuracy might be the same as in Model 4A in which the larger response 
threshold might have created greater opportunities to arrive at the correct 
response. Finally, achieving high accuracy rates also allowed the current model 
to generate a greater number of data points for the analysis of modality shift 
effects (MSE).  
The MSE in Model 4B and the MSE in the bimodal CMTS study are 
shown in Figure 8.10 and Figure 8.1 at the beginning of the chapter. The MSE 
in pure networks and in mixed networks will be discussed separately. 
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Figure 8.9. Accuracy and reaction time in Model 4B. Bars represent reaction time 
(in cycles) and lines represent accuracy. Error bars represent 95% CI of means. 
 
Figure 8.10. Modality shift effect in Pure trials (left panel) and Repetition trials 
(right panel). Blue bars show the RT differences (cycles) between A2V and V2V (MSE to 
visual target), and yellow bars show the RT differences (cycles) between V2A and A2A 
(MSE to auditory target). Error bars represent 95% CI of means. 
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8.3.3.1 Pure trials 
The MSE in the pure networks exhibited an asymmetric shift cost (Fig. 
8.10, left panel). Like in the behavioural experiment (Fig. 8.1), there was a 
larger MSE to the auditory target (V2A-A2A) than to the visual target (A2V-V2V). 
More importantly, MSE was only reliable to auditory targets, but not to visual 
targets. The overall result appears to have a better fit to the behavioural data 
than Model 4A, in which, despite achieving asymmetric MSE, the networks also 
exhibited a large MSE on trials with visual targets. 
Since the model did not have other n-1 influences such as priming on 
response settling, the asymmetric MSE in pure networks was caused by the 
different dynamics in PS activation updates on modality-repetition (MR) and 
modality-shift (MS) trials. The PSAUD unit was initiated at 0.8, below the 
maximum of 1, to allow for upward or downward updates. The MSE on auditory 
trials reflects the differences in the activation gain/loss between A2A and V2A 
trials. On A2A trials, the inhibited MAVIS unit increased the activation of the 
PSAUD unit from the very beginning of the perceptual preparation window. In 
contrast, on V2A trials, the cross-modal MAVIS was activated at the early stage 
of the processes, thus it was likely to result in a loss of PSAUD activation through 
the inhibitory pathway. This loss is stopped only when the MAAUD is sufficiently 
activated, due to the constant perceptual input, which in turn inhibits the MAVIS 
unit.  
The MSE on visual trials was absent because there was no further scope 
for activation gains for PSVIS unit on V2V trials, since the PSVIS unit was 
initialised at the maximum value. Although there were no activation gains on 
V2V trials, similar to V2A trials, there was an activation loss on A2V trials during 
the early stage of processes. It would appear that this early activation loss has a 
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limited effect on the overall response settling on A2V trials, since there was no 
significant MSE to visual targets on pure trials. 
In sum, the MSE effects in the pure networks suggest that these effects 
may largely be attributable to activation gains on MR (modality-repetition) trials, 
rather than activation loss on MS (modality-shift) trials, during the course of 
response settling. 
8.3.3.2 Repetition trials 
On repetition trials, it was expected that the MSE to auditory targets 
would be reduced by moderating the PSAUD activation on both A2A and V2A 
trials through the intermittent inhibitory inputs from the PE unit. This is because 
on A2A trials, the mild inhibitory input from the PE unit can lessen the level of 
inhibition on the MAVIS unit (the source of MR facilitation to auditory targets), 
through reducing the positive net input into the MAAUD unit. The negative input 
from the PE unit, in its functional term, has a similar effect as the bias to the 
MAAUD unit, since both factors determined how much net input is needed to 
positively update the activation of the MAAUD unit. The end result is that MAAUD is 
more likely to be only mildly excited on trials with an auditory target, regardless 
of the status of the modality transition (repetition or shift). As the MAAUD is only 
mildly excited, this essentially means that MAVIS is also likely to be only mildly 
inhibited (the source of positive inputs to PSAUD  unit). The overall result is a 
limited activation gain on the A2A trials in the mixed networks, as compared to 
the larger gain on the A2A trials in the pure networks.  
On V2A trials, the residual positive activation of the MAVIS unit will reduce 
the PSAUD activation from the initial activation (PSAUD=0.8) at the beginning of 
the trial. However, this reduction is quickly stopped after the MAAUD  becomes 
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sufficiently positive (through PSAUD input), and the MAVIS unit was inhibited 
(through lateral inhibition connections and bias). Like for the A2A trial, due to 
the negative input from the PE unit, at the end of the response settling process, 
both MA units were likely to be only mildly excited and mildly inhibited. 
Thus, the critical difference between the MSE to auditory targets in the 
pure and in the repetition trials is how progressively inhibited the cross-modal 
MAVIS unit was throughout the trial. This, in turn, determined how much the 
PSAUD unit gained in activation. The cross-modal MAVIS was overall more 
inhibited in the pure networks, than in the mixed networks, and thus PSAUD units 
in pure networks were more likely to exhibit larger activation gains. 
Although the MSE to auditory targets appeared not to be significantly 
different from zero, thus replicating the behavioural result, there was no reversal 
of the asymmetry (Fig. 8.10, right panel). Since the MSE in Model 4B mainly 
reflects information gain on the MR trials rather than information loss on the MS 
trials, PSVIS unit initialised at the maximum value did not benefit from modality 
repetition.  
8.3.4 Model 4B: Discussion 
 Model 4B was successful in capturing the asymmetric MSE cost 
on pure trials. In particular, the MSE to auditory targets was reliably larger than 
zero, but the MSE to visual target was not reliably different from zero. The 
reason for the asymmetric cost was due to the differences in the scope allowed 
for PS activation gain. When the stimulus was visual, the PS activation was 
already near maximum at the beginning of the trial. On an A2V trial, even if 
there was an inhibitory input from the auditory MA unit due to the residual 
activation, the loss of PSVIS activation was not significant enough to alter the 
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course of response settling. In comparison, on V2V trial, even if there was an 
excitatory input from the auditory MA unit due to the unit being inhibited on the 
n-1 trial, since the visual PS unit was already at ceiling activation, there was 
little scope for upward updates. 
When the stimulus was auditory, the PS activation was high but there 
was still scope for further upward or downward updates. On an V2A pure trial, 
there was likely to be inhibition from the visual MA unit due to n-1 residual 
activation. However, with the constant perceptual input, the auditory PS 
activation was likely to be maintained. In comparison, on an A2A pure trial, 
there was likely to be positive input from the inhibited visual MA unit, in addition 
to the constant perceptual input. Thus, the activation of the auditory MA unit on 
A2A trial was likely to be greater than that on the V2A trial in the pure condition, 
resulting in an overall faster RT. 
On repetition trials, there was a partial success in capturing the MSE to 
auditory targets, but not to the visual targets—success as in the MSE to 
auditory targets was not reliably different from zero in any network age, since 
the error bar crossed the zero point. The small inhibitory input from the PE unit 
appeared to push the the PSAud activation to be closer to the initial activation 
values on either MR or MS trials. On an A2A trial, the positive input from the 
cross-modal inhibited MAVis unit was likely to be downregulated due to the 
lateral inhibitory interaction (i.e. positive input into the MAVis unit) with the mildly 
inhibited MAAud unit—mildly inhibited because of the occasional gating function 
(i.e. negative input) from the PE unit. On a V2A trial, PSAud is likely to receive 
negative input from the positive MAVis unit at stimulus onset, but this effect was 
likely to be counteracted by the constant perceptual input. Once the response 
settling started, the auditory MA unit was still unlikely to gain much ground from 
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the PSAud unit due to the gating function from the PE unit. The overall effect on 
V2A trials appears to be relatively moderate. PSAud activations on both A2A and 
V2A trials were likely to stay around the initial activation values without ever 
reaching the maximum. 
 Although the confidence interval of mean MSE to auditory targets on 
repetition trials crossed zero, the absolute mean values in Middle and Young 
networks still appear comparably larger than the behavioural result. However, 
this is likely to be caused by the suboptimal parameter tuning in those networks.  
Nonetheless, Model 4B failed to capture the MSE effect to visual targets 
on repetition trials. To create such an effect requires a mechanism that 
facilitates the differentiations between PSVis activations on V2V and A2V trials. 
Since PSVis was initiated at the maximal value at the beginning of the trial, it 
would be necessary to update the activation downward on modality-shift trials, 
and this could only happen if the cross-modal auditory MA unit was high at the 
beginning of the trial (thus inhibiting the PSVis unit). Unfortunately, the auditory 
MA unit was unlikely to gain much activation due to the small inhibition from the 
PE unit in the mixed condition. 
Finally, the dynamic interactions among all the processing layers in the 
mixed networks in Model 4B make it challenging to predict how the model would 
behave with a specific parameter change or a combination of parameter 
changes. There was also the possibility that the mechanism that increase MSE 
effect to visual targets on repetition trials was different from the mechanism that 
eliminates the MSE effect to auditory targets on repetition trials. 
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8.4 General Discussion 
 Model 4 investigated possible mechanisms that could account for 
the  asymmetry of MSE costs observed on pure and repetition trials, with either 
a task-focused architecture, or a task-and-modality parallel processing 
architecture. Both task-focused (Model 4A) and task-and-modality networks 
(Model 4B) were able to create asymmetry MSE at the population level. 
However, only Model 4B was also able to capture the statistical equivalence of 
the behavioural result in terms of whether the MSE was reliably different from 
zero cost or not. The model suggests that phonological engagement activities 
(such as verbal self-reminders) interacted with cross-modal selective attention, 
and that it is the interaction of these processes that causes the MSE to auditory 
targets on repetition trials. However, none of the models could explain the 
reversal of asymmetry from nonparadoxical on pure trials, to paradoxical on 
repetition trials.  
The increase in the MSE to visual targets in the mixed blocks (vs. pure 
blocks), may be due to processes independent to the modality attribute 
representations. Model 4B incorporated multiple modality-specific factors such 
as the asymmetry in stimulus-response compatibility (i.e. asymmetry in PS-RO 
pathways), differences in temporal integration of semantic information (i.e. 
different initial PS activations), cross-modal selective attention (MA-PS 
inhibitory connections), and the additional inhibitory effect to MAAUD from the 
probabilistic verbal rehearsal. Yet our model was not able to capture the large 
MSE to visual targets in the mixed blocks. It is possible that other information 
processes not explored in our model are needed to account for the large MSE 
to visual targets. 
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Our model shows that asymmetry can happen for many different 
reasons. These different types of asymmetry can create complex inter-trial 
effects. At this point in time, our simulation results suggest that modality-based 
measures such as the size and the direction of MSE can change as functions of 
pathway asymmetry, initial activation of the perceptual representation, 
additional modality attribute representation and additional cognitive process. 
Thus MSE reflects composite effects of multiple information processes.  Our 
previous models (Chapter 5 to 7) focused on task-associated effects, and were 
successful at capturing developmental differences in RT and accuracy on each 
trial type. These differences are likely to be dependent on baseline response 
speeds arising from factors such as connection weights and Top signals. 
Although between-condition effects such as mixing costs and switch costs were 
not always good indicators of cognitive control, particularly when the accuracy 
on baseline trials (e.g. pure and repetition trials) differs between age groups, 
our models show that all things being equal (i.e. accuracy, as was the case in 
Models 1 and 2), even between-condition measures may exhibit reliable 
developmental differences in control mechanisms. 
Cross-modal effects, on the other hand, were likely to arise from the 
lower-levels of processing. Although verbal self-reminders may interact with 
modality-specific processes, these processes may not implicate higher level 
cognitive operations. Thus, switching between tasks and shifting between 
modalities are likely to engage different parallel information processes. Modality 
shift costs, therefore, do not appear to be good indices of the development of 
cognitive control per se. 
In the next chapter, I will provide an overall discussion of the results of 
the behavioural studies and how our computational models can account for the 
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observed behaviours. I will also talk about other mechanisms that might be at 
play, but that have not been investigated in our models. Additionally, I will 
highlight the limitation of our models. Finally, I will make a few predictions for 
future research.  
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Table 8.1 Parameter setting in Model 4A (Priming Model without MA units) 
Parameter Name Old 
 (Default) 
Middle Young 
Weights (Pure networks)    
PSVIS unit to RO unit  4.7 3.7 3.3 
PSAUD unit to RO unit 3.6 2.6 2.2 
Lateral connections from ROYES to RONO -2.0 - - 
Lateral connections from RONO to ROYES -1.0 - - 
Weights (Mixed networks)    
PSVIS unit to RO unit 3.9 3.5 3.1 
PSAUD unit to RO unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
TA unit to ROYES unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
TA unit to RONO unit 1.8 1.4 1.0 
PS unit to TA unit 3 - - 
Within-set lateral connection from ROYES to RONO -2.0 - - 
Within-set connection from RONO to ROYES -1.0 - - 
Between-set lateral connections between RODog and ROBird -2.0 - - 
Inputs (Pure networks without TA unit)    
Intrinsic signal to ROYES 5 - - 
Intrinsic signal to RONO 2.0 - - 
PSVIS initial activation* 0.7 - - 
PSAUD initial activation* 0.7 - - 
PS input* 3.5 - - 
Bias -2.0 - - 
Inputs (Mixed networks)    
Top signal on switch trial 8 6 4 
Top signal on repetition trial 8 6 4 
PSVIS initial activation* 0.7 - - 
PSAUD initial activation* 0.7 - - 
PS input* 3.5 - - 
Bias -2.0 - - 
Time constraints    
Task preparation window 150 - - 
Timeout 600 - - 
Other parameters    
Priming rate between PS and TA  2 - - 
Priming rate between TA and RO 2 - - 
Step size  0.0015 - - 
Noise  0.006 - - 
Response threshold 0.3 - - 
Min. and max. activation of TA and RO units -1.0 to 1.0 - - 
Min. and max. activation of PS unit* 0 to 1.0   
Squashing parameter for TA unit 0.7 - - 
Top-down/ Intrinsic signal update probability 0 to 100% - - 
* Indicates new parameter in the current chapter. 
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Table 8.2 Parameter setting in Model 4B (with MA units) 
Parameter Name Old 
(Default) 
Middle Young 
Weights (Pure networks)    
PSVIS unit to RO unit  3.0 2.6 2.2 
PSAUD unit to RO unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
PS units to MA units* 3 - - 
MA units to PS units* -15 -10 -7 
Lateral connections from ROYES to RONO -2.0 - - 
Lateral connections from RONO to ROYES -1.0 - - 
Lateral connections between MAVIS and MAAUD* -2.0 - - 
Weights (Mixed networks)    
PSVIS unit to RO unit 3.0 2.6 2.2 
PSAUD unit to RO unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
TA unit to ROYES unit 2.8 2.4 2.0 
TA unit to RONO unit 1.8 1.4 1.0 
PS units to MA units* 3 - - 
MA units to PS units* -15 -10 -7 
PS unit to TA unit 3 - - 
Within-set lateral connection from ROYES to RONO -2.0 - - 
Within-set connection from RONO to ROYES -1.0 - - 
Between-set lateral connections between RODog and 
ROBird 
-2.0 - - 
Lateral connections between MAVIS and MAAUD* -2.0 - - 
Inputs (Pure networks without TA unit)    
Intrinsic signal to ROYES 5 - - 
Intrinsic signal to RONO 2.0 - - 
PSVIS initial activation* 1.0 - - 
PSAUD initial activation* 0.8 - - 
PS input* 3.5 - - 
Bias -2.0 - - 
Inputs (Mixed networks)    
Top signal on switch trial 8 6 4 
Top signal on repetition trial 8 6 4 
PSVIS initial activation* 1.0 - - 
PSAUD initial activation* 0.8 - - 
PS input* 1.5 - - 
Bias -2.0 - - 
Input from PE unit to MAAUD unit* -1.0 - - 
Time constraints    
Task preparation window 150 - - 
Perceptual preparation window 30 - - 
Timeout 600 - - 
Other parameters    
Priming rate between PS and TA  0 - - 
Priming rate between TA and RO 0 - - 
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Table 8.2 Parameter setting in Model 4B (with MA units) 
Parameter Name (cont.) Old 
(Default) 
Middle Young 
Other parameters    
Step size  0.0015 - - 
Noise  0.006 - - 
Response threshold 0.3 - - 
Min. and max. activation of TA and RO units -1.0 to 1.0 - - 
Min. and max. activation of PS unit* 0 to 1.0   
Squashing parameter for TA unit 0.7 - - 
Squashing parameter for MA unit* 0.5 - - 
Top-down/ Intrinsic signal update probability 0 to 100% - - 
* Indicates new parameter in the current chapter. 
‘-’ indicates the same setting as in adult networks 
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Chapter 9. Discussion and future direction 
In this chapter, I will first outline the main empirical results from the 
behavioural experiments, specifically with respect to task-associated findings 
and modality-associated findings. This will be followed by a description of the 
findings from the computational models, which include— (1) the main 
mechanisms that determine performances, (2) sources of individual differences 
within each age group, and (3) task structures defined by external instructions 
and by internal representations (i.e. with or without a goal). I will also outline 
other potential mechanisms not incorporated in the models, and discuss the 
limitation of our models. Finally, the chapter will end with some 
recommendations for future behavioural research. 
9.1 Task-associated empirical findings 
 A series of task-switching studies using stimuli with different 
modalities and task attributes, requiring either within- and cross-modal 
attentional shifts, and different with switch predictabilities, showed that children 
as young as four years old have the requisite ability to switch between 
competing tasks. Most young children performed well above chance level 
across these experiments. 
The task procedures in the unimodal TS (Chapter 2) and bimodal CMTS 
(Chapter 3) experiments were similar, involving both a pure-task condition and a 
mixed-task condition in which the task switched at a fixed interval. Our final 
unimodal CMTS experiment (Chapter 4) was designed to be the most 
challenging. This task involved relatively abstract task attributes, random task 
switches, and no preparation window. The participants of each age group 
exhibited comparable overall accuracies across the three experiments. With 
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regards to between-condition effects, we found reliable mixing effects (in both 
RT and accuracy measures) and switch effects (in RT only) across all ages in 
the unimodal TS experiment. In the bimodal CMTS experiment we found 
reliable switch effects (in both RT and accuracy) but no mixing effects (in 
neither RT nor accuracy) across all ages. Finally, in the unimodal CMTS 
experiment (involving only the mixed task condition) we found reliable switch 
effects (in both RT and accuracy) across all ages in. Taken together, repetition 
trials and switch trials appear overall to be more challenging than their 
respective baseline trials (i.e. pure trials and repetition trials respectively). 
However, having the requisite ability to do something, and having the 
skill to excel are two different things. While young children exhibited the ability 
to attend to multiple tasks, and to respond to environmental changes, most 4-
year-olds were far from ceiling accuracy on baseline trials (e.g. pure and 
repetition trials). In comparison, 6-year-olds were only slightly less accurate 
than adults. Taken together, our behavioural results suggest that for whatever 
reason, younger children, particularly 4-year-olds, were much more likely to lose 
control than adults. 
Despite these age differences in overall performance, surprisingly, when 
using conventional between-condition measures such as mixing and switch 
effects, there were few developmental differences in either measure across all 
the experiments. If between-condition costs index additional task demands on 
the more difficult trials (e.g. Altmann & Gray, 2008; Meiran & Kessler, 2008; 
Reimers & Maylor, 2005; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), we would have expected 
younger children to have greater difficulty in responding to these additional 
demands. These suppositions were not supported in our experiments.  
 281 
Our studies are not the first to report a lack of age effect in between-
condition costs. Many other developmental studies also found limited age 
effects with these conventional between-condition measures (e.g. Davidson, 
Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006; Dibbets & Jolles, 2006; Ellefson, Shapiro, 
& Chater, 2006; Reimers & Maylor, 2005). Since each trial type in task-
switching studies implicates multiple cognitive operations, it may be hard (with 
behavioural studies alone) to ascertain the reason for this lack of age interaction 
with between-condition effects while accounting for the apparent lower overall 
accuracy in children. To this end, our computational models became 
instrumental in understanding how between-condition effects can be masked by 
other factors that determine the overall accuracy in young children. 
9.2 Modality-associated empirical findings 
Modality associated effects were explored with respect to concurrent 
cross-modal interactions, namely modality dominance, and inter-trial effects, 
namely modality shift effects (MSE). The current thesis also explored whether 
the defining feature of a task set incorporated modality-associated attributes.  
Modality dominance was explored in the bimodal CMTS study. Past 
studies have generally reported visual dominance in adults (for a review, see 
Spence, Parise, & Chen, 2012) and auditory dominance in young children 
(Nava & Pavani, 2013; Robinson & Sloutsky, 2004; Sloutsky & Napolitano, 
2003). Our experiment found that modality dominance could be measured with 
RT, rather than just error types; and in tasks with meaningful and familiar stimuli 
(e.g. animal categories), instead of the usual novel and asemantic stimuli 
(although see Wille & Ebersbach, 2016, for experiment with semantic stimuli).  
In our experiment, the modality dominance effect was measured by how much 
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RT was slowed when the target was presented with a cross-modal distractor, as 
compared to when the target was presented alone (i.e. unimodal stimulus) in a 
pure task context. Our results support the idea of a transition from auditory 
dominance to visual dominance during the course of development, as 4-year-
olds experienced greater RT slowing with auditory distractors, and adults 
experienced greater RT slowing with visual distractors. Both visual and auditory 
distractors appeared to be equally distracting to 6-year-olds.  
Although modality dominance was at play when bimodal stimuli were 
used, this was only part of the story in an overall task set. All ages were likely to 
be quicker (in both unimodal and bimodal CMTS) and more accurate (in 
unimodal CMTS) in responding to visual targets than to auditory targets. This 
may be due to multiple advantages in visual processing in our experiments. 
These advantages include the better stimulus-response compatibility between 
visual-manual than auditory-manual associations (Stephan & Koch, 2010; 
Stephan, Koch, Hendler, & Huestegge, 2013), and a smaller demand in 
temporal integration when encoding semantic visual information, as compared 
to semantic auditory information. Thus, ‘auditory dominance’ or ‘visual 
dominance’ does not necessarily translate to a quicker or a better performance 
to the dominant modality. The overall performance to a modality-specific target 
depends on multiple task- and stimulus-dependent factors unique to each 
experiment.  
Modality shift effects were investigated in order to examine more closely 
the cost in shifting directed attention in both bimodal and unimodal CMTS. Our 
studies also found asymmetries in the MSE in the bimodal CMTS study. In 6-
year-olds and adults, the direction of asymmetry in the pure condition was 
nonparadoxical, since the MSE was greater to the slower/less accurate auditory 
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detection than to the faster/ more accurate visual detection. This was not 
surprising given the multiple advantages in visual processing in the 
experimental design, in addition to the visual dominance effect (if present, i.e. 
adults). Thus, responding to visual targets in the pure condition was inherently 
‘easier’ on multiple levels, regardless to the modality transition of the targets. In 
contrast for 4-year-olds, the direction of asymmetry in the pure condition was 
paradoxical—a greater MSE to the dominant auditory modality than to the 
nondominant visual modality. Although 4-year-olds were likely to have an 
auditory dominance through concurrent cross-modal interactions, they might still 
experience other task- and stimulus-dependent advantages of visual 
processing, such as the benefit of visual-manual compatibility and faster 
temporal integration of semantic visual inputs.  
Task-switching studies also often report asymmetric RT switch costs, 
which happen when the competing tasks differ in the level of difficulty (e.g. 
Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Ellefson et al., 2006; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). 
The similarities between asymmetric MSE and task-switch costs prompted the 
question of whether a similar top-down mechanism was also involved in shifting 
attention between modalities (e.g. Kreutzfeldt et al., 2015). This appears 
unlikely since, despite one task-switch cost being larger than the other, costs 
associated with switching to either easy or hard tasks were statistically 
significant in those studies (e.g. Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Ellefson et al., 
2006; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). In contrast, the MSE in our study was only 
found to auditory targets, but not to visual targets in the pure condition in the 
bimodal CMTS. Our results suggest that MSE may be due to mechanisms not 
associated with the control required to switch between tasks. The larger MSE to 
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auditory targets in the pure condition may simply reflect a certain advantage of 
visual processing in our experimental setting (at least in 6-year-olds and adults).  
However, our unexpected finding with 4-year-olds suggests that when 
modality dominance and task-modality compatibility (e.g. S-R compatibility) 
differ in their respective directions, one effect may overshadow the other. 
Similarly, Lukas, Philipp and Koch (2014) also reported a paradoxical MSE—a 
greater MSE cost to the faster/more accuracy modality than to the slower/less 
accurate modality; although in their experiment, instead of the usual visual 
dominance in adults, they found auditory dominance with temporal judgement 
tasks (i.e. judging the duration of the stimulus). They argued that modality 
dominance reflects modality-task appropriateness. According to Modality 
Appropriateness Theory (Lukas et al., 2014; Stephan & Koch, 2010), modality-
specific inputs can be more or less effectively processed, depending on how 
compatible the inputs are with the task dimensions. Thus, MSE might be a 
composite effect of multiple processes, including concurrent cross-modal 
interferences, modality-task compatibilities and a shift in directed attention. 
If the MSE is indeed a composite effect of multiple processes, it might be 
less surprising to observe a reversal of cost asymmetry when the task 
conditions changed. In the mixed blocks in bimodal CMTS as well as in 
unimodal CMTS (re-analysed data shown in Chapter 9), MSE was greater to 
the easier visual targets than to the harder auditory targets. Although not 
explicitly tested, this reversal of the MSE asymmetry may be caused by 
additional cognitive operations specific to the mixed blocks, compared to the 
pure blocks—namely verbal self-instruction. Past literature suggests that verbal 
self-instructions or inner speech are particularly useful tactic for task 
management (Cowan, Saults, & Morey, 2006; Emerson & Miyake, 2003; 
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Karbach & Kray, 2009; Kray et al., 2008), thus it is plausible that participants in 
our studies recruited this task tactic in the more difficult mixed condition. We 
suspect that this verbal forms of self-reminders may interact with MSE through 
changing how attention is directed in the experiment, causing a reversal of 
asymmetry from nonparadoxical to paradoxical. However, this reversal is less 
likely to happen in the ‘modality-based task-switching’ studies with task sets 
defined by modalities, instead of meaningful abstract tasks (e.g. Kreutzfeldt et 
al., 2015; Lukas, Philipp, & Koch, 2010; Sandhu & Dyson, 2012). In these 
modality-based ‘tasks’, the participants were cued to attend to the imperative 
modality only, but the abstract task goal remains unchanged (e.g. localisation). 
Therefore, arguably, there was no switch in task goal despite a shift in the 
attended modalities. This again highlights the lack of consistency and 
consensus in defining what a task is, and what the requisite cognitive 
operations are in these tasks. Nonetheless, our results show that MSE are likely 
to interact with multiple stimulus- and task-level operations, and should be 
differentiable from task-switch costs. 
9.3 Interactions between task and modality 
In contrast to the abovementioned modality-based tasks (e.g. Kreutzfeldt 
et al., 2015; Lukas, Philipp, & Koch, 2010; Sandhu & Dyson, 2012), not 
explicitly cuing modalities as part of an overall task set allowed us to ask how 
‘amodal’ the task sets were in our studies. Our unimodal CMTS was designed 
to address this question by looking into how different attentional shift costs 
added up when both modality and task changed. Hunt and Kingstone (2004) 
argued that if attentional control in shifting between modalities and switching 
between tasks depend on shared cognitive resources, RT should be longest 
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when both dimensions (task and modality) changed, and the costs should be 
additive; in contrast, if they rely on independent systems, the RT cost on 
modality-shift task-switch (MSTS) trials should reflect one or the other type of 
attentional shift cost. Adult cross-modal task-switching studies with supramodal 
task goals have generally reported mixed results: the additional demand in 
modality-shift, on top of a task-switch, incurred an RT cost that was less than 
expected (Hunt & Kingstone, 2004; Sandhu & Dyson, 2013). On another 
occasion modality-shift could facilitate task-switch (Murray et al., 2009). Thus, 
past studies have been inconclusive about whether modality-associated 
processes and task-associated processes are independent or interdependent. 
Adding to these mixed findings, our studies did not find a less-than 
expected RT cost or a facilitative effect when both task and modality changed. 
Both modality-shift and task-switch produced similar RT costs across all ages, 
and these costs appeared to be additive. Thus, our results suggest some form 
of inter-trial MSE effect on task-associated processes. However, this inter-trial 
MSE effect is unlikely to be bound to the imperative elements of the tasks, since 
modality transition did not interact with response repetition. It is well-known that 
response repetition is facilitative only when the task repeats, but not when the 
task changes (Cooper, 2009; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Meiran, 1996, 2000, 
2005; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), since the facilitative effect depends on task-
stimulus-response primes. No such constraint was observed with modality 
transition, as response repetition was equally facilitative regardless of whether 
the modality changed or not. This indicates that the modality-associated 
representation that underlies MSE is unlikely to be an important constituent of 
the task set. In sum, our behavioural result indicates a role of modality-
associated representations on the overall information processes, but the 
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modality-associated representations are not likely to be significant components 
in the overall representation of a largely amodal task set.  
Thus far, our behavioural results have helped inform the possible 
relations between different levels of representations within a task-set. Our 
computational models provide a platform for testing how different information 
processes give rise to behavioural variations observed in the task set. In the 
next sections, I will highlight the main findings in the computational models of 
the bimodal CMTS study. 
9.4 Main mechanisms that affect the task performance of the 
computational models 
Flexible behaviours should be investigated by understanding the 
processes that operate within each task-specific environment. In order to 
quantify the effects of the control mechanisms and of information interference, 
information processes within a task context need to be specified beyond the 
descriptive level. Our computational models consisted of accumulator systems 
in which evidence was collected from two main processing pathways—one 
going from task attribute to response outputs, and another going from stimulus 
to response outputs. There were also temporary priming connections that 
changed from trial to trial. The models provided a framework for understanding 
our empirical results in the bimodal CMTS study. The modelling results revealed 
that task performance was dependent on goal activation, and on the level of 
carry-over facilitation and interference. These two mechanisms are discussed 
further below. 
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9.4.1 Goal activation 
Our model results strongly support the idea that top-down control plays 
an important role in determining overall performance. Adults and 6-year-olds 
were more accurate overall than 4-year-olds because they had greater top-
down control required to activate a task goal prior to settling for a response. In 
adults, the relevant/ irrelevant task goals are likely to be strongly activated/ 
inhibited during the preparation window. As long as the task goal was 
sufficiently activated, adults were much better at withstanding other task-based 
interference factors such as primes and reactive task retrieval. In addition, as 
long as adults employed a sufficiently high level of top-down control throughout 
the experiment, then whether they modulated their top-down control according 
to each trial type had little impact on their performance. 
In 6-year-olds, the relevant/irrelevant task goals were likely to be 
moderately activated/inhibited during the preparation window. Six-year-olds 
were highly accurate on repetition trials, indicating a sufficient level of top-down 
control to maintain goal representation against decay. However, in the face of 
strong interference and/or reactive retrieval on switch trials, they were more 
likely to make errors on switch trials than adults. In other words, 6-year-olds 
were not as prepared for the upcoming task as adults, and their goal 
representations were more vulnerable to task-based interferences.  
In contrast to the control exhibited in 6-year-olds and adults, 4-year-olds 
were likely to show limited top-down control. In the Young networks in our 
models, the Top signal on repetition trials was only marginally above the bias 
(see, for example Model 3C, Chapter 7, in which Top=3, bias=-2.5), yet the 
accuracy on repetition trials remained relatively high (approx. 80%). Thus, it is 
likely that many of the correct answers on repetition trials were facilitated by 
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other reactive processes, such as reactive task activation and priming 
facilitations, and were not the result of a preparatory effect. However, these 
facilitations were relatively absent on switch trials (other than the occasional 
reactive task activation when the trial contained a target). Thus, to respond 
correctly on switch trials, additional top-down control was necessary. Our 
modelling results suggest that many 4-year-olds did appear to understand the 
benefit of a greater level of control on switch trial during the preparation window, 
although they might only be able to do this reactively in response to the 
additional task cue present on switch trials. Consequently, the poorer 
performance on the repetition trials in many 4-year-olds may be to do with their 
inability to sustain sufficient top-down control across trials, when additional 
encouragements such as change signals are lacking. 
In sum, strong top-down control is likely to result in a strong goal 
representation prior to settling for a response. A strong goal representation can 
minimise the detrimental effect of subsequent information interference. Although 
6-year-olds were able to represent task goals proactively across the duration of 
the experiment, due to the immature top-down control, their goal 
representations are still not strong enough to withstand the multiple 
interferences that occur on switch trial. In comparison, despite a lack of top-
down control, 4-year-olds were relatively accurate on repetition trials. Their 
accuracy on repetition trials may not be due to a strong goal representation, but 
may arise because of other reactive processes that facilitate responses on 
repetition trials after the stimulus onset. Despite this lack of overall control, 
when encouraged by an additional change signal on switch trial, 4-year-olds 
could reactively modulate their top-down control in response to the 
environmental changes. Thus, our model results support the role of 
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endogenous control in goal activation and maintenance during the preparation 
window, as well as highlighting the role of age in how children modulate their 
control either proactively or reactively. 
9.4.2 Carry-over effects 
Although goal activation during the preparation window is the most 
important factor predicting performance (irrespective of trial types), some 
features of the switch trials make them more demanding and thus more likely to 
result in worse performance than on repetition trials. In our models, carry-over 
effects arose from three main sources—(i) the residual activation/inhibition of 
the TA units from the n-1 trials, (ii) the PS2TA primes, and (iii) the PS2RO 
primes. On task repetition trials, these carry-over effects were almost always 
facilitative, since the activated components in the n-1 trial were still task-
relevant on the repetition trials. As a consequence, these resulted in a 
bootstrapping effect that reinforced the goal representations on successive 
repetition trials. On switch trials, however, these carry-over effects caused 
interference since the previously task-relevant components now become task-
irrelevant. In this case, the primes might activate the wrong task attribute or the 
wrong response set.  
Although residual activation/inhibition of the TA units and the different 
types of primes all caused some forms of interference on switch trials, these 
effects operated at different stages of processing. The residual 
activation/inhibition are at play at the early stage of processing, particularly 
during the preparation window. On switch trials, younger networks needed a 
longer preparation window to overcome the residual TA activations due to their 
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smaller top-down control. Thus, children are likely to experience a longer effect 
of carry-over TA interference on switch trials than adults. 
In contrast, priming effects came about after the stimulus onset. In our 
models, the primes were continuous fixed effects until a response was made. 
Thus, the priming effects were sensitive to the overall speed of response 
settling. Old networks (adults), were quicker at gathering evidence to generate a 
response, consequently limiting the impact of the interfering primes. Young 
networks (children), exhibited larger priming effects because of the relatively 
slow settling speed due to global network characteristics such as generally 
smaller connection weights. Unlike the time-limiting effect of residual TA 
activation, which theoretically can be overcome with a larger preparation 
window or with a larger Top signal, age differences in priming effect are likely to 
be resistant to experimental manipulations. In sum, our models suggest that 
children will experience greater and longer carry-over effects than adult. 
9.5 Capturing individual differences with computational 
models 
Although the core factors of goal maintenance and carry-over effects 
could largely account for the observed developmental differences in the overall 
performance, our model results also revealed why younger children displayed a 
greater range of performance variations than adults.  
Our model results showed that younger networks were particularly 
susceptible to certain factors not associated with task preparation or task-based 
interferences, such as individual differences in self-reminders. Once the 
preparation was over, without any additional Top signal (i.e. update probability 
at 0%), the activation of task attribute units started to decay (i.e. the activations 
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were squashed) with each cycle. As Young and Middle networks were 
inherently slower than Old networks, due to smaller connection weights, they 
were also more likely to go through more cycles of decay. The decay of task 
attribute unit was further compounded by not being fully prepared in the first 
place because of lower top-down control. Thus, any individual difference in the 
likelihood of using a remedial tactic  following the preparation window, such as 
using self-reminders, could have a great impact on young children’s 
performance, despite having similar top-down control between individuals. 
The probability of remedial self-reminders occurring affected both 
accuracy and RT on all trial types in the mixed condition in Young networks, but 
only accuracy on switch trials in Middle networks. In contrast, no effects of self-
reminders were found in Old networks. In other words, additional verbal self-
reminders can be particularly beneficial to 4-year-olds, and to a lesser extent 6-
year-olds. Although our behavioural experiments did not tap directly into verbal 
reminders or inner speech, we did observe the use of verbal tactic with many 4-
year-olds, and occasionally with some 6-year-olds. Thus, children who 
understood the utility of self-reminders might have achieved higher accuracy 
than those who did not. In sum, our model results suggested that 4-year-olds 
were likely to exhibit a greater range of individual difference in both RT and 
accuracy, than either 6-year-olds and adults, and that 6-year-olds were more 
likely to exhibit a greater range of individual difference on switch accuracy than 
adults.  
9.6 External task structure and internal task representation 
Simply defining a task externally does not necessarily mean that the 
participants will form an internal representation of the task set consistent with 
 293 
the external task instructions. In the pure condition, our model results showed 
that the task could be approached both with or without a goal representation. 
However, accuracy was likely to be lower without a goal representation, as 
there was a greater chance that other unspecified distractions would influence 
the response outputs. In the pure condition, because of a lack of task selection 
demand, some participants may approach the task simply using S-R rules. 
Indeed, according to our modelling results, younger children with slower S-R 
translation would make more errors as a result of distractors or noise (i.e. 
Intrinsic signals) than adults, whose stronger and faster information processes 
naturally shielded them from the effects of such noise.  
In contrast, the use of active goal representations was more likely in the 
mixed condition. This is because activating appropriate task goals was an 
inherent requirement in this condition. . Thus, rather than an inability to form 
appropriate task structures, as Zelazo suggested (Zelazo, 2006; Zelazo, Frye, & 
Rapus, 1996; Zelazo et al., 2003), young children might simply be less likely to 
actively form appropriate task structures spontaneously and will only do so if the 
task encourages them to do so.  
Taken together, active goal setting is likely to be sensitive to the 
perceived need and benefits of setting goals. Thus, to ensure mixing costs 
reflect the intended differences associated with multiple task sets (e.g. 
differences in goal activations and/or interference between task sets), it is 
necessary to ensure that all participants actively form a supramodal task goal in 
the baseline pure condition. One possible procedure for ensuring this may be to 
incorporate catch trials in the pure condition. 
 294 
9.7 Understanding modality shift effects with computational 
models 
Our empirical results in bimodal CMTS show a greater MSE to auditory 
targets and a nonsignificant smaller MSE to visual targets in the pure condition. 
Two different models—a priming model that was based on asymmetric 
modality-response pathways, and an MA model that was based on cross-modal 
carry-over effects with additional modality attribute representations, provided 
plausible explanations of how the MSE asymmetry might be achieved in the 
pure condition. Our results showed that the MA model was better at capturing 
the observed data.  
In the priming model, the asymmetric MSE was due to pathway 
asymmetries. There was a stronger pathway from visual inputs to manual 
response, and a weaker pathway from the auditory inputs to manual responses. 
This was intended to reflect a better visual modality-response compatibility. The 
strength of stimulus-response primes depended on the level of activation of the 
percept-stimulus unit. Specifically, it was assumed that a longer exposure to the 
stimulus (due to slower response time) would result in a stronger prime. This did 
indeed result in an asymmetric MSE, as there was stronger priming facilitation 
from the slower responses to auditory stimulus, and a weaker priming 
facilitation from the faster responses to the visual stimulus. Thus, neither 
priming model involved any additional modality-specific representations other 
than the asymmetric modality-response compatibilities inherent in the 
experimental design.  
While the asymmetric modality-response pathways could produce 
asymmetric MSEs through stimulus-response primes, this priming account was 
not compatible with several empirical observations. Firstly, MSE was only 
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significant in the presence of auditory targets, but not visual targets, whereas 
the priming effect was significant in the presence of targets in either modality in 
the model. Secondly, the priming account was also incompatible with the 
observation in the unimodal CMTS experiment. In that experiment, we found 
that modality transition did not interact with response transition. Thus a 
modality-associated representation is unlikely to be an imperative element of 
the task-set. The same dissociation between task and modality may also be 
true in bimodal CMTS. In sum, our empirical results in both the bimodal CMTS 
and unimodal CMTS, strongly suggested that MSE is more than just a stimulus-
response priming effect. 
Our MA model offered a more parsimonious account of MSE asymmetry 
as arising through carry-over effects from additional modality-associated 
representations. The MA units implemented an n-1 memory mechanism that 
allowed inter-trial interactions. Our results with the pure networks suggested 
that asymmetric MSE might be driven by the difference in repetition facilitation 
that occurs between the stronger and weaker modalities. The facilitative effect 
from modality repetition is likely to be more evident when the initial strength of 
the input is weak, as compared to when the input is already strong. 
In our models, auditory processing was weaker than visual processing on 
two levels—a weaker auditory-response pathway that corresponds to the 
weaker auditory-manual compatibility, and a weaker activation of auditory 
stimulus. With regards to stimulus activation, we do not know whether the 
weaker activation of the auditory stimulus corresponds to visual dominance 
(since all trials contained bimodal stimuli) through cross-modal distraction, or, to 
the additional need for temporal integration of auditory inputs. However, for 
whichever reason, auditory stimuli were likely to be weakly activated compared 
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to the visual stimuli, leaving scope for repetition facilitation. In sum, our MA 
model was better at capturing the observed behavioural data, particularly in 
regards to the significant MSE to auditory target, and non-significant MSE to 
visual targets in the pure condition.  
We also observed that the MSE could change with an additional 
inhibitory modulator from the phonological engagement unit (PE), which 
represented inner speech or verbal task rehearsal. In the mixed networks, we 
observed that MSE to auditory targets could be reduced to a non-significant 
level if this additional PE unit, interacted with the modality-associated units. 
Specifically, this PE unit mildly inhibited the auditory MA unit and indirectly 
reduced the facilitation of modality repetition to auditory targets. Our MA model 
in the mixed networks failed to increase MSE to visual targets. It is therefore 
possible that there are other mechanisms that interacted with visual processing 
in the mixed condition.  
Overall our results support the general observations that, although MSE 
is often observable, the direction of asymmetry and the overall size of MSE 
(significantly greater than zero or not) are changeable under different task 
contexts. This changeability of MSE makes it differentiable from task-switch 
costs and stimulus-response priming effects, which were relatively constant 
across different task contexts. 
9.8 Other mechanisms not incorporated in the models 
Although our models incorporated multiple levels of representation and 
information processes, many other mechanisms were not investigated. In this 
section, I will outline some further mechanisms (not implemented in the models) 
that may also be at play in our behavioural studies. 
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9.8.1 Representational conflicts and inhibitory mechanisms 
Behavioural research generally does not differentiate between 
interference and conflicts explicitly; the two terms are often used 
interchangeably. As the task-switching paradigm involves overlapping task sets, 
information interference is a natural result of the experimental design. However, 
these interferences do not necessarily result in representational conflicts. A 
conflict refers to a situation where more than one representation at the same 
processing level is positively activated. Thus, although interference often results 
in some perturbations that may in turn result in RT changes, there is no conflict 
as long as the competing representations remain inhibited. Although not 
explicitly stated in our modelling results sections, errors were almost always due 
to conflicts, whereas RT costs were due to interference with or without conflict. 
Since conflicts are particularly detrimental to accuracy, an effective 
system is likely to have a mechanism to monitor the level of activation/inhibition 
status of the competing task goals and responses. Younger children may be 
less sensitive to the status of activation/ inhibition between the competing task 
goals than adults. This conflict monitoring system may explain the higher order 
effect such as n-2 repetition cost observed in task-switching studies (Mayr, 
2001; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Schuch & Koch, 2003). The n-2 repetition cost refers 
to the RT cost when switching back to a task that was previously switched away 
from (e.g. ABA), compared to switching to a new task that was not recently 
encountered (e.g. CBA). Building upon Gilbert and Shallice’s task-switching 
model, Sexton and Cooper (2017) developed a model that incorporates a layer 
of processing units that record task conflicts. When the two task attributes are 
positively activated, the system creates a memory trace of this co-activation 
conflict and modulates the activation of the task attribute units in the following 
 298 
trial through inhibitory mechanism. However, this inhibitory mechanism was not 
involve in active selection as all previously co-activated units received inhibitory 
inputs from the conflict monitoring units. That is, the inhibitory inputs from the 
conflict monitoring are indiscriminate to what the current task is. For example, in 
both ABA and ABB sequences, if A and B task attributes were previously co-
activated, regardless of whether the final trial in the triplet was A or B, either 
task attribute would receive inhibitory inputs from the conflict monitoring unit. 
Thus, the inhibition is non-selective to only the interfering task attribute (e.g. 
either only B or only A), and therefore may be dissimilar to endogenous control 
mechanism like top-down control. The role of these inhibitory inputs is not to 
‘deactivate’ the task attributes to such an extent that they become inhibited (i.e. 
below zero), since it would be nonsensical as both task-relevant and irrelevant 
representations are involved. Instead, these inhibitory inputs had a universal 
‘slowing effect’ on response settling.  
It is not clear if the conflict monitoring system constitutes part of the 
inhibitory control mechanism. Inhibitory control is generally measured with the 
ability to suppress motor outputs; but in the context of task-switching, it is often 
also used to explain various RT slowing such as negative priming, switch cost, 
and n-2 repetition cost. Research on inhibition phenomena often cannot agree 
on whether a dedicated inhibitory control module is needed, as other selection 
processes associated with task demands are often sufficient to account for 
various RT slowing and stopping failures (Hampshire, 2015; Pritchard & 
Neumann, 2009; Sharp et al., 2010; Tipper, Jordan, & Weaver, 1999; Tipper, 
2001). Since our models did not include an inhibitory mechanism other than the 
non-selective ‘dumb’ lateral inhibitory connections which facilitate overall 
response settling, our models also questions the need for selective ‘smart’ 
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inhibitory control in cognitive tasks. Instead, it suggests that different inhibition 
phenomena, at least in the context of task-switching, simply reflect 
heterogeneous selection processes aided by additional non-selective 
modulators such as lateral inhibition and the conflict monitoring system. 
9.8.2 Speed-accuracy mechanisms 
In our models, the response threshold was critical to whether the network 
had sufficient opportunity to gather information from the associated information 
pathways. If the response threshold was set too low, the network would be 
more likely to make errors since one of the competing response output units 
may reach the threshold before the network had a chance to rectify the course 
of response settling. A higher response threshold generally is accompanied with 
an increase in accuracy. A legitimate question, therefore, is whether children 
were overall less accurate due to a lower response threshold, suggesting that 
the errors they made were due to speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) commonly 
observed in speeded tasks. 
The decision-making in our models follows a principle of ‘integrating’ 
different information from the associated pathways, and ‘firing’ when the 
activation of a response output exceeds the threshold. In an accumulator-based 
model, a response is more likely to be accurate if there is a ‘safe distance’ 
between the baseline activity and the response threshold. If this distance 
between baseline activity and threshold is less than ideal, responses are likely 
to be quicker but more error-prone as there may not be enough time to sample 
correct information (Fig. 9.1). This shortened distance may be caused by raised 
overall baseline activity in the network or a lowered response threshold, causing 
the SAT phenomenon. Although the underlying neurophysiology corresponding 
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to either baseline activity or response threshold may be different, the effects 
were the same mathematically speaking (Bogacz et al., 2010). 
 
 
Figure 9.1. Schematic illustration of how speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) occurs 
in an accumulator, with processing time shown on x-axis and unit activation shown on y-
axis. (a) A safe distance between baseline activity and response threshold enhances 
accuracy but results in longer RT; (b) a risky elevated baseline activity or a (c) risky 
lowered response threshold shortens RT but increases the likelihood of SAT-based errors. 
Figure is borrowed from Bogacz et al. (2010). 
 
Thus, it is possible that young children made more errors in our 
experiments not (just) because of the weak goal representations and 
information interference, but of a lower-than-ideal response threshold, resulting 
in a tendency to respond before an optimal level of information was collected.  
In Model 1 (Chapter 5), where there was little information interference 
and no decay function, younger networks were overall more accurate than older 
networks. This reflects an advantage of having a smaller baseline activity 
relative to the response threshold due to weaker connections. This advantage 
of being ‘slow’ disappeared in Model 3 (Chapter 7), when the task attribute units 
were allowed to decay and when there were additional interferences in the 
networks (e.g. primes and reactive task retrieval). However, the accuracy of 
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younger networks was again improved in Model 4 (models for MSE effects, 
Chapter 9) when the response threshold was raised for strategic purposes, 
effectively widening the distance between baseline activity and response 
threshold.  
It follows that our models cannot rule out the possibility that children 
made more errors because of the SAT.  If this is the case, it would support the 
idea that children make errors due to failures to prevent prepotent responses 
(e.g. Davidson et al., 2006; Kirkham & Diamond, 2003; Wright & Diamond, 
2014), rather than the failure to maintain task goals. Although in this case a 
response is prepotent not because of a lack of inhibitory control, but because of 
a low response threshold. Despite this possibility, information interference and 
weak goal representation remain central to our account of why young children 
perform worse than adults because these task-associated factors are the 
reasons for why a younger network would require a much larger response 
threshold in the first place. 
In sum, how young children and adults maintain the balance between 
speed and accuracy by either changing the response threshold and/or baseline 
activation, is clearly critical to the understanding of developmental differences in 
flexible behaviours. Future studies are needed to determine the speed-
response mechanism in young children, and what the underlying neural basis 
are in both children and adults. 
9.8.3 Task strategies 
Our models pointed to some speculations about the use of different task 
strategies in different age groups, such as a proactive strategy in which the 
participants employed the same level of high top-down control across all trial 
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types, in order to optimise speed and accuracy, or, a reactive strategy in which 
the participants only employed a greater level of top-down control when 
detecting a need to do so. However, our models did not specify any mechanism 
that would account for how different networks would modulate top-down control. 
One such mechanism may be the conflict monitoring system that was 
mentioned earlier. However other harder to specify mechanisms, such as 
idiosyncratic characteristics of each participant (e.g. some people may try 
harder than the others), may also exist.  
There are also theoretical issues with how task-strategy can be defined. 
For example, in our model, we defined a task-strategy as ‘proactive’ when the 
same top-down control was used throughout the experiment, regardless of 
whether the participant made a greater number of errors on switch trials, such 
as in the case of 6-year-olds in the bimodal CMTS. However, other researchers 
might see 6-year-olds as ‘not proactive enough’ or being ‘reactive’ on switch 
trials. This begs the question whether “proactivity” and “reactivity” should refer 
to the subjective effort within a specific developmental level of competence, and 
would perhaps be more closely associated to neurophysiological responses, or, 
whether it should rest on a more objective definition in which suboptimal 
performance (relative to some absolute level of competence) would be labelled 
as ‘reactive’ and ‘not proactive’.  
9.8.4 Learning mechanisms 
Other than the temporary connections that allow priming effects, all of 
our networks have manually fixed connections. The differences in connection 
weights may correspond to both experience-dependent learning and 
experience-independent changes such as pruning and myelination. These 
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weights embody global characteristics of a specific age group. Indeed, weight 
changes in a connectionist model have traditionally been used to simulate 
learning and/or development, with stronger weights representing a more mature 
or experienced network (Elman et al., 1996; Leech, Mareschal, & Cooper, 2007; 
Munakata & McClelland, 2003; Sirois & Shultz, 1998). For example, 
connectionist models that aimed to explore developmental differences often 
involve a ‘training’ stage in which the network ‘learns’ by modifying weights 
between different levels of processing units, and a ‘testing’ phase to see how 
the network perform after learning (see Mareschal, 2010; Mareschal & Thomas, 
2007, for a review). The network’s performance could therefore be traced back 
to the differences in how connection weight changed across simulated 
development. Thus, despite the fact that the weights in our current models were 
hand-set, the underlying assumption that the fundamental between-group 
differences are underpinned by the global differences the connection weights, is 
the same as in other learning-based connectionist models.  
Because our experiments were concerned with the existing ability to shift 
attention, either between tasks or between modalities, learning was not 
considered to be an important dimension during the experiments. However, it 
remains possible that learning could take place within the experiment, 
especially for young children who might need a greater number of exemplars to 
establish the associations between different task elements. Future modelling 
works should therefore incorporate some form of learning other than temporary 
priming effects within networks of different ages. 
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9.9 Model limitations 
The greatest limitations of the models are two-folds—the connection 
weights of different age groups were manually fixed, and the top-down control 
was simplified into a single input. On the first issue of the connection weights, 
network ages were constructed in a slightly arbitrary manner. Furthermore, all 
networks were constructed with a strict criterion that they should be able to 
achieve 100% accuracy at zero noise and zero decay.  
This is because the models were extremely sensitive to the precise 
balance among all information pathways. If one pathway was much stronger 
than the other, the network would always make the same deterministically 
defined errors. The reason for adopting the 100% accuracy criterion was based 
on the assumption that young children made errors not just because of their 
inability to construct tasks appropriately, but also because of other modulatory 
factors such as top-down control and interferences. This remains a fundamental 
assumption of the models that is yet to be tested empirically. 
We know that adults were likely to construct the task sets appropriately 
since they achieved near-ceiling accuracy. We can also be relatively confident 
that 6-year-olds were also likely to do since their accuracy on repetition trials 
was high. However, we could not say for certain that 4-year-olds did construct 
the task set appropriately and did not make deterministic errors in the 
experiments. Therefore, alternative explanations such as deterministic errors 
(i.e. errors caused by constructing the task set inappropriately, such that the 
child might always respond to a specific stimulus in the same way regardless of 
the task goal) could potentially account for the behavioural results in (some) 4-
year-olds. 
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The second issue (regarding Top signals) is more critical because this 
parameter is central to our account of the observed developmental differences 
in behaviour. Although it is plausible that children had weaker top-down control, 
how this weaker top-down control is translated into a smaller Top signal within 
our models remains unclear. There may be a whole host of mechanisms that 
modulate inputs from the higher level of processing into task attribute units. For 
example, the greater Top input could equate with greater connection weights 
from the higher processing level to the task attribute level in adults than in 
children. Thus, Top ‘inputs’ are equivalent to connection weights feeding in 
activation from additional processing layer. However, what these processing 
layers are, and what mechanisms may modulate top-down control are not 
specified in the  current models. Thus, our models can be improved by 
specifying more precisely  how the connection weights are derived and what 
other higher order processing layers exist.  
Another limitation is that, although our models provide an account of 
what mechanisms may underlie the changes in performance on each trial type, 
they might not fit behavioural measures perfectly. For example, task strategies 
by trial type (i.e. modulation of Top signal) in our models were based on the 
assumptions that the participant of a specific age was more or less likely to 
adopt a specific task strategy (e.g. reactive task strategy in adults). However, it 
is entirely possible that there was a wide range of individual differences within 
each age group. These individual differences will have a direct effect on the size 
of the switch costs observed. To perfectly capture the behavioural results at 
both between-subject and within-subject levels, requires a clear specification of 
how each participant at each age group approached the task—an undertaking 
not possible with the sample size and the experimental design in our studies. 
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Instead of striving for a perfect fit to the behavioural data perfectly on all 
levels, our models focused on mechanistic (process level) explanations of 
behaviour rather than closeness of fit to the observed behavioural data. The 
consequence of focusing on mechanistic level of explanation is that making 
precise prediction can be challenging, given that a small parameter change 
often result in complex behavioural changes. Adding additional processing 
layers and mechanisms to the models is likely to further increase the difficulty of  
fitting model results to behavioural studies with multiple measures. 
9.10 Future directions 
 In this thesis, I have presented how the task-switching paradigm 
can be used to explore cognitive flexibility in young children. Despite some 
evidence that 4-year-olds could reconfigure task goals according to 
environmental changes, our model results also suggest that 4-year-olds were 
overall poor at maintaining task goals (Freier et al., 2017). Our results are in 
agreement with the Crone et al.'s (2006) finding that the ability to switch task 
goals emerges earlier than the ability to maintain a task goal. In their 
experiment, the participants (8 to 9 years old, 11 to 12 years old, 14 to 15 years 
old, and young adults) were asked to sort some stimuli based on feedbacks. 
This experimental paradigm was similar to the Wisconson Card Sorting Task 
but with child-friendly materials. They found that adult-level of distractor error 
was reached much later than adult-level of perseverative error, indicating that 
children were overall poorer in maintaining task goal consistently.  
Thus, cognitive flexibility should not only refer to the ability to initiate a 
representational and behavioural change, but also the skill in consistent 
performance. Our studies and models indicate that complex effects such as 
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mixing costs and switch costs were not appropriate indices of cognitive flexibility 
in young children, as low accuracy on baseline trials and individual differences 
in remedial tactics (e.g. self-reminders) may obscure these between-condition 
effects. In adults, although a very large top-down control theoretically can 
eliminate RT switch cost in our models, the performance gains on RT are 
relatively small. In fact, a person might be considered more ‘savvy’ if the task 
goal is neither too weakly nor too strongly activated—if the goal activation is too 
weak, interferences would be relatively impactful during response settling; 
conversely, if the goal activation is too strong, there would be a longer process 
in deactivating the task goal on switch trials. A ‘savvy’ participant is likely to 
conserve attentional resource to prevent fatigue, given that the experiment 
requires sustained attention. Since RT and accuracy on either pure, repetition 
or switch trials depends on multiple factors, from the internal representation of 
the task structure, developmental constraints on top-down control, and  task 
strategies, to remedial tactics of self-reminders, between-condition mixing and 
switch costs do not necessarily directly index developmental differences. 
Instead, understanding how mixing costs and switch costs arise is useful in 
uncovering what underlying information processes are involved on different trial 
types, but these two costs do not necessarily reveal whether a participant has 
more or less cognitive control.  
So how do we move forward from the results in the current thesis. 
Although conventional complex between-condition measures themselves may 
not be particularly useful for understanding behaviours in either children or 
adults, taking a holistic account of accuracy, RT, and carry-over effects such as 
different types of primes, are helpful for understanding why young children are 
particularly susceptible to involuntary effects such as priming 
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facilitation/interferences and other forms of reactive memory retrievals. For 
example, children might experience greater interference because of their slower 
response speed. Thus, it follows that if young children can be trained to be 
more efficient at translating a stimulus into responses, and translating task 
goals into selection of response sets, the effect of involuntary interference/ 
facilitation may be reduced. However, our models also suggest that, even if 
their overall RT improves with practice, if young children’s top-down control is 
indeed constrained by development, they are still likely to make many more 
errors than older children or adults.  
The Task switching paradigm can also be useful for understanding 
individual differences in children’s tendency to modulate top-down control (i.e. 
proactive vs. reactive strategies), and in other remedial tactics such as verbal 
self-reminders. We found greater individual differences in 4-year-olds, which 
matched our model results. If the use of verbal self-reminders was indeed a 
tactic particularly useful to young children, individual differences among children 
may narrow on tasks that cannot be represented in verbal form, or when the 
articulatory systems are suppressed. Future studies should aim to elucidate 
whether the individual differences observed in young children can be captured 
by differences in cognitive ability (such as working memory), differences in 
complementary tactics, and/or the efficiency in translating task elements into 
responses. 
With regards to modality-associated effects, our behavioural results and 
models show that concurrent or carry-over modality-associated effects are likely 
to come from lower-level processes. Future studies should investigate which 
mechanism underlies the weaker activation to auditory stimuli. For example, if 
the weaker activation was due to concurrent cross-modal interferences, such as 
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that caused by modality dominance, the asymmetric MSE in the pure condition 
should disappear with unimodal stimuli. The modality-associated 
representations appeared to be independent to task-associated 
representations, although modality shift effects could be influenced by cognitive 
processes that are also engaged in modality-associated pathways, such as 
verbal or inner speech. Modality-associated effects are often composite effects 
of complex interactions, as asymmetric processes exist on many different 
levels—from potentially developmentally-dependent modality dominances, task-
dependent modality advantages underpinned by modality-task/modality-
response compatibilities, different temporal integration of perceptual inputs, to 
other factors such as spatial attention. These different asymmetric processes 
potentially make understanding developmental differences in modality-
associated effects particularly challenging, given that the different processes 
might interact with one another. Thus, developmental differences in modality-
associated processes might first need to be explored in a relatively simple 
environment before moving on to more complex task condition, in order to tease 
apart different levels of information asymmetries. 
In sum, future studies should aim to answer questions such as why 
young children still perform less well than older children and adults, despite 
exhibiting a reasonable ability in the overall task?; What causes the larger 
individual differences in performance in younger children?; and What are the 
developmental differences in asymmetric modality-associated pathways, from 
concurrent cross-modal interferences to modality-task compatibilities?; and 
whether the developmental differences in asymmetric modality-associated 
pathways are due to the maturation of multisensory system, or to the effect of 
learning. 
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Appendix A. Glossary of terminology 
 
Terminology Definitions 
A2A A trial with two consecutive auditory targets. It is a 
modality-repetition trial 
A2V A trial with a visual target that was preceded by a 
trial with an auditory target. It is a modality-shift 
trial 
Auditory dominance  See modality dominance 
Backward inhibition See n-2 repetition cost 
Bi-selection Choosing between two inputs from target sets 
Bias A defined negative value in the model that 
determines how much net input is required to 
positively update a processing unit 
Bimodal CMTS: Cross-modal task-switching behavioural 
experiment with bimodal stimuli 
BV/BA Visual and auditory percept-stimulus units in the 
bird stimulus set 
BY/BN Yes and No RO units in the Bird response set 
Carry-over effect Any effect that arises from the previous trial(s) 
Cross-modal Between modalities 
Cycle A unit of time in the computational models. 
Activation states are updated at every cycle 
DCCS Dimensional Card Change Sorting task 
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Terminology Definitions 
DV/DA Visual (DV) and auditory (DA) percept-stimulus 
units in the Dog stimulus set 
DY/DN Yes and No RO units in the Dog response set 
IA model Interactive activation model 
Intrinsic signal A signal that is sent to the response output units 
(RO), without the mediation of a higher level 
representation such as a TA unit. It represents the 
effects of task-unrelated noise 
lrate The learning rate of associative connections 
between two processing units. This parameter is 
used to model priming connections 
MA Modality attribute unit: a unit that represents 
modality-associated representations that can 
result in cross-modal interactions 
MAAUD Auditory modality attribute unit 
MAVIS Visual modality attribute unit 
Mixing costs Differences between mixed task (network) and 
pure task (network) performance 
Modality dominance An attentional bias to inputs from the dominant 
modality when encountering multisensory 
information 
Modality-shifting Shifting between modalities 
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Terminology Definitions 
MR Modality-repetition trial: when the target modality 
in the n-1 trial is the same as the current target 
modality. See also TR/TS 
MS Modality-shift trial: when the target modality in the 
n-1 trial is different from the current target 
modality. See also TR/TS 
MSE Modality shift effect in reaction time, calculated as 
the difference between the reaction time in the 
modality shift trial and modality repetition trial 
Multi-tasking Managing multiple tasks in a given context 
n-2 repetition cost  A performance cost in returning to a task that had 
previously been switched away from 
Negative priming Reaction time cost in attending to information that 
was previously ignored 
Neutral set The stimulus input that is not associated to any 
task 
Non-paradoxical 
asymmetry 
When an attentional shift cost is larger when 
switching to the more difficult condition than to the 
easier condition 
Nonresponse An absence of button-press in our experiments. 
See also response 
Paradoxical asymmetry When an attentional shift cost is larger when 
switching to the easy condition than to the difficult 
condition 
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Terminology Definitions 
PE unit A unit indicating phonological engagement (PE) 
such as when engaged in self-reminders 
Perceptual preparation 
window 
A time window to allow PS units to be updated 
before response settling begins 
Population approach Understanding global behaviour by constructing a 
population sample with individual differences 
Preparation window A time window that allows the participants/network 
subjects to retrieve/activate the task goal (task 
attribute) before the stimulus onset 
Primed response A button-press on a trial that contains a prime. In 
our experiments, a prime is stimulus-led in pure 
and repetition trials, and response-led in switch 
trials (see also stimulus-led primed trial, response-
led primed trial and unprimed response) 
Priming compound  A priming compound is formed when multiple 
representations become associated due to an 
episodic event, which can result in priming effect 
on the following trial(s) 
Priming cost RT cost from the excitatory priming effect from the 
previous trial(s), most commonly observed in 
switch trials. 
Priming facilitation: RT facilitation from the excitatory priming effect, 
most commonly observed in pure and repetition 
trials. 
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Terminology Definitions 
Proactive control  Sustained cognitive control in anticipation of the 
need to respond 
Proactive strategy When the network (participant) employs a strong 
Top signal on both repetition and switch trials. The 
definition of a 'strong' signal is dependent on 
(network) age 
Processing speed  The time it takes in translating mental 
representations into measureable responses 
Production system Rule-based (i.e. symbolic) computational model 
PS input: An external input to the unit that represents a 
perceptual stimulus 
PS unit: A unit that represents a perceptual stimulus. 
PSAUD Auditory percept stimulus 
PSVIS Visual percept stimulus 
PS-RO Fixed feedforward connections from percept-
stimulus (PS) units to response-output (RO) units 
PS-TA Fixed feedforward connections from percept-
stimulus (PS) units to the corresponding task 
attribute (TA) units 
PS2RO Temporary priming connections from percept-
stimulus (PS) units to response-output (RO) units 
PS2TA Temporary priming connections from percept-
stimulus (PS) units to task attribute units (TA) 
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Terminology Definitions 
Reactive control Transient cognitive control in response to an 
environmental change 
Repeated-response A response (button-press) preceded by another 
response (button-press) 
Response A button-press in our experiments 
Response-led primed 
trial 
A trial preceded by an n-1 trial that also results in 
a button-press. 
RO unit: A unit that represents a response output 
RP Response prime: a form of priming that  is defined 
by the occurrence of a response repetition. 
RR Response repetition: a button-press preceded by 
a button-press. 
Single-response A response (button-press) preceded by a 
nonresponse (withholding button-press) 
Squash A fixed parameter that decreases the activation of 
a processing unit by a certain percentage 
Step The rate of activation update of a processing unit 
Stimulus-led primed 
trial 
A trial preceded by an n-1 trial that contains a 
stimulus from the same target set and of the same 
modality as the stimulus in the current trial 
Subadditive effect A processing cost that is less than the expected 
combined cost of modality-shift and task-switch 
when these two costs are simply added together. 
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Terminology Definitions 
Switch costs Performance differences between switch trials and 
repetition trials in the mixed task condition 
(network) 
TA unit: Task attribute unit. This is conceptually equivalent 
to a task goal representation 
Target set The stimulus input that is associated to one of the 
two tasks 
Task set  A task set comprises multiple components that are 
necessary for achieving a task goal 
Task set inertia Collective interferences formed from the previous 
trial or trials 
Task-switching Switching between tasks, which result in switch 
cost 
Task-relevant Relevant to the current task goal 
Top An endogenous input to the task goal 
representation in the model. It is conceptually 
equivalent to top-down control 
Top-down signal:  See Top 
Top-down update Updating goal representations such as the TA unit 
through top-down signal 
TR Task-repetition trials. Trials in which the task is the 
same as in the n-1 trial. For example a MRTR is a 
modality-repetition task-repetition trial (see also 
MS/MR) 
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Terminology Definitions 
TS Task-switching trials. Trials in which the task is 
different from the n-1 trial For example a MSTS is 
a modality-shift task-switch trial (see also MS/MR) 
Uni-selection Choosing between one input from the target set 
and one input from the neutral set 
Unimodal CMTS: Cross-modal task-switching behavioural 
experiment with unimodal stimuli 
Unimodal TS: Task-switching behavioural experiment with 
unimodal stimuli 
Unprimed response A correct button-press in trials in which the n-1 
trial does not prime the current event in any way 
Update frequency This refers to the probability of sending a top-
down input to the TA unit. This parameter defines 
inter-network differences (i.e. each network 
subject has its own update frequency) 
V2A A trial with an auditory target that was preceded 
by a visual target. It is a modality-shift trial 
V2V A trial with two consecutive visual targets. It is a 
modality-repetition trial 
Visual dominance  See modality dominance 
WM Working memory 
 
 
